Preamble

The House—after the Adjournment on 12th May for the Whitsun Recess—met at Ten o'clock.

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

IMPORTATION OF ANIMALS

10.5 a.m.

Mr. A. P. Costain: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to extend control over the importation of live animals.
When I first tabled this Motion, it was my intention to introduce a comprehensive Bill to cover the importation of all live animals from tropical and subtropical countries; but, on further consideration and after further research, I came to the conclusion that this was too comprehensive a Measure to introduce at this stage in the Parliamentary calendar. I therefore propose to ask the leave of the House to introduce a Bill to control the importation of tortoises and terrapins. I will, Mr. Speaker, with the leave of the House, move an Amendment in Committee so to amend the title. As there is some doubt about the definition of tortoises and terrapins, the Bill will contain a Clause defining these as the species chelonia.
I should like to inform the House that I have the unanimous support of a recent Parliamentary Committee of the Animal

Welfare Group. I have support from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and from the British Veterinary Association. I have the support of Dr. Boycott, a director of the Public Health Laboratory Service, Taunton Branch, the British Veterinary Zoological Society, the Universities Federation of Animal Welfare, and the Animal Health Trust. I also have all-party support in the House.
These authorities would welcome the restricted import of this species because of the danger of importing diseases transmit-table to man and to domestic animals. Parents buying tortoises do not realise the health risk which may be involved in their children handling these pets. I quote from a letter received from Dr. Boycott, a director of the Public Health Laboratory at Taunton, an independent authority, who, referring to tortoises, said this:
Few people know that these animals are a real source of human disease, if a rare one. It was this which first interested me in them. Eighty to 100 per cent. of the species imported here harbour in their bowels bacteria which can cause enteritis in man. The risk is a slight one, for obvious reasons, and limited, as far as I know, to children, who are the only ones likely to fondle a tortoise.
He is informed that
about six infections have been reported in this country and the same number in Holland and Germany. There have been a good many more in the United States of America, but the species kept there as pets are terrapins … which are bred in captivity and fed on offals.
It is not generally realised that about a quarter of a million tortoises are imported into this country each year for sale to the general public as pets. They come by


sea and by air, from Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. Many of these tortoises die in transit, despite improvements brought about in transport conditions as a result of agitation by the R.S.P.C.A. and the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare. Of those that survive the journey and are subsequently sold to the public, herpetologists estimate that only about 1 per cent, survive the first 12 months after purchase. Replacement of these casualties helps to boost the trade.
I should like to give the House brief details of a large consignment of tortoises which reached this country in 1966. In May of that year, a consignment of 6,000 tortoises arrived at London Docks from Casablanca, consigned to a pet stores in the Midlands. They were in 100 baskets, each containing 60. As no representative of the firm had called to collect them, the matter was reported to the R.S.P.C.A. The Society arranged for the tortoises to be collected from the docks and transferred to its air hostel for animals at London Airport, where they remained until 4th June. When ultimately contacted, the owner of the pet stores claimed that he had cancelled the order for this consignment, but he eventually agreed to accept delivery. One wonders how long they would have remained at the docks but for the prompt action of the R.S.P.C.A.
In a similar case in April of this year, the River Thames Police reported to the R.S.P.C.A. emergency night staff at headquarters that there were 104 baskets containing tortoises which were awaiting collection at Free Trade Wharf. Each basket contained 60 tortoises—a total of 6,240. It transpired that this was part of a consignment of 35,000 tortoises, some of which had been collected by lorry, but the rest were left on the quayside when work for the day finished, where they were found by the river police. The 6,240 were taken by the R.S.P.C.A. to its air hostel for animals at London Airport. Of the 3,000 examined before they were collected by the firm that had ordered them, 40 were dead and many were weak. It must be remembered that these tortoises had already been transported from their country of origin. Other cases could be cited, but I will not bore the House with them.
The Royal Society fully realises the difficulty of looking after tortoises, and it has issued a leaflet on the subject. The problem is that these animals are not really fitted to live in our climate. An early spring causes them to wake up from hibernation, and they subsequently die. There is no doubt that many parents buy tortoises and terrapins as pets for their children without any knowledge of how to keep them.
It will be seen that terrapins as well as tortoises are included within the provisions of the Bill. The following comments in The Field of 27th April this year, regarding the tortoise trade, make my case clearly:
Commenting a year ago on the scandalous casualties among oriental finches consigned in bulk air freights to the British pet trade, we called for its prohibition. The case of the tortoises found dying on arrival at London Docks demands that this call be repeated.
Very few among those who sell imported cage birds or tortoises are callous. But some of those operating at the wholesale level quite obviously do not know, do not care, or do not think what is happening to the creatures out of which they are making money. Their abuses should be stopped by law.
That is precisely what the Bill is designed to do. I can understand the child's viewpoint, but tortoises need professional care, and my Bill would allow them to be imported only for zoos, learned societies and those who have the facilities to look after them properly.
I appreciate that it is late in the Parliamentary calendar, but, in view of the interest which the Government have shown in giving time to private Members for the promotion of animal welfare, I very much hope that—I put this plea to the Leader of the House—that time will be given for the introduction and passage of this Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Costain, Mr. Burden, Dr. Summerskill, Sir Ronald Russell, Dr. Winstanley, and Miss Harvie Anderson.

IMPORTATION OF ANIMALS

Bill to extend control over the importation of live animals, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 16th June and to be printed.[Bill 262.]

Orders of the Day — ROAD TRANSPORT LIGHTING BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

10.12 a.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. Stephen Swingler): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Hon. Members will be aware that this Bill stems from support in the House for a proposal that permission should be given for the use of reflective number plates on motor vehicles as an additional road safety measure. Many hon. Members have from time to time raised this question, but I pay a personal tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hudders-field, West (Mr. Lomas), whose persistence and initiative on the matter, including the speech he made a short time ago proposing to introduce a Private Member's Bill on the subject, has spurred us on to the introduction of this Measure this morning.
The reflective materials which are used in the manufacture of these plates are of a comparatively recent design, and they were not in sufficient general use in this country for them to be taken into account when the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1957 was passed.
It now seems that there may be some doubt in law as to whether reflective materials which are neither lights, lamps, nor reflectors as such come within the scope of the 1957 Act. I am sure that the hon. Members will agree that it is essential that the status under the law of reflecting materials, which for all practical purposes might be said to show a light when another light is shone upon them, should be clarified; and this is done in Clause 1. Clause 1 may seem very simple—almost naive—to many hon. Members, but I am advised that it is a necessary step forward to clarify the law on the subject and to indicate what we are talking about when introducing the power of the Minister to make regulations regarding the use of reflective materials.
Those of us who have witnessed demonstrations of the effectiveness of reflecting material at night will agree, I am sure, that good use can be made of it, subject, however, to a degree of control. At

the same time we must exercise the greatest care in defining the types of reflective materials which we are trying to control. I would certainly not wish to create a situation wherein one of my hon. Friends might leave this Chamber one evening, climb into his motor car, and find himself summonsed because, over the weekend he, or his wife, had found time to clean it and polish it and thus restore to it a reflective surface. We are not concerned with that. Yet what could be more reflective than a highly-polished chromium-plated rear bumper or the cellulose finish on a newly polished motor car?
It is, obviously, not our wish to interfere in any way with such standard characteristics of modern vehicles but only to control those materials which are specifically designed to act as a form of reflector in the commonly accepted sense of the word.
The powers we are seeking would not prohibit altogether the use of these new materials but would enable us to permit their use where we consider that this would be beneficial to road safety or make the task of identification easier for the police.
As hon. Members no doubt know, the present terms of the 1957 Lighting Act are such that, once it was established beyond doubt that reflective materials must be treated as showing a light when another light is shone upon them, it would be illegal to use any reflective material on the back of a vehicle except a red one. It has been the policy of all Governments, and will remain so as far as we are concerned, that a red light or reflector on a vehicle denotes the back of that vehicle. Therefore, any permission to use reflective materials will not include the use of red on the front of a vehicle.
Where, however, it is proved to our satisfaction that the use of a colour other than red on the back would be beneficial for road safety without confusing other motorists on the road—trials which have been carried out at the Road Research Laboratory indicate that red is not always the colour most easily distinguished—we wish to have the powers to permit it.
In order to guard against possible confusion, it is necessary for us also to be able to control the quality and quantity of the material which is used. These


are the powers which we seek under Clause 2.
One of the major developments in this field relates to the use of reflective number plates. I shall not deal with them in much detail because I expect that my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West will wish to speak about them. I just say, that although doubts have been expressed to us as to their value in aiding road safety, we think that there is sufficient evidence that they do make a vehicle using them more conspicuous and, consequently, lessen the chances of its being involved in a rear-end collision. For this reason, we think that we should allow reflective number plates to be tried out.
Our belief is based on trials which have been carried out at the Road Research Laboratory and also on the experience of other countries where the use of reflective plates is permitted. There can be no doubt that their legibility is such as to make the enforcement task of the police much easier.
I can tell the House now that when my right hon. Friend has the necessary powers, if Parliament grants them under this Bill, it will be her intention to make the use of reflective number plates permissive. We do not at this stage intend to make their use compulsory, but we shall watch with interest their effect on our road accident figures. There is also the possibility that we shall require certain vehicles which we think constitute a special hazard on the roads to carry a distinctive marking, involving the use of reflective materials. Again, the trials which have been carried out indicate that the most conspicuous marking, both for day and night, requires the use of a combination of red reflective and fluorescent materials with those of other colours. But until we have the powers of the Bill, any marking which we could legally require could only be fourth or fifth best.
There is another aspect of rear lighting which has caused us some concern. When the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1927, replaced by the 1957 Act, was drafted, it was appreciated that certain signalling devices such as direction indicators were necessary on the backs of vehicles. For these to be really effec-

tive, it was necessary to distinguish them from the normal rear lighting of the vehicle and this could best be done by using a different colour from the red of the obligatory rear lamps and reflectors.
Provision was, therefore, made to permit the fitting of such devices, but experience has shown that the words in which this was done might be interpreted in such a way that it would be legally permissible to fit any device which is described as intended for use as a signal to overtaking traffic and which is illuminated by a lamp of any colour on the back of any vehicle. I do not think I need to stress the confusion which this might create on our roads. I think that the House will agree that it is essential that when a driver gives any signal it must be clearly understood by all other road users. Otherwise chaos will ensue and the best of intentions may result in serious accidents.
Some of the devices which may be developed by ingenious designers who are working on this subject may, in fact, prove to be very beneficial so we do not want to take any action which would be a bar to further progress; but we do want to have the powers to control such devices and to permit the use only of those which my right hon. Friend is advised will make a worth while countribution to road safety. In such cases the Department would be responsible for ensuring that the meaning of the signal was clearly understood by all road users and not just by a few who might adopt some device of their own.
The Bill which is now before the House will make a worth-while contribution towards road safety and help us to alleviate the individual suffering and loss to our national economy which stem from the appalling toll of casualties which are suffered on our roads every year.
I therefore ask for the support of the House for the Bill.

10.22 a.m.

Mr. Ray Mawby: I wish to associate myself with the Joint Parliamentary Secretary's congratulations to the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Lomas), because no one has done more in this House towards furthering the great development in reflector materials and drawing attention to the experience gained elsewhere, where the use of reflective


number plates has reduced considerably rear-end accidents.
This is an all-party matter. Hon. members on both sides are tremendously interested in the subject. That is why we joined together originally in putting a Motion on the Order Paper, which was followed by the presentation of a Ten Minute Rule Bill by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West. This Bill is designed to resolve doubt and to establish the status of this material, particularly where it is used as a safety device, for its status must be clarified.
The Parliamentary Secretary made the important point that, with the amount of chromium plating modern cars carry, it seems ludicrous that the law is such that chromium plate, which could act like a mirror and have dangerous effects, is permissible whereas material which is only capable of reflecting an image could be considered to be outside the law.
When the earlier Acts were introduced, there was not sufficient development or enough known about reflective materials to make them part of the law but the important thing is that one could now, I understand, use a reflective material on a number plate at the rear, provided it was red. But that would conflict with the normal test plate used by garages for moving vehicles from point to point and therefore could lead to more confusion if used on cars.
As the hon. Gentleman has said, the main thing is to prove whether these new devices are beneficial to road safety and that the Ministry should be able to control their quantity and quality. Experience elsewhere has shown a great reduction in the number of rear-end collisions by the use of these devices and that is of great importance.
Another point which impresses me is that with the use of reflective number plates, even on the front of a vehicle, one is capable of reading the number even with the headlights shining at one. This should surely be more helpful to the police. They will be able to read a number plate whether the car is approaching or departing.
I believe that this is a good Bill because it seeks to resolve doubt and makes certain that any motorist can adopt these number plates in future. As the hon. Gentleman has said, they will not be

compulsory. Obviously, one hopes that many people will use them and that we shall then be able to start compiling some figures of accident rates to see whether there is any change. In the light of those figures, no doubt we can decide in future whether stricter measures are or are not needed. I believe that it is right that there should not be compulsion at present.
The hon. Gentleman also commented on certain types of vehicles on which a reflective material might be helpful to road safety. This point has been raised by a number of hon. Members before in relation to very long vehicles turning. There is no requirement under the law to show a light on the side or even to have a reflective material for use when such a vehicle is turning. This has led to accidents. I hope that the Minister, in making orders under the Bill, will take into account the long articulated vehicle and require a reflective material at some point along the side of the vehicle. This would reduce the danger of accidents in situations where a car approaches a long vehicle which makes a turn.
I fully support the Bill because it clarifies a doubt. I believe that, once it is passed, many people will supply themselves with these plates and that, as a result, we shall find that the Bill is helping to reduce the appalling accident rate.

10.30 a.m.

Mr. Kenneth Lomas: I should, first, like to express my very sincere thanks to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary for his extremely kind words about the part which I played in helping to bring the Bill forward. In return, may I express my personal thanks both to him and to his Department for the help and guidance which I have received over the last few weeks. I couple with those thanks the name of the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) who, on an all-party basis, has joined in stimulating and creating interest about the concept of reflective number plates.
I am extremely glad to have the opportunity of speaking in support of the Bill, because it deals not only with reflective number plates but with the whole question of the lighting of vehicles in general. It is customary for a Member to declare his interest. I will declare mine: road safety, and the saving of lives and of suffering


by people who sustain accidents on the road.
Without seeking to dramatise an already dramatic situation, may I say that I think that everyone in the House should be appalled that during the time that the House has been in recess—from Friday, 12th May, until today, 31st May—400 people have been killed on our roads, 5,000 have been seriously injured and 15,000 have been slightly injured—20,000 people involved in accidents in the short space of two and a half weeks. Some of those who died would have been alive today and some of those who were injured would have been fit and well if motorists had obeyed the simple road safety slogan "See and be seen".
To me, it is ludicrous that as the law stands a vehicle can be on the road, day or night, without either headlamps or stoplights. I therefore warmly welcome the recently published Report of the Home Office and Metropolitan Police on the compulsory fitting of dim-dip headlights on all vehicles. I hope that the Minister will give urgent consideration to the recommendations made in that Report, for this is literally a matter of life and death. I hope the Bill will give the Minister power to do something about this matter.
As hon. Members know, my main interest in the Bill is the power which the Minister will be given under it to lay regulations to allow the use of reflective number plates on all road vehicles. Before I deal with that matter, I should like to say a few general words about the rest of the Bill.
It may come as a surprise to some hon. Members to know that Britain is second only to Italy in the number of road vehicles in the country per road mile. In Belgium, there are 34; in Canada 14; in France 17; in the German Federal Republic 49; in the Irish Republic 6; in New Zealand 15; in Spain 24; in Switzerland 44; in America only 24. In this country we have no fewer than 57 vehicles per road mile. Faced with that appalling density on our roads, it is obvious that any measure designed to assist motorists to see and be seen, especially at night, should be warmly welcomed.
I was glad to hear the Parliamentary Secretary say that a measure is being contemplated to standardise the lighting

of vehicles at the rear. It is time that this was done, and the Bill gives the Minister power to do it. The assortment of colours which sometimes appear on the backs of vehicles needs to be standardised. The gimmicks and gadgets which we sometimes see should be outlawed. In many instances, only the person driving the car knows what those gimmicks and gadgets mean; the person following has no clue. I have no objection to having a "tiger" in my tank, but I object to having one in the rear window of a motor car which flashes its eyes at me. This is a matter on which the Minister should take action.
I hope that under the Bill the Minister will have power to introduce, and will introduce regulations stipulating that every vehicle should be equipped with stop lights. It is ridiculous that stop lights are not obligatory at present. Few drivers use hand signals to denote that they are slowing down or stopping. Stop lights are a great help in warning approaching vehicles that the one in front is coming to a halt.
I was glad to hear the Minister say that regulations would be laid before the House to require certain commercial vehicles to carry a distinctive rear marking to show that they constitute a special road hazard. I am thinking of those types of vehicle, the heavy lorries, which carry equipment longer than the vehicle or those which are so long that to overtake would be highly dangerous unless one had a warning signal that the vehicle was over a given length. If the rear lights of these vehicles fail, vehicles which can be under-run can cause the worst possible kind of accident, especially to motor cyclists and the baby and mini cars. Whatever form these markings take, they must be visible at night in the light of the lamps of a following car. It was very heartening to hear the Minister say that the Ministry has in mind that there should be a reflective triangle in the centre of the tail board and reflective and fluorescent zebra stripes on either side.
I turn to the specific question of reflective number plates. I should like to say why I believe that they should be introduced at the very earliest opportunity. I first raised this question in the House in November, 1965, and I have been pressing for their introduction since. During that time, I have met no one who


has argued a case, let alone a convincing case, against them. They are designed to stop accidents. Other safety measures which the Ministry of Transport has introduced—for example, the compulsory fitting of seat belts—are designed to reduce the severity of accidents. Reflective plates are designed to stop accidents.
Clause 2 gives the Minister power to permit the use of reflective number plates. I am sure that this will make a great contribution to road safety because it will allow motorists to fulfil the second part of the slogan "See and be seen", even if all the lights on the vehicle should fail or if it is left parked or abandoned on the roadside at night without lights. It is no use denying that this happens. We all know that it happens. Many serious accidents occur because a vehicle has been left with no lights showing and an oncoming motorist has no indication that there is a hazard in front of him and there is a rear-end collision with sometimes appalling results.
The Bill is obviously necessary, as the Parliamentary Secretary said, because under the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1957, the fitting of reflective number plates would be illegal, because they could be held to be showing a light to the rear, unless the colour was red. The Road Research Laboratory and the Lighting Working Party of the Ministry and the experience which has been obtained from other countries where these plates are now in use point to the fact that the most effective colour combinations are black and white at the front and black and amber at the rear.
Forty million vehicles in the world out of a vehicle population of 160 million, or 25 per cent, of the total, will by the end of 1967 be equipped with these retro-reflective number plates. I am all in favour of some form of standardisation of lighting on the rear of vehicles, and I hope that we shall not seek to emulate certain States in America where these plates are in use which have chosen a colour combination which sometimes has very little to do with the most effective road safety combination but has more to do with the colours of the local State baseball team or the State college or university or the personal whim of the governor. One State has chosen the combination of white on green merely because the Governor happens to be an

Irishman. There could be worse reasons than that, but it seems odd that there should be this lack of standardisation. I hope that we shall not allow this but that we shall seek to standardise colour schemes.
However, I appreciate that a convincing case could well be argued for the police or doctors or Government officials having a distinctive marking so that people know who they are. An argument could be advanced—in fact, I have heard it advanced—that in the period when these plates are made permissive, provided the Minister gets power to do that, and until they are in general use, some confusion could arise in the minds of members of the public. But this is an argument which I reject completely. It is not an argument against retro-reflective number plates; it is an argument against change.
I am certain that, once these plates are allowed under the Bill, motorists will soon see the benefit and more and more will come to adopt them for their own use. It would be logical to argue that, once the case for these retro-plates has been accepted, it would be right for the Minister to introduce compulsory regulations. However, at this stage I am content to see the introduction of permissive legislation in the firm belief that the value to road safety will become obvious within 18 months, and I give notice that at that time I shall begin to press the Ministry for the compulsory fitting of these plates to all new vehicles and to all vehicles coming up for Ministry of Transport tests, which, I hope, will be down to two years by 1969.
When in the process of preparing my Private Member's Bill for presentation to the House on 19th April, a Bill designed to allow the use of reflective number plates on all road vehicles, I wrote to a number of organisations for their views, including the R.A.C. and the A.A. The R.A.C. replied on 18th April saying:
I am pleased to confirm that the Club is sympathetic to the objective of your Bill which will enable further experience to be obtained concerning the advantages of reflective number plates which have been revealed by the limited experiment in this country and the use of such equipment in other countries. It is the Club's view that it is desirable to encourage the use of devices which may help to reduce the risk of accidents at night, especially when vehicles


have broken down on the highway and when their lights are not operative.
The Automobile Association replied on 12th April saying:
We would certainly be in favour of permissive legislation as this would enable more experience to be gained of the practical value of these number plates. Thereafter, the possibility of making reflectorisation a standard requirement might well be considered".
Those two organisations represent a considerable body of motorists and their opinions should be noted.
Clause 2(b), says that the provisions which may be made by regulations include:
where any such light is required or authorised by the regulations to be so shown by means of reflecting or fluorescent material, provision imposing conditions with respect to the material, its position and dimensions …
I assume that the Minister's decision about the material to be used will be taken after consultation not only with her technical advisers, but with the motoring organisations and other interested bodies. Without seeking to delude the House into believing that I am a technical expert—which I am not—I hope that the Minister will not think in terms of British Standard 873, of 1959, which is the material now used for road bollards and road signs, but more in terms of the superior British Standard AU47 of 1965.
The Minister will have power to specify the position of these plates. I appreciate the difficulties of obtaining uniformity at once on all road vehicles, but I trust that the Minister will bear in mind the advantages which would be obtained if these plates were to be centralised on the rear of vehicles, because that would be a further indication to motorists that there was something on either side of the reflected light.
I assume that the area of the plates will be roughly the same whether the plates are oblong or square, but at some date perhaps the Minister can think in terms of introducing regulations to standardise the shape of the plates on all vehicles.
I am well aware of the efforts of the present Minister and her Ministry to promote road safety and to overhaul the Lighting Acts. The Ministry is doing great service. We know that, according to the Royal Society for the Prevention of

Accidents, the cost in monetary terms of road accidents in this country in 1966 was no less than £267 million, a factor of which we must take careful note. Lighting regulations are crucial. Almost 50 per cent, of all road deaths occur at night and more than one-third of road accidents occur during the hours of darkness, and this is at a time when traffic is much less when measured in vehicle miles travelled.
Motorists pay too little attention to ensuring that their vehicles have adequate lighting. According to a recent survey conducted by the A.A. one-third of all vehicles on the road today are inadequately lit at light, which means that 5 million vehicles constitute a potential source of a road accident at night.
The previous Government—and I am grateful for the efforts which they made—in April, 1964, asked the Road Research Laboratory to conduct a trial with reflective number plates and I am glad that the present Government are acting so rapidly on the conclusions obtained from those trials and the investigations of the Lighting Working Party.
Quickly to summarise the advantages of these reflective plates for the benefit of those hon. Members who were not present on 19th April when my Bill was introduced and for those who are not yet convinced; they are not dependent on their own lighting system; they have no battery and no bulb and no wiring is required; their brightness is at least 100 times that of white paint; after 80,000 miles of motoring—this was the rigorous test to which the Road Research Laboratory submitted these plates—they were still 60 times brighter than white paint and could be restored to about 80 or 90 per cent, of their original power by the use of a simple polish.
There are those who argue that it is just as efficient to have simply effective or enlarged ordinary reflectors, but I point out that there are no red reflectors on the front of a vehicle and that in any case reflectors are brittle and can easily be damaged and that a reflective plate means that a vehicle can be identified even if all the rest of its lights are out, and that is something to be welcomed as a contribution to law enforcement.
I will not weary the House with them, but statistics can be produced to show


that in America, where tests have been carried out in Minnesota, Maine, Illinois and Iowa, night-time accidents, especially rear-end collisions, have been greatly reduced by the use of these plates. At the Fifth World Meeting of the International Road Federation in London in September, last year, Mr. Kare Rumar, who is well known in road safety circles and who comes from the Department of Psychology at the University of Upsala in Sweden, said:
The retro-reflective materials that industry is now able to produce are capable of giving the registration plate … a sizeable increase in the night-time visibilty of the vehicle. With reflectorisation there is also a considerable improvement in the legibility of the number at night as well as increased difficulty for those who might attempt to fabricate counterfeit plates. When reflectorised. therefore, the-registration plate becomes a definite safety element.
He concluded by saying:
In the beams of headlights they make the vehicles carrying them visible from long distances and almost any angle, a fact which contributes to greater road safety.
The four plates as well as the rear plate are more legible to law enforcement patrols—and from a greater distance. This is a factor of order and discipline on the roads.
At the Fifth International Congress of Traffic Police in Paris in 1965 a resolution was adopted recommending the use of reflectorised registration plates as a contribution to road safety and to assisting in law enforcement.
If these plates are introduced, they will do much to reduce the number of accidents involving parked cars, because the plates reflect at an angle regardless of the position of the vehicle. I understand that some time ago a comparison was made of the number of fatal and serious accidents involving parked cars in an 18-month period before and after the coming into force of regulations allowing parking without lights in certain areas of London. Serious accidents involving heavy vehicles parked without lights increased by 50 per cent. This would not have happened if the parked cars had been fitted with reflective plates. Once again, it is a simple question of seeing and being seen.
The Pedestrians' Association, which is concerned with road safety, was in touch with me and was concerned that reflective number plates might take the place of the light which must be shown over the rear number plate. That, however, is not the intention either of myself or the Bill, because the light which is required over

or under the number plate would still remain to assist pedestrians and when vehicles are parked.
It is wise to dot the i's and cross the t's when one has the opportunity, and perhaps I may correct a slight mistake which I made on the subject of reflective plates when presenting my Private Member's Bill last month, when I mentioned that the cost of the plates would be about £2 a pair. I should have made it clear that that was the manufacturers' price.
Road Research Laboratory Report No. 44 states, in paragraph 7:
Ordinary registration plates are sold by manufacturers to garages at a cost of £2 a pair and upwards and fitted to cars by garages at a cost of £3 10s. It is estimated, after consulting with the firm making plates of the type used in the experiment, that the price would be about £2 a pair.
Even if the price increased slightly, this would be well worth paying to save life.
A number of organisations which have been in touch with me would like to see, for example, raised digits and numbers above the surface, of the reflective material. With that I do not quarrel. Perhaps my right hon. Friend the Minister can consider it at a later stage. I am, however, glad again to assure the House and the Ministry that I have received a number of letters from the Number Plate Manufacturers' Association, one of which, dated 5th May, states:
We do not wish to resist the reflectorisation of vehicle number plates for the purpose covered in your Bill.
As a result of further correspondence, a letter dated 26th May signed by the chairman of the Association, states:
I am of the opinion that all the points raised have been satisfactorily covered and can therefore assure you of my co-operation when the Bill is finally passed.
We therefore have the support of a tremendous number of bodies which are interested in the project.
I am also informed that the plates can be produced in this country. No dollar expenditure is involved, no balance of payments crisis is threatened as a result. The purpose of the plates is, however, to help to save life. They have been tested and tried in over 30 American States and many other nations have accepted them, including France, where they are now compulsory on all heavy road vehicles.
I have a report which I obtained from the Tasmanian Government from a 1965


Committee on Road Safety and Traffic Accidents, in which all the advantages of reflective number plates are given. I quote merely two short paragraphs:
Whilst they are obviously not a complete answer for the following too closely or improper signals accidents, we believe that the reports which we have read show that they materially reduce night-time accidents.
The Committee recommended to the Tasmanian Government
that reflectorised number plates be issued to all vehicles at the earliest opportunity.
It is the same story in Australia as well.
Police forces throughout the country have expressed themselves, and have being doing so since 1959, in favour of these plates. A sub-committee of the United Nations has gone on record as giving its support. As the hon. Member for Totnes said, Members of all three political parties have urged their introduction. I hope, therefore, that it will not be long before we have the appropriate regulations.
I express once again my appreciation to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary for the speed with which the Bill has been brought forward by his Department and I hope that it will have a speedy and successful passage through its various stages to the Statute Book.
I conclude with the words of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport, who, when speaking at Brighton in October, said that
coming to terms with the motor age means developing a new sense of urgency about road safety. In the last 10 years, 3< million people have been injured on our roads, and if accidents continue to increase at the present rate the figures will have risen to nearly 1 million a year by the 1980s. We can no longer tolerate this terrible toll.
I entirely agree with those sentiments.
Let us make sure that when we drive, all of us can see and be seen. To do that we must act, and act now, and give the Bill our full support and ensure that the Minister is in a position to lay the appropriate regulations to allow the permissive use of retro-reflective number plates, certainly before the dark nights come upon us again.

10.55 a.m.

Mr. Hector Monro: I should like briefly to add my general support to the Bill. Very often it is the simple things which are the most effective,

and this is a simple Measure to have reflective number plates. Therefore, I am certain that in the long run we shall all feel the benefit of it.
My view is that the Minister is right at this stage to make the use of these plates permissive. It would be wrong to go ahead to compulsion without a little more practical experience. So often a little soap and water are necessary if something is to become effective, because even a reflective number plate, while admittedly better than a normal one, would be almost valueless if caked with mud, as can often be seen on our trunk roads.
In talking of simple remedies, I often wonder why we do not advance lighting-up time by, perhaps, an hour or half an hour. All of us who are interested in road safety know that very often when we are travelling along at about dusk, we see enormous vehicles without their side lights on when it costs absolutely nothing to turn them on except the effort of reaching forward and turning a knob. I hope that this is something to which the Ministry gives constant thought.
The Bill is brought forward not only because of the excellent efforts of the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Lomas), but also because of the increasing use of reflective substances on the rear of motor cars. I hope that during the Committee stage of the Bill, if a regulation governing their use is not presently in force, consideration will be given to the use of rotating beacons on cars.
For the very reason that we have found a sudden increase in the use of reflective material, so, too, we are finding a rapid increase in the use of beacons, frequently without genuine reason. We rightly accept that police, fire and ambulance services and roads staff when working on the highways should use reflecting beacons, but we now find them on all sorts of heavy vehicles and loads. I have even seen their use reported on airport buses going in and out of London airport. This debases their use. We must maintain them for essential purposes and only when their use is essential.
I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to give his views on the sudden and rapid increase in the use of rotating beacons which is getting out of hand. If there are not regulations which he can make more effective, perhaps he can give


the matter early consideration. In general, however, I am warmly in support of the Bill and I hope that it becomes an Act in the very near future.

10.58 a.m.

Mr. John Binns: I do not want to take up too much time. It is no use my going again into the arguments in favour of reflectorisation. They have been put exceptionally well by my hon. Friend the Member for Hudders-field, West (Mr. Lomas) and by the hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby). It is sufficient for me to say that I, too, have seen reflectorised number plates in use and, like everyone else who saw them that day, I came away convinced that they were an absolute necessity, particularly on our motorways.
I had the unfortunate experience a few weeks ago of travelling on one of the motorways and seeing one of the pile-ups from a rear-end collision. Anyone who saw the chaos caused and the number of people standing in the middle of the motorway flashing torches to warn oncoming motorists of what had happened would agree that reflective number plates are an absolute necessity.
While I welcome the Bill and feel that it would be almost churlish to find fault with it, Clause 3 worries me a little. It says:
Section 2 (2,b) of the principal Act … shall not authorise a vehicle of any description to carry a lamp showing a light to the rear for the purpose of illuminating any device for giving signals to overtaking traffic …
I hope that does not mean that the Minister will not look at the possibility of some rear light warning on very large vehicles for overtaking purposes. During the Whitsun Recess, I travelled on the Continent and, for part of the time, I was driving on dark winding mountain roads crossing the Pyrenees. When following very large vehicles, I was greatly helped by the presence on the back of most of them of two flashing signal lights. One is a flashing red light which tells a motorist not to pass and, as my driving wheel was on the near side, it was difficult to see to pass such a large vehicle. As soon as the road is clear, the driver changes the red light to a flashing green light, and the motorist behind knows that it is safe to pass. I hope that the wording of the Bill does not mean that the

Minister has closed her mind to the advantages of such a system.
This is a Bill which both sides of the House will support. Road safety is not political. Anything which adds to safety on our roads is desirable. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West on all the hard work which he has done, and I thank the Parliamentary Secretary for the sympathetic way in which he has listened to my hon. Friend.

11.3 a.m.

Mr. David Webster: We are glad to see the Joint Parliamentary Secretary here in the morning. Often he is here late at night tidying up the affairs of the day, sometimes in a dinner jacket, though not always.
I join with him in congratulating the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Lomas) on the valuable work which he has done in attempting to pioneer activity in this respect by earlier legislation which has now been taken over by the Government. It is a better use of Government time than the Live Hare Coursing (Abolition) Bill which has been taken over in a similar way. I want also to join in the tribute which has been paid to my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) for what he has done to help. If nothing else, it proves that there is peace and harmony on all sides of the House.
It is right that the powers in the Bill in respect of reflective number plates should be permissive at first to see how they work out. However, we have had information from the Road Research Laboratory, and I should like to know whether there has been any recommendation by the National Road Safety Advisory Council, what advice that Council has given the Minister, and if there were any restrictions on that advice.
There are many councils and groups which advise the Minister of Transport on a wide variety of matters. Indeed, there might almost be an advisory council to count how many there are. We know that recently the Chairman of the Road Safety Advisory Council, Sir Alfred Owen, was replaced by a Parliamentary Secretary. On these occasions, one always wants to know if independent advice is still given. That is why, on this non-controversial matter, I hope that


the Parliamentary Secretary will tell the House whether the Road Safety Advisory Council approved of this Measure freely and without inhibition. Was a vote taken, and what other advice was sought from outside bodies? I think that the hon. Gentleman covered the latter point, but I am sure that the House would wish to know what rôle the Advisory Council has played.
This is not the first time that the independent chairman of an advisory body has been removed by the Minister of Transport and replaced by someone who is much more dependent upon her. When considering road safety matters, this is to be regretted, and one would like to know whether there is a definite reason for it.
When the White Paper is published, I hope that we shall have further details about points raised by hon. Members on both sides of the House which could possibly be incorporated into the Bill but which would probably require an amendment to the Long Title. Hon. Members on all sides have said that they approve of the Bill. However, we all think that it should be more comprehensive. My hon. Friend the Member for Totnes made a point about the long vehicle coming out of a side road, having to turn or having been involved in a jack-knifing accident. Such a vehicle is at an angle with the main road and completely unlit, presenting a terrific hazard to other traffic. I know many cases of people who have been killed by running into these vehicles at great speeds. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will find it acceptable, by way of an amendment to the Long Title of the Bill, to bring such a desirable and urgent matter before the House at a time when we see more and more trailers on our roads, in line with Continental practice, and an increasing number of large articulated vehicles. This is an urgent matter, and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will agree that the Bill would be improved by the addition of some provision in this respect.
We welcome the Bill, and we know what has led to it. However, we should like to know a little more about the legal side. The hon. Gentleman talked about the principle of red at the rear and white at the front, which would make

side lighting a problem. Is there any evidence that accidents would be reduced, because it appears that they have been in foreign countries? Is there much evidence of accidents being caused by the unlit sides of heavy commercial vehicles?
We all know that we can amend the law as much as we like, but that, without enforcement, it is worthless. Those of us who drive to town from our constituencies know how under-policed our roads are. I wish that there could be more police in evidence, because I know that I behave with greater circumspection when a member of the police force is not far away. A conspicuous police vehicle helps to improve driving standards. Any officer on road patrol finds that driving standards are excellent when he is driving his patrol car. However, they are very different when he is driving home in his own car.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) talked about the increasing use of rotating beacons on vehicles of all types. I agree that we should have better control of them. On ambulances, vehicles doing maintenance work on motorways and police cars, they are essential, but we must prevent their indiscriminate use. A rotating beacon on a vehicle represents something important, often an accident, and their indiscriminate use creates yet another hazard.
We can see evidence of another matter near to this House. I am thinking of what I call a portable container dustbin which is used when a house is being demolished. It is left at the side of the road and loaded with rubbish. When it is full, it is hoisted on to a vehicle, and in fact becomes part of it. I do not know what it is called, but what concerns me is that it is not properly lit at night, and I think that regulations ought to be introduced to deal with this hazard. As far as I can see, the common practice is for the local authority concerned, which apparently supervises these things, to place on the container a road lamp of the very oldest kind, which any hooligan returning from a party at night can remove, thus leaving an unlighted obstruction in the road. This is an extreme hazard, and if we were able to extend the scope of the Bill, perhaps something could be done to deal with it.
Having said that, I commend the Bill to the House. I thank the Joint Parliamentary Secretary for what he said. I hope that he can tell us a bit more about some of the points which have been raised, and I conclude by congratulating the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West and my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes on this issue.

11.11 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, perhaps I might make a few comments in reply to the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster).
First, I am pleased that the Bill has been welcomed by both sides of the House. I think that all hon. Members have found that the Bill is a valuable clarification of the existing law. The first point to get clear is about the state of the law with regard to the use of reflecting material.
Secondly, I think that it is generally accepted—certainly by hon. Members who have studied the experience in the United States and the evidence which was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Lomas) and which was laid before the International Road Congress in London, namely the results of trials at the Road Research Laboratory—that we have sufficient evidence of the safety value of the use of reflecting material in relation to number plates and other devices, and of its value as a means of identifying the vehicle for the purpose of enforcing the law, to say that we must come to the point of making it permissive for these things to be used.
Thirdly—and here I deal with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Binns)—part of the Bill is simply and solely for the purpose of establishing control over signalling devices. I remind my hon. Friend of what I said in opening, namely,
Some of the devices which may be developed by ingenious designers who are working on this subject may prove to be very beneficial, so we do not want to take any action which would be a bar to further progress; but we do want to have the powers to control such devices and to permit the use only of those which my right hon. Friend is advised will make a worth while contribution to road safety.
Our purpose is to bring about standardisation and also a standard of compre-

hension by all road users of the signalling devices used, but certainly not in any way to count out further technical progress which undoubtedly may be made in the development of such signalling devices.
The hon. Member for Totnes (Mr. Mawby) mentioned the importance of distinctive markings on lorries. I should like to emphasise this. I hope that the Bill will make a contribution by enabling my right hon. Friend to make further regulations about this. We have very much in mind the point about distinctive markings on heavy, long, or wide loads. This has frequently been mentioned in the House, and it has been the subject of criticism from many sides. Many hon. Members have referred to the dangers caused by wide, heavy, and long loads, and we have it in mind that the regulations which my right hon. Friend will be able to make under the Bill will be useful in dealing with this.
As one would expect, my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West made an important contribution to the debate. He and a number of other hon. Members raised a number of important points, and the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare, not for the first time this Session, suggested that we might consider extending the Long Tide of the Bill so that hon. Members could range further and wider in their consideration of road safety measures. There has been no lack of opportunity during this Session for considering these things. I think that some matters were raised when we were considering what is now the Road Safety Act. We have also had before us the Measure introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead, West (Mr. Randall), and another Measure dealing with off-street parking. During discussions on all these Measures suggestions have been made that their scope should be extended so that the House can discuss other matters. I am sure that during each Session hon. Members would like to produce an omnibus Bill to enable them to discuss all these wider issues of road safety, but we must take these things as they come from the working parties and from the technical reports which we receive and from data of that kind.
My hon. Friend mentioned headlamps and, I think, stop lamps. These are being


considered with a great deal of urgency. We have draft regulations about the compulsory fitting of headlamps. It might come as a surprise to many citizens, and indeed to hon. Members to know that although it is generally assumed that vehicles must be fitted with headlamps, this is not obligatory, and we are about to make regulations to deal with this.
Nor is the fitting of stop lamps compulsory. This is something about which my hon. Friend is concerned, and we intend to take action to deal with the matter. We are being held up by a lack of international agreement on the standard to be adopted. We are trying, as in so many of these spheres, to get international standardisation of the type of device to be fitted. We intend to make the fitting of stop lights compulsory, and to take similar action about direction indicators. We are proposing to take action in many respects which I hope the House will agree will raise the standard of safety on the roads—working on the basis of my hon. Friend's slogan, "See and be seen on the highway."
The hon. Member for Dumfries (Mr. Monro) raised the question of rotating beacons. The use of these beacons is at present controlled by Regulations, but if hon. Members feel that their use is being permitted too widely, perhaps they will let me have evidence of this. The Regulations deal principally with the use of these beacons by the police and the fire, ambulance, and breakdown services, especially on motorways. If hon. Members have evidence of the use of rotating beacons spreading unnecessarily, I hope that they will let me have it, because we want to ensure that they are used only for essential purposes.
The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare asked whether the principles of the Bill had been considered by the National Road Safety Advisory Council which advises my right hon. Friend. The Council has from time to time considered whether the law should be changed to permit the use of reflective materials, and it has given its blessing in principle to the provisions of the Bill. It was a result of the Council's deliberations that the technical matters involved were referred to the Lighting Working Party, which recently reported to my right hon. Friend in favour of the permissive use of reflec-

tive number plates and other changes for the control of the rear lighting of vehicles.
The Bill is supported by a wide consensus of opinion, and I hope that hon. Members will ensure that it receives a speedy passage through the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Walter Harrison.]

Committee Tomorrow.

ANCHORS AND CHAIN CABLES BILL

Order for second Reading read

Dr. Reginald Bennett: On a point of order. Mr. Deputy Speaker, may I ask for your guidance whether you are in a position to accept a reasoned Amendment on Second Reading?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Technically I am in a position to accept one. Whether it will be selected is a matter for the Chair.

Mr. David Webster: We did not hand in the reasoned Amendment until we had had time to obtain a Ruling from you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, whether it would be in order. Is it in order for me to hand you the reasoned Amendment now?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It is in order at any time to hand in an Amendment.

Mr. Webster: Then I will hand it in now.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am afraid that I am unable to select it.

11.21 a.m.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu): I beg to move. That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Some hon. Members will remember that my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Blenkinsop) introduced a Private Member's Bill dealing with anchors and chain cables in February, 1965. Because of the desire shown by a number of hon. Members to widen the scope of the Bill, and because of the eventual advent of a General Election,


we ran out of time and the Bill was lost. I now introduce the Bill as a Government Measure.
In effect, it repeals the Anchors and Chain Cables Act, 1899, dealing with the testing of cables and anchors for ships registered in the United Kingdom. That Act, so it seems to us, has two defects. First, it embodies many detailed requirements concerning the ways in which anchors, and cables should be tested. With the development of modern techniques and the introduction of different types of material many of these requirements become out of date, and yet to alter them requires legislation. Under the new Measure we propose that these changes should be made by way of negative Resolution.
Secondly, under the old Act all manufacturers are compelled to test the anchors and cables they make in licensed proving houses. This involves some expense and delay to the manufacturers. Many manufacturers have their own testing equipment and use it for anchors and cables which are to be sold to ships not registered in the United Kingdom. We have been told by Lloyds Register—and I believe it to be true—that there is no significant difference in the number of breakages as between those tested in proving houses and those tested by the manufacturers. This Measure, while allowing the continued use of proving houses to manufacturers who want to use them, will also permit testing by manufacturers on their own equipment in conformity with the rules laid down by the Board of Trade.
That is the purpose of what, at the moment, is a simple Bill. There are, however, two other aspects that I should mention. First, liability for ensuring that ships have properly certificated anchors and cables will be placed not only on the owner but also on the master. The reason for this is that some ships registered in the United Kingdom may be owned by people whose premises are outside these islands—perhaps in Canada, Bermuda or the Bahamas—and it would be very difficult to bring home to such owners responsibility for any breach of the regulations. We therefore think it right that the master should be joined with the owner in this matter.
The second aspect that I should mention is a throw-back to the debate

we had in a previous Parliament, when many hon. Members expressed a wish to extend the scope of the Bill. Naturally, since that time we have given serious consideration to the points made, but we still think, on balance, that the original limitations were correct. Suggestions have been made that the Measure should apply to hovercraft. This is an extremely difficult legal problem. We are dealing with ships. Hovercraft, whatever else they are, are not ships—

Dr. Bennett: Does the Minister realise that in the debates to which he is referring his predecessor ruled that hovercraft were ships, and that in the Finance Bill debates last year this was accepted?

Mr. Mallalieu: I am afraid that it has not yet been accepted, because their exact legal position has yet to be established. At the moment I believe that they are dealt with under air navigation orders. I would prefer to say that these are not ships or aircraft, but hovercraft, and that in terms of the rule of the road and other matters they will have to be treated as a distinct entity. It is proposed that when the legal status of these craft has been finally established we shall deal with them in separate legislation.
It was also suggested that fishing vessels should be included. There is no doubt that they are ships. They have traditionally been exempt from many safety regulations which apply to other ships. At present, international discussions are taking place on the whole question of safety aboard fishing vessels and I would much prefer to wait until we are in a position to bring forward special legislation dealing with them than to do it piecemeal by adding them to this Measure.
It was further suggested that we should include pleasure yachts carrying less than 12 passengers. If we consider the myriads of small boats in these islands we see that any attempt to do that would produce a sizeable new slice of bureaucracy. It would be unnecessary and probably unworkable. They are exempt from the Merchant Shipping (Load Lines) Measure, which was generally accepted. There is no case for including them.

Mr. Webster: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for appearing to be somewhat behind. I want to refer


back to what he was saying about hovercraft and I have been trying to find the reference. If he has read every word of that precious document, the OFFICIAL REPORT of the Standing Committee which considered the original Bill in 1965, he will see that the late Mr. Edward Redhead said:
… seized … with the point that to the extent that at the present moment hovercraft are required to use chains and anchors it would be reasonable and sensible to bring those chains and anchors within the provisions for testing under this Bill.
In those circumstances, I am ready to accept the principle of the proposed new Clause …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing committee C, 19th May 1965; c. 172.]
The new Clause to which Mr. Redhead there referred contained the words:
For the purpose of this Act a hovercraft shall be defined as a ship or vessel.

Mr. Mallalieu: I was aware of that and of the reason why Mr. Redhead was prepared to accept it. He was anxious to get the Bill through.

Dr. Bennett: I am sure that Mr. Redhead meant what he said when he said it.

Mr. Mallalieu: Mr. Redhead was saying that, in so far as hovercraft carry anchors and cables, it would be reasonable to call them ships, and I agree with that. But there are other considerations about the classification of hovercraft. I do not think that this is a vital point. It is untidy to call them ships when we are not sure what they are legally to be described as.
Harbour moorings, chain ferries and so on are covered by existing regulations. They are not ships and we do not think that it would be desirable to extend the scope of the Bill to take them in. But, though important, all these are matters of detail which we shall have a further opportunity to discuss, and I do not think I need go into them in a long argument on Second Reading. The aim of the Bill is to simplify the procedures of regulation, to make them more flexible. It is a modest little Bill but an important one, and I hope that the House will give it a Second Reading.

11.33 a.m.

Mr. David Webster: I thank the Minister of State for a longer explanation than we had on the

occasion of the Second Reading of the 1965 Bill, which was introduced under the Ten Minute Rule so that there was no possibility of debating the matter with thoroughness.
I am very sorry to see that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Commander Pursey) is not here. I have a feeling that both he and my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) will be sad that this Bill, despite all the hard work which we put into the subject, remains largely unaffected by that work. It is certainly a simple Bill but it lacks the precision of its ancestor of 1899. Whatever the defects of the 1899 Act are, it is precise. It has 21 Sections and 3 Schedules. This Bill has 2 Clauses and no Schedules. Yet this Bill is very vague; it lacks precision and fails to deal with so many of the modern developments of nautical events which are coming so rapidly.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham and I have been proved right in pressing the case for the hovercraft. It is now in mass use but it seems that we are waiting for disaster before dealing with it, as is all too often the case. That aspect also applies to drilling rigs. I remind the hon. Gentleman that even now legislation would be after the event in their case. It is not sufficient just to say that the case that the Continental Shelf Act, 1964, was not precise about the mooring of these creations has been amply proved by tragic events.
Incidentally, perhaps this Bill should be referred to the Prices and Incomes Board. After the 1965 Bill had been amended, with great trouble, in five meetings of the Standing Committee, its price was 6d. The price of this Bill, unamended, is 10d. That is almost double the price for less than half the value. Perhaps the Board should look at the Bill, particularly as it contains so little for the price.
The 1899 Act itself now needs to be modernised, but an important constitutional principle is involved. The Act is precise. It has 21 Clauses and 3 Schedules, and there are no vague rulemaking powers.
We know the practice in this House. We give great rule-making powers to the Executive, who bring them on at a fairly late hour of night with the Whips on and always get what they want if it is under


the negative procedure, as in this case. In 1965, we sought to make the Bill more precise, both by new Clauses and by new Schedules, and in some respects were carrying our way. But all that has been taken out. That is regrettable because we also know that the more delegated legislation there is, the less Parliamentary time can be found to pray against it. One is thus giving a blank cheque to the Government in a case where they have already proved that they are inadequate to deal with the situation.
Modesty may not be my greatest virtue—I have not analysed myself to that extent. But I recall the Merchant Shipping Act, 1964, which I had the honour to introduce. It got an unopposed Second Reading and, with the aid of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East, got through the Committee stage in one sitting. This was because, although it also gave immense delegated legislation, it was made utterly precise because the regulations were based on rules contained in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea which was signed in June, 1960. The document is 388 pages long and consists of precise regulations.
If one is to give wide rule-making powers, they should be laid down precisely. But that is precisely—to use the word yet again—what this Bill does not do. That is regrettable, and it will be necessary once more to try and improve it in Committee with the aid of hon. Members on both sides.
As is the case with all marine matters, this subject has an international flavour. But no convention has been signed in this case. It is probably in itself an isolated matter and is too small for a convention. On the other hand, we want to make our usage as much as possible the same as that applied abroad, otherwise we place the masters of our vessels at a disadvantage and put ourselves at a disadvantage commercially as well. This is a very delicate matter in relation to the safety of life and to the protection of our commercial interests.
I wonder whether the practice in the United States might be to the disadvantage of British shipping. We know that the Federal Maritime Commission—which the hon. Gentleman has no doubt had to deal with—is a tricky customer. It is dominated in that huge

country by people who have perhaps never seen the sea, largely and very often it is in direct contradiction to the interests not only of foreign vessels but of American vessels as well. It would be worth looking into this matter so that we should not be at a disadvantage in this respect or at a disadvantage with our rapidly declining coastal fleet at a time when so many foreign vessels seem to be getting into the business.
The original Bill said the fine should be £100 and in the present Bill that sum has been increased to £400. I said that £100 would be chickenfeed to any operator, but increasing the fine to £400 lends force to the argument that the master of the vessel concerned should not be responsible for paying the fine. When the master was to be liable to a fine of £100, there was much strong feeling in maritime circles and it was equally felt that £100 would not be enough to check any owner who was not fulfilling his responsibilities. Now that the fine has been increased to £400, there is a still better reason for excluding the master, and I hope that those who serve on the Standing Committee will consider this matter carefully.
I notice with regret that an Amendment to the original Bill to protect the rights of proving stations has been taken out of this Bill. I appreciate that the Bill represents an improvement on the original, but there are plenty of people in the Black Country around Dudley, the area represented by the Paymaster-General himself, who work in small chain-making factories and, although there were many at the time of the 1899 Act, the number of proving stations is now down to four. The mayor, aldermen and burgesses of Bristol and of Hull among other places were involved. These provisions will reduce the number of chain-making factories even more and the small establishments will go out of business, which will mean unemployment, or, in the more fashionable expression of the day, redeployment. We should like to know why there has been such a change from two years ago when the party then in power is still in power.
I should be grateful if the Minister of State could tell us a little more about Section 684 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, because a new provision has


been introduced which he did not mention. It would also help if he could tell us how many examples there have been over the last convenient period, perhaps five years, of defective anchors or cables, preferably giving the numbers separately. Perhaps he could provide a schedule if we put down a Question on the subject. Perhaps he could also say what weights were involved. There is no provision for a limitation on weight. In the original Standing Committee we sought to bring it down to 50 lb. but failed to do so.
In the Second Schedule of the 1899 Act there are precise specifications, such as anchor ex stock and proving strain and so on, and it would be better if the House had been provided with a little more detail of that kind and also if more attention had been paid to modern developments at sea. When we last discussed this matter we talked a great deal about sea anchors, but there is nothing about them in the present Bill. I would have thought—although it is abundantly clear from my remarks that I am not a seaman myself—that there should have been a reference to this subject.
I now turn to the subject of drilling rigs. A drilling rig in the Bristol Channel near my constituency provides a good example. Despite every kind of expert opinion then available, we were assured that the régime of the Bristol Channel was absolutely firm and that there would be no deflection. We in the House were over-ruled—we got them in the end—and the drilling rig was installed. Its effect on the régime of the Channel was to begin to scour under one of the legs and this set up an inverse pendulum movement which increased the scouring until, after about two days, the whole thing gradually tilted over and almost disappeared. If there had been many people on board and if it had been difficult to get them off, there would have been a tragedy. There have been tragedies in the North Sea. The B.P. drilling rig "Seaquest" has nine anchors of 300,000 lb. each and it seems absurd that the Bill should not contain any reference to this kind of activity.
If it is said that this is a modest little Bill, then the Minister of State should become immodest and make it a Bill which is more effective and which can

deal with an activity which is springing up all round our shores and which requires urgent action. This was the first thing for which I looked on the day when the Bill was presented by the President of the Board of Trade in his delight and celebration of the fact that the Prime Minister had announced that we were going into the Common Market. I found no reference to drilling rigs nor any adequate reference to lightships.
I must join issue with the Minister of State on the subject of hovercraft. In solemn words we had a statement by his late predecessor, Mr. Redhead, to whom I must pay tribute both as a Member whom we all very much loved and also because he arrived on the Bill by accident. I know that he would have forgiven me for saying that, because he said so himself. He was obliging the other Minister of State who has now gone to another Department but who was then abroad, having been told that this was only a little Bill. Mr. Redhead was with us for five weeks on what was then a two-Clause Bill.
He said that hovercraft required to use chains and anchors so that it would be reasonable and sensible to bring those chains and anchors within the provisions for testing under the Bill. He said that in those circumstances he was prepared to accept the principle of the proposed new Clause which defined hovercraft as ships for the purposes of the Bill. Apparently those words no longer stand.
I hope that I misheard the right hon. Gentleman when he said that that concession was made only to get the Bill through. That is not a fair reflection on the memory of Mr. Redhead. I withdrew my new Clause because the principle had been accepted. It is exceedingly regrettable that such a provision is not in the present Bill and unless the Bill is amended by the Government, my hon. Friends and I will seek to amend it in Committee.
We shall seek to reduce the Bill's regulation-making powers, to make them more precise and to bring in Schedules which are as precise as possible. We shall probably seek to amend the Long Title in order to do so and to introduce new Clauses to make this Bill, necessary in itself, relevant to the modern age and to new developments of maritime engineering and to one of the best inventions


of Great Britain—the hovercraft. In this respect we have the chance to lead the world, provided that we take the requisite action.
We will not oppose the Second Reading of the Bill, but, in nautical terms, I fire a warning shot to show the Minister of State that if he does not do something to make the Bill more up to date and more adequate, he will not find us particularly obliging when we get to Standing Committee.

11.50 a.m.

Dr. Reginald Bennett: May I ask you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, whether a further reasoned Amendment which, I believe, is in your possession is considered to be in order?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am afraid that I am unable to select the Amendment handed in by the hon. Gentleman.

Dr. Bennett: This Bill seems familiar to some of us. Indeed, it is, in all substantial respects, the same Bill as that which we dealt with for a few weeks in those charming summer mornings of 1965. In spite of the "serious consideration" which the Minister says has been given by his Department, the Bill is virtually unchanged. It seems that the Government, once again, are like the Bourbons: they have learnt nothing, or virtually nothing, from all those long and serious discussions which we had two years ago.
May I say a word of praise for the late Mr. Redhead, who was the Minister in charge of those discussions, for his unfailing good humour. We all liked him very much before, but we liked him a great deal more afterwards. It is very sad that he is no longer with us.
What I object to about the Bill is its kinship with certain other Bills before the House. This Bill, like them, when stripped of the necessary trimmings, is a Bill of few words. Clause 1 merely provides:
The Board of Trade may make rules with respect to the testing of anchors and chain cables …
That is all. This seems to me to be a typical Socialist blanket enabling Bill, just like another one, the "Nationalising of Computers Bill" alias the Post Office (Data Processing Service) Bill which, in seven words, enables the same sort of

thing to be done without safeguards, undertakings or assurances of any kind.
This Bill does not say that the Board of Trade "shall" make rules; it says that the Board of Trade "may" make rules. I consider legislation in this form to be a contempt of Parliament. We go to a lot of trouble over getting elections and representation in the House and yet we have frivolous wording in Bills of this sort merely saying that the Board of Trade may do anything it likes about anchors and chain cables, just as the Post Office may expect to do anything it likes about computer communication networks. This is an insult to the process of democracy, and this is why I regard this as a nasty little Bill. I opposed it before when it reared its ugly little head, and so I oppose it again.
Having said what I think of this thoroughly defective Bill, I should like to make clear that I do not approach this subject in any nihilistic or unconstructive sense. As a practising seaman, I am in favour of the testing of anchors and chain cables. I am in favour of the marking of anchors and chain cables as having been satisfactorily tested. I am in favour of the obliging of all registered vessels to carry and use only anchors and chain cables which have been tested and marked. I am in favour of putting the onus for that on the owners of the ship, and, if need be, the placing of writs on the ship against the master as the representative of the owners. However, that is the position today. The 1889 Act ensures all those things. Why, then, must we have to put up with this little specimen of creeping Socialism?
The principal argument for the Bill which was put forward by the then Minister in Committee was that it was
to ensure that British manufacturers shall have freedom to have their product tested by equipment on their own premises if they have such equipment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. Standing Committee C, 19th May, 1965; c. 13.]
That is an excellent idea. I am sure that it is a very reasonable way of extending the provisions of the existing legislation. However, I understand that, apart from the four testing houses which exist and whose cause was fought for and won in the Standing Committee when the Government accepted, unwillingly enough, the Amendment put forward by one of their own supporters……

Mr. Webster: The Government did not accept it. They were defeated on a Division. It was a decision of the Committee.

Dr. Bennett: I was being immensely polite and courteous, as usual, to the admirable Minister on the Government Front Bench. I said that the Government accepted it unwillingly. It was forced upon them. It was to be incorporated in this beastly little Bill until it died, quietly strangled, on Report. There are four testing and proving houses which still exist. As I say, Mr. Henderson, the then right hon. Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, put forward an Amendment in their favour.
However, to quote the words of the Minister again:
As far as we know there are only three chain manufacturers who have the equipment for testing a full length cable, although several places have equipment of some kind… As far as we know no anchor manufacturers have anchor testing equipment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee C, 19th May, 1965; c. 13.]
So what is all this about? All that we are doing is allowing three manufacturers to test their own products. Nothing is changed. All that we have is a Bill which gives no one any guidance and which gives the country no assurance that guidance will be forthcoming.
As I have said, we have a Bill which provides that the Board of Trade can do what it likes. Is this a sufficient reason for the issuing of a blank cheque? It is nonsense. But, since we have the Bill before us, ostensibly in the light of new circumstances, there are plenty of new points which it should include. There are new materials. There are new types of vessel. There are new lower limits of size which are relevant today. In 1899 the late Mr. Frank Cooper was the only man mad enough to go cruising in a converted fishing boat for pleasure. Nowadays many people do so at very great expense. A smaller ship may very well cost as much as a much larger ship and be of as much value to the owners and underwriters and need as much protection, when the weather comes in hard, as any of the bigger, more classical type of ship.
The 1899 Act had a Schedule on testing establishments including those of the mayors and burgesses of Hull and of

Bristol. I remember that we discussed on the former occasion whether mayoral chains had been tested. The Bill has absolutely no Schedule. It has no factual content. The Minister at that time said that there was some point in keeping some flexibility in this matter, but here there is the flexibility of a drunken snake. It would be much more flexible if a few new establishments were added to existing ones and if necessary we could leave out the mayors and burgesses of Hull and of Bristol.
Surely something is needed in Schedules dealing with tensile strengths. The 1899 Act had Schedules dealing with them but this Bill has none. It is merely an enabling Bill. We have to swallow the Bill—not the anchor—and wait for rules which may or may not be made. Many of these materials are standard and have been unchanged since 1899. Why on earth should there not be tables of testing strengths included in a Schedule to the Bill where they could be referred to? All that we need do is to add new tables for new materials and new patterns of anchor as they arise. This could be done in a Schedule.
We could have Schedules dealing both with testing establishments and tensile strengths and these provisions could be removed or added to by affirmative or even negative Resolution of both Houses. This would give the Bill some material and still enable it to be changed without the burden of having to put new legislation through all stages whenever we wanted to make a change to the existing Measure. On testing establishments and on tensile strengths the Bill is defective.
Since 1899 several new types of vessel have been evolved. This Bill should bring them within its scope. The Bill refers to registered ships, but there are new types of vessel which are just as much ships, just as important and in their own ways just as established as registered ships, but this matter has been side-stepped. Here was a unique opportunity for bringing all these things under the same form of legislation.
I say this because those of us who have been in this House long enough have discovered that quite soon in one's Parliamentary career when something has not been put into a particular Bill during its passage through the House, when the matter is mentioned later there is a not very


pleasant smugness shown by the Department concerned and the reply is, "This should have been brought up at the time when the Bill was before the House. You had your opportunity then. Why did you not propose that it should be in the Bill?" One needs to be more than a little tenacious in trying to get the right thing done when the opportunity occurs so that there will not be that type of Parliamentary brush-off later.

Mr. Webster: That is not quite so bad as what appears to be happening when we are reminded that two years ago we had an assurance from the Minister of State and now we appear to be getting a brush-off.

Dr. Bennett: I agree. This is a specific point which has arisen during the debate this morning. There were all the undertakings and judgments given which were quoted a great deal in debates on the Finance Bill last year when we discussed Customs legislation with reference to hovercraft. On that occasion two years ago Mr. Redhead said:
I am advised that it is not free of legal doubt, as the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster) said. It has not been tested in the courts at any time, but the view taken by the Customs for the purpose about which I was concerned was that it …
the hovercraft—
is a ship. This is the basis upon which the duty relief provisions will be administered in that particular connection."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee C, 19th May, 1965; c. 69.]
That was the judgment of a Minister and the whole matter has been discussed again in the interminable debates late at night on the Finance Bill. To say that we should wait for special legislation is not only wrong but actually dangerous.
I frequently commute by hovercraft. The hovercraft is a very thriving industrial business and probably its most successful commercial application is the service which I use in crossing the Solent with great frequency. Are we to wait for special legislation knowing how slowly such legislation is produced in this House which is always preoccupied with idiotic Socialist dogmata? Can we afford to wait until after the hovercraft, which is known to break down sometimes, has had some trouble with its anchors or chain cables and may drift into the path of some other vessel? I saw one being towed up Portsmouth Harbour since the beginning of the

Whitsun Recess. If there had not been plenty of boats about it would have had to anchor.
Is it right that passengers employing hovercraft should not know that they are not in any way under any assurance given by the Government that the conditions under which they would anchor in distress are not being supervised by the Government? This is a matter of great urgency which cannot wait for special legislation.
My hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare, with his well-known passion, mentioned drilling rigs, which are an unorthodox type of craft. Surely they should not be outside the law simply because they are unorthodox. That seems a very strange doctrine. They carry anchors. I do not think they are anchors of 300,000 lb. because 300,000 lb. is a lot of tons, and I do not think many ships could float with anchors of that weight. I think my hon. Friend intended to say 30,000 lb.

Mr. Webster: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing me to put the record right. I put in an extra 0 because I was excited.

Dr. Bennett: It was another link in the long chain of 0s.
Another type of vessel mentioned in previous debates on this interesting subject which was not mentioned is a type which has probably not been built since the 1899 Act—the old chain ferry which goes on its painful course across various estuaries and harbours. There was one at Portsmouth which finally expired with a gasp and has now been scrapped. There is one asthmatically wheezing its way across the Itchen at Southampton and one which goes across the Medina at Cowes. There is one at Torpoint.
There is one in that dangerous estuary at Poole Harbour, where even the boom intended to keep the oil out or in was torn away by the strength of the tides. If a boom intended to keep the oil out or in can be torn away by the strength of the tides, it stands to reason that the floating bridge ferry that pulls itself across that estuary, across that very rapidly moving water—the ferry goes far faster sideways through the water than it goes lengthways along the chain, if the dimensions can be distinguished—is a


conveyance in which a large number of people are entirely and wholly dependent upon the integrity of the chains which are used. Yet two years ago there was the most prolonged and fanatical opposition to their inclusion in that Bill.
It is not a frivolous matter to try to extend the application of the Bill to chain ferries. They are not registered ships. They could not go outside territorial waters. Nobody has made a chain long enough for that. But the passengers who use them should be entitled to the protection of the Government.
Therefore, all these things—hovercraft, drilling rigs, chain ferries—should be classified as ships, whether registered in one way or another. They are all registered in some appropriate manner. They should be classified as ships for this purpose, but they are not. The Bill merely enables. Therefore, in this sense again the Bill is defective.
Then there is the question of the lower limits of size. The 1899 Act made a lower limit for anchors which needed testing of 168 lb. I imagine that chains of comparable weight were also subject to such a lower limit. It was regarded as highly lunatic to go cruising around the coasts in vessels smaller than a fishing smack in the old days. Fishing smacks were pretty big. In fact, it is a well known old aphorism at sea that the man who goes to sea for pleasure would go to hell for a pastime. That is one of the oldest saws which have ever been said at sea. Nowadays people have entirely given that the lie. Nowadays, as the Minister of State acknowledged, there is a huge population at sea, in vessels using bower anchors of much less weight than are the minimum in the table, and often of new designs of anchor which require less weight and give the same holding power when embedded in the bottom of the sea.
The late Mr. Redhead gave a very hopeful reply to this point in the Committee proceedings on the previous Bill. He said this:
Turning to Clause 1(1,e), this provides that the rules may exempt small anchors and chain cables, and also anchors and chain cables which have been manufactured or tested outside the United Kingdom. There again the 1899 Act applies only to anchors and chain cables exceeding 168 lb. in weight. At our previous meeting there was a sugges-

tion that this figure should be amended to a lower figure, and I think 50 lb. was suggested. That was prompted by the view that with the vast increase in small craft and with the growing popularity of yachting around our coasts, it would be reasonable in the interests of safety to bring this limit down. I take that point. Whilst not committing myself on the particular figure, may I give an assurance that we shall be prepared to consider this point in formulating the rules."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee C; 26th May, 1965; c. 67–8.]
The present Minister seems to have abrogated his predecessor's statement on this matter, too. It is not just a question of bureaucratic interference with pleasure yachting. These are substantial vessels that cost far more per ton than any other form of shipping, I should be prepared to wager. They are valuable. They are insured. I should think that Lloyds would be very interested in this. These vessels carry anchors. They carry some form of cable. I would advise the House that, to have the maximum disposable ballast weight for racing, many large yachts of 20 tons or more leave their chain cable ashore and take a length of nylon warp instead.
In the debate on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill" in the previous proceedings—it was the only operative Clause—I mentioned the present Royal Yacht "Bloodhound", which some Members of the House have had an opportunity of sailing in. About 10 years ago when she was under other ownership, she was caught by a hurricane which got up from negligible strength to a wind of something like 100 or 120 m.p.h. She was entering the Solent coming in past the Nab. Then the wind got up. Even though she was a powerful ship of over 20 tons, fitting the 12-metre rules for scantlings, she was unable to get into the Solent. She was blown back out of it and ended up by having to drop anchor near the Owers Shoal. She dropped anchor there and sent up distress signals. The lifeboat came out and took off everybody on board, but was unable to take the vessel in tow because of the conditions. Those on board reckoned that they were lucky to escape with their lives.
They were taken ashore and they thought, "That is the end of the good old 'Bloodhound'." Not so. Next morning she was still bobbing serenely there off the Owers. They went off. They got


aboard. They pulled up the gear. They found that the top fathom or so of the chain was so stretched by what she had been through that the chain was not flexible at all. It was like a metal rod, all the links being bitten into one another in a straight rod. When they finally got that lot; aboard, they found that the anchor to which she had been lying had had both arms sheered off. The flukes were gone. She was lying with just the crown of the anchor—that is the swelling on the end of the shank which unites the arms—wedged in a crevice in the rocks, and that was all that was holding her.
Nothing had given. If anything had given, that would have been the end of the ship. This is why I say that it is not safe to allow these big and substantial fine-looking yachts to go to sea with nothing more than a piece of even synthetic line as an anchor warp. Registered yachts of any substantial size should carry tested chain. It is no hardship to anybody. It is not a bureaucratic interference. They should be expected to do this. They would welcome being told to do so, because it would stop their competitors from getting away with something which was not quite safe. As the Bill does not include any such provision, in this sense, once again, it is defective.
While I am on this point of yachts, with which I have a certain acquaintance, may I say that the word "registered" is still unclear to me, because the great majority of yachts of any size are registered; but the registration is slightly different from that which is known in the merchant shipping world, where a yacht has a classification and where, as the Minister's predecessor was at great pains to tell us on previous occasions, the periodical Lloyds examinations of a vessel include the anchors and chain cables of a vessel. Therefore, the argument used was that new chains and cables needed to be tested and marked, but older or secondhand chains did not need to be tested and marked, because the Lloyds' surveyors would turn them down, if necessary, on their periodical examinations of the chain and anchor. But I remind the Minister, in case he does not already know, that if one looks through the pages of Lloyd's Register, approximately one yacht per page—perhaps I am pessimistic, and there may be two—has a Lloyds' classification. Yachts are: mostly registered yachts, registered with the Board of Trade, but they

are not liable to Lloyds' periodical surveys. We need clarification on this matter. The Bill says nothing about it, and in that sense, too, it is defective.
In our debates two years ago, we on this side raised the question of moorings. In many harbours, ships lie to buoys. Neither the promoter of the Bill two years ago nor, if I remember aright, the Minister was au fait with this. I recall the Minister saying once, inadvertently, that ships tied up in harbour by using their anchor cables off the quay. This caused a certain amount of merriment among those of us who had had to handle anchors and cables. There was some doubt about whether ships ever lay to buoys at all, but, as anyone who knows about these things realises, oil ports, for example, increasingly put out large moorings for tankers now up to 120,000 tons which come to load or discharge their oil. The vessels lie off because there are submarine pipes which they can hoist to the surface and connect up in order to load or discharge cargo. Today, therefore, ships of all sizes, including the very largest, can be expected to lie to buoys.
What occurs in such circumstances? Generally, the ship uses one of its own anchor chains to make fast to the buoy. The anchor is taken off, and the chain is used and shackled direct to the buoy. Below the buoy there is the chain which never sees the light of day. It lies permanenalty between the buoy and the bottom of the sea. No one knows what that chain is. Certainly, the ship master does not, and he is supposed to be responsible under this Bill. He has no idea what goes on under the water. With a bigger ship, because of the heavy strains involved, the buoy is not used; it is hoisted clear and removed. The ship shackles straight on to the chain underneath the buoy, and there is therefore an uninterrupted length of chain from the ship to the bottom.
In these circumstances, whether the buoy is there or not, whether the ship is fast to the top of the buoy or the bottom of it, is immaterial in one sense because there is just this long length of chain cable running from the ship's hawse pipe down to the bottom. Under the Bill, the captain will be responsible for the proper standards of strength, testing and marking of the cable to which he is lying, down to the water-line. But below the water-line he is still responsible for his ship, though he does not know what is there.
I made this point strongly in the Standing Committee, as did many hon. and gallant and shell-backed Members. We insisted that moorings must be included in the provisions of such a Measure as this. The responsibility of the port authority is every bit as great, yet no such responsibility is accepted under the Bill. Therefore, the master of a ship riding out a storm on moorings has no idea what is holding his ship, and he has no assurance that Her Majesty's Government have any interest in the matter.
The Minister said earlier today that no one is compelled by this Bill to use tested and marked chain because that is all covered by regulations elsewhere. We went into this in the Standing Committee. I remember that the Government were at some disadvantage there because neither the promoter of the Bill nor dear Mr. Redhead knew one end of a ship from another, and no one could find out what were the regulations or legislative provisions under which the standards of moorings provided in ports were regulated. I do not know to this day what the standards are, and I have a deep suspicion that no such standards have been laid down. It is up to us on this occasion, now that we have the matter before us again, not to let the opportunity escape us but to get down to the job of ensuring that all chains used for the mooring of ships are subject to one standardised type of provision under a Measure of this kind. In this respect also, the Bill is defective.
With the utmost brevity, I have touched on a few respects in which the Bill is defective. There are half a dozen of them, but they are of radical importance. I regard this as an absurd Bill as drafted. I believe it to be objectionable in principle, as I have said, and to be defective in practice in many respects. We should strangle it, as we quite properly strangled the earlier Bill, or if, by some mischance, it should survive our opposition on Second Reading, it will be our business to cut it about ruthlessly in Committee. I urge the House to reject it.

12.26 p.m.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: I apologise to the Minister for not being here to hear his opening

speech. I had hoped to do so, but a deputation arrived to see me, and I was not able to come in time. If the questions which I wish to put to the hon. Gentleman were dealt with in his opening remarks, I can only apologise.
First, I take the question of the people competent to carry out these tests. Clause 1(1,c) provides for regulations to be made covering the supervision of such tests by surveyors of ships and
by such other persons as the Board of Trade may authorise".
This is a major departure from the 1899 Act, where it was clearly provided that there had to be a qualified inspector to do this work.
What worries me is that, although the shipbuilding regulations covering work done in shipyards on such matters, provide that a suitably qualified person should do the tests, the wording of the present Bill is extremely wide, covering any persons whom the Board of Trade may choose. This must be wrong.
My second question relates to the vessels to which the Bill is to apply. The 1899 Act specifically provided that it should not apply to Admiralty vessels and, presumably, to a wide range of work done in naval dockyards and elsewhere. There is nothing in the present Bill to indicate that it will not apply to Admiralty vessels. When the detailed regulations are made, it may be stated at that stage that it should not apply to Admiralty vessels, but the Government should tell us now whether they intend in such regulations to exclude Admiralty vessels, and they should also tell us why, if that is their intention.

Dr. Bennett: Does my hon. Friend recognise, as was recognised in our debates two years ago, that there are times when Admiralty vessels are disposed of to the civil market and may then be used for commercial purposes? Their anchors and chain cables may have been exempt under the Admiralty regulations, but they will not be in civil life.

Mr. Taylor: My hon. Friend makes an important point, even more important now, perhaps, than it was when the previous Bill was discussed. In the past, the Admiralty vessels constructed in our yards were essentially vessels to be used for one purpose, but in the Clyde shipyards, where


I worked for five years before coming to the House, Admiralty vessels of a far wider range of activities were built, for example, naval assault craft and supply vessels. I believe that a larger proportion of the vessels being built on Admiralty order can be used for such civil purposes. As my hon. Friend has rightly indicated, this point is even more relevant now than it was before.
My third question concerns methods of testing. When we were discussing with the Ministry the question of shipbuilding regulations, it was quite alarming to see how little progress had been made.

It being half-past Twelve o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

HOSPITALS (LAUNDRIES)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Harper.]

12.30 p.m.

Sir Ronald Russell: I asked for this debate on the cost and costing of hospital laundries following a talk I had some weeks ago about something quite different—Selective Employment Tax—with the managing director of a well-known laundry in my constituency. I thank the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health for being here and apologise to him if I have given him somewhat vague notice of some of the things I intend to raise. If I raise anything in detail of which I have not given notice sufficiently, I shall not, of course, expect an answer this morning.
I have had correspondence and conversations with other laundry experts, most of whom are anxious about the growth of hospital laundries and group and regional laundries in the hospital service in recent years, together with the effect of this on the taxpayer and on established commercial laundries. The question we have to ask is whether the growth of hospital laundries is in the national interest.
I have asked Questions of the Ministry of Health on 23rd January, 20th March and 13th April about various aspects of this problem. The first Question concerned the amount of capital invested in the past two years in building laundries

to serve hospitals in the National Health Service and the interest charged. I wanted to know how much had been saved in the cost of laundering compared with charges made by existing independent laundries. The answer in relation to capital investment was £3·6 million, including the cost of machinery. I was told that this had been financed from the general revenue—the taxpayer—and a notional calculation of the cost of borrowing would give current interest charges of about £230,000 a year.
I was also told that information about comparisons with independent laundries was not readily available in the form I sought. But it should be available. The taxpayer's money is involved and the taxpayer is hard pressed enough today. His money should not be spent on building laundries specially for hospital use unless it can be shown beyond doubt that they can do the work much more cheaply than commercial laundries when costed on exactly the same basis or that commercial laundries are not conveniently available.
The sum of £3·6 million in two years is not an unappreciable amount of money when one considers the other things that need doing in the N.H.S. I realise that, in some parts of the country, commercial laundries may not be available but in most areas they are and there are some with spare capacity. There are also some with no spare capacity but which might be expanded with help from private capital at much less cost than the building of a whole new laundry for the National Health Service. There does not seem to be enough investigation into the costing of hospital laundries. They vary enormously, as the figures contained in Part II of the Hospital Costing Returns show.
Incidentally, this must be one of the largest documents in area ever produced by the Stationery Office. It is about 15 inches by 10 inches. It only just goes into the normal briefcase and all three volumes probably would not. The Minister of Health, in answer to a supplementary question from my hon. Friend the Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine) said in relation to this subject:
… it is much more economic to run a laundry with a very large turnover than a small laundry."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th March, 1967; Vol. 743, c. 1020.]


The N.H.S. laundry with the largest turnover is the South-West Regional Hospital Board's laundry at Carshalton. Its turnover in 1966 was 144,736 items and the unit cost—per 100 items—was £2 3s. Id. The fourth laundry down the list, the Hope (Salford) laundry, had 53,357 items at an average unit cost of £1 1s. 9d.
Another point is that the number of articles laundered per operative week in the case of Carshalton was only 1,035 whereas in the case of Hope it was 1,769. A laundry with a much smaller turnover, Halifax General, which was 63rd in the list, had a turnover of 23,071 units, the average cost being only 19s. 5d. The number of items laundered per operative week was 2,728—nearly two and three-quarter times that of Carshalton. I wonder why.
This discrepancy does not fulfil the Minister's statement that it is much more economic to run a laundry with a very large turnover than a small one. On 13th April, I asked about the different unit costs at two teaching hospitals, St. George's and Guy's. I asked why the cost was £2 6s. 9d. per unit for St. George's and £1 8s. 9d. for Guy's. Both these figures are given in the Returns. The difference, apparently, is due to higher transport costs because the St. George's laundry is at Wimbledon. But there is also a lower output per operative week at St. George's—only 1,133 compared with 1,895 in the case of Guy's.
Such variations show that there should be a thorough probe into the whole costing on a national and not only a regional or group basis, particularly into the differences involved in the number of items laundered per operative week. Presumably there is more incentive and less disincentive at Halifax and Salford, for example, than at Carshalton, and more incentive at Guy's than there is at St. George's. There should be a proper comparison with commercial laundries.
I also have a figure relating to commercial laundries used by one of the London teaching hospitals, St. Mary's, Paddington. It is £2 4s. a week. I understand that the Whitley scales for the employees of hospital laundries are higher than the minimum rates agreed

with the Laundry Council for commercial laundries. Most London commercial laundries, however, pay more than the minimum rate. Some hospital laundries do not include all the items of cost which should be included. For instance, if there is a hospital administrator responsible for a laundry, is a proportion of his salary charged in the costing of the laundry? Is the rent of the land used by the laundry charged, together with the cost of the building? If the boilers serve the whole hospital, is that included?
According to the Returns, the cost of boilers per unit item is £2 9s. 9d. in the case of Loughborough Genera] Hospital, but only Is. Id. for two other hospitals, Ipswich and South-East Northumberland. There must be a very great variation in the way that costing is carried out. Commercial laundries, being independent undertakings, have to include all these items and more, and hospital laundries should be costed on the same basis. What proportion of laundry work is done in hospital laundries and what proportion is done by contract? I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be able to give me that answer. I wonder how many hospital laundries obtain commercial quotations as a check against their own costs.
Finally, without wanting to be dogmatic about this, is not this really a problem of private enterprise versus nationalisation in the form of group or regional laundry units? Surely the test should be cost and efficiency. The hospital service should not be allowed to spend public money on building laundries unless no commercial laundries are available and unless it can be proved beyond any doubt that hospital laundries can do the work more cheaply, after being properly costed.

12.40 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Julian Snow): I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wembley, South (Sir R. Russell) for his acceptance that he may have asked me certain questions of detail to which, without notice, I would not be able to provide answers. However, I must say that I agree with his general case that there should be the maximum possible publicity to the statistics upon which the costing and costs of laundries are based.
At the inception of the National Health Service, there were more than 1,000 hospital laundries, mostly of small capacity. During the early years, resources were used mainly on maintaining existing plant and machinery and it was not until the end of the 1950s that the hospital authorities began a programme of replacing uneconomic plant and improving productive efficiency and quality standards. The main development lay in the closure of some of the smaller and less efficient units and the concentration of work in larger hospital laundries where improved facilities would achieve economies of scale. This process of rationalisation, the establishment of group laundries serving neighbouring hospitals, has resulted in the closure of about 450 smaller hospital laundries since 1948.
The planning of hospital laundry services rests with regional hospital boards and with the boards of governors of teaching hospitals as part of their responsibility for hospital development programmes. To assist hospital authorities in their task, the Ministry issues guidance about the design, equipment and cost limits of hospital laundries. In addition, the Ministry has a small staff of professional laundry engineers who are available to visit hospitals on request from hospital authorities who are contemplating reorganising their laundry services and to advise on technical and other questions affecting the efficiency of operations.
Furthermore, by virtue of the Ministry's membership of the British Launderers' Research Association both the Ministry and individual hospital authorities have available to them facilities for keeping in touch with modern developments in the industry. Hospital authorities have access to the Association's library and advisory service and full information is made available to the Ministry on the results of relevant research carried out by the Association.
Separate figures for laundry investment are not maintained centrally, but in the financial years 1964–65 and 1965–66 hospital authorities in England and Wales spent a total of £3·6 million in building and equipping hospital laundries. Any forecast of future expenditure must necessarily be tentative since priorities are kept under continuous review and the total capital resources available from year to year are subject to the prevailing econo-

mic circumstances at the time. However, the present plans of hospital authorities envisage spending £10 million on laundries up to 1970, slightly more than half on the provision of new and the remainder on the improvement of existing laundries.
Hospital authorities are, of course, conscious of the need to take full account of local circumstances, including transport costs, the local labour available and, not least, the possibility of using commercial services for hospital laundry. As I shall show the hon. Gentleman later in my observations, this is a dominant consideration when examining these problems. But decisions whether laundry should be done by direct labour or contractual services, assuming that it can be done satisfactorily either way, must depend on the economics of each case.
Hospital costing arrangements are governed by the relevant Statutory Instrument, No. 1414 of 1948, which requires hospital authorities to prepare cost accounts in such form as the Minister may prescribe. A working party set up by the Minister to devise a full Departmental costing system for hospitals reported in 1955 and from 1956–57 onwards laundries have been costed on the basis of the cost per 100 articles laundered. The costed expenditure includes all the direct costs—salaries and wages, steam, materials and so on—and depreciation on plant and equipment. It does not, however, include interest charges on capital expenditure on land and buildings, nor any allowance for general hospital overheads.
This is because the primary purpose of the costing system is to assist hospital authorities themselves in the day-to-day management of hospital laundries by keeping costs under continuous review and to provide a common basis for comparing performances with other hospital laundries. It is not designed to provide a straightforward comparison between the cost of hospital laundry services and contractual services. Nevertheless, hospital authorities can readily adapt their existing costing system in cases where they would find it useful to assess the relative costs of hospital laundries against the cost of commercial laundry contracts.
In 1965–66, the latest year for which information is available, the average


cost per 100 articles laundered for a sample of 183 laundries serving more than one hospital was £1 11s. 8d. The costs ranged from 17s. to £3 13s. 3d. The lower costs occurred mainly where the scale of operations was greatest and also because there is some employment of patients in laundries attached to mental illness hospitals. In case the hon. Gentleman thinks that the cost of such labour is included, I should say that it is, but payments to mental patients are not on a commercial scale, for obvious reasons. Conversely, the highest costs were mainly in those laundries operating on a relatively small scale. There is also a wide fluctuation in efficiency measured by the average number of articles laundered per operative per week, and this is a reflection mainly of the extent to which modern laundry equipment is in use.
The hon. Gentleman may like to know that an alternative cost unit "per 100 lb. dried weight" has been introduced on an experimental basis in cases where weighing facilities are available, and the value of this unit of measurement will be assessed when the 1966–67 cost accounts become available later this year. The costed expenditure covered will be the same as that used to produce the cost per 100 articles laundered.
Both the measurement units can be criticised, because they do not reflect the size of laundry or the particular laundering process involved, but any improvement would mean using a complicated system of weightings for the many different articles laundered and the costing process would consequently be more time consuming and expensive. Furthermore, it is not clear whether there would be any consequential advantage for hospital management, and we consider that the present arrangements are adequate for the purposes of financial control.
Since the present hospital costing system does not include items such as interest on capital, it might be contended that the costing figures do not reflect the real cost of the work done in hospital laundries and that in some cases it would prove advantageous for hospitals to use the services of commercial laundries instead of investing in laundries of their own. However, boards are conscious of

the need to plan laundry services taking account of local circumstances, geography, communications and transport costs, local labour supply and availability of commercial laundries able to provide reliable and economic services. Indeed, the latter is considered, as part of a board's submission, when it seeks approval of individual building schemes including a laundry. I emphasise that before approval is given to the building of a new laundry, or substantial re-equipment, the whole position of local availability of commercial services is investigated.
Comparisons between the cost of providing direct labour services and contractual services very widely in different parts of the country. It would be wrong to compare the costs of the least efficient of the former with the most competitive of the latter, especially when they are not in the same locality. There is no doubt, however, if only because of the physical limitations of space as well as capital resources, that some hospitals in built-up areas will need to continue to rely on the services of commercial laundries for some time to come.
Hospital authorities, wherever possible, obtain competing quotations from commercial laundries before entering into contracts for laundry work. Although the position has improved, we have had the experience in the Department of not being able to obtain competitive tenders. Not all commercial laundries have the necessary capacity to provide a satisfactory service to hospitals at competitive rates. The capacity varies widely in different parts of the country and at different periods not unrelated to the state of the domestic economy.
Thus, in a cool atmosphere, economically speaking, as is normally commercially to be expected, there are more offers by commercial laundries to service hospitals than in times when their facilities and capacity are fully absorbed by other work. In 1965, for example, several hospitals in the London area without their own laundries experienced some difficulty in obtaining competitive tenders for laundry work from London firms. The position has now improved.
Another factor which might have some bearing on the willingness of commercial laundries to undertake hospital work is the problem of fouled and infected linen.


I hope that the hon. Gentleman will pay close attention to this. Hospitals with attached laundries are generally better equipped to cope with this problem by means of segregation, preliminary sluicing and disinfection of the soiled work before the normal laundering process is undertaken. This work is reflected in the costing of these hospital laundries. On the other hand, hospitals which use commercial laundry services must themselves carry out the preliminary sluicing and disinfection before the work is passed to the laundry contractor, which process inevitably involves some double handling.
In 1959, the Central Health Services Council issued a Report on Hospital Laundry Arrangements which was circulated to hospital authorities with the Minister's commendation. The Report recommended, inter alia, procedures designed to minimise the handling of fouled and infected linen to prevent cross-infection. Articles in these categories should be segregated in impermeable bags from ordinary soiled linen and subjected to preliminary sluicing and disinfection as appropriate before being laundered. Sluicing should be done with mechanical sluicing equipment and disinfection is achieved by means of soaking in a recommended solution of disinfectant.
I wanted to emphasise that point because the public should know all the factors involved, and the question of cross-infection from hospital to public, and even vice versa, has to be very seriously considered. The information about the proportion of hospitals with or without their own laundries is not readily available. However, if the hon. Gentleman would say what sort of statistics he would like, we could produce the information, although it would not be easy because of the complications and the variations in practice. For instance, some hospitals contract outside and also have their own laundries.
No one would disagree, however that, given a completely reliable commercial service, the criterion of choice between the one method or the other should continue to be efficiency combined with economy of expenditure. Although there is perhaps a natural tendency for capital investment by hospital authorities to be devoted to urgent projects more directly affecting the well-being of patients, the

total capital investment in hospital laundries is by no means insignificant. It must be our continuing aim to ensure the maximum returns from such investment, and hospital authorities as well as my Department are fully conscious of this responsibility.
With the advent of new and larger machinery and the increasing use of automation the future trend is in the direction of larger group laundries to take full advantage of the economies of scale which they can achieve. The Ministry's professional engineers are keeping abreast of technological developments in the industry and taking active steps to encourage the use of advanced techniques in hospital laundries. In this way productivity and efficiency are continually being improved.
Moreover, benefits which are essentially long-term can be expected to derive from the efforts of the specification working groups set up by the Ministry's Supply Division primarily to examine the requirements for, and the most suitable methods of purchase of, items of equipment and commodities widely used in the hospital service. These benefits are likely to accrue from greater standardisation of textiles used in hospitals.
The report on bed linen, for example, which has recently been circulated to hospital authorities, not only recommends articles of standard quality, but also of standard size. The latter consideration, in particular, may be regarded as of incidental, but, nevertheless, welcome advantage in the laundering processes. Similar developments may be expected with other textiles in due course.
Of more immediate concern, perhaps, a working party of chief O & M and work study officers of regional hospital boards has recently prepared a draft report bringing together the practical knowledge and experience gained from surveys and studies conducted by them in almost 100 laundries in the hospital service. The report, which is expected to be published shortly, is concerned with managerial and operational aspects of hospital laundries and suggests possible improvements with a view to increasing productivity.
Methods are also suggested whereby individual laundry managers can readily measure standards of performance. An important part of the report deals with


the future planning of hospital laundries, and sets out data for determining the optimum size of laundries taking account of variations in size and location of the hospitals to be served and other local circumstances.
The hon. Member asked about the present position at certain specified hospitals. In 1965–66 the costs per 100 articles laundered were: £1 8s. 9d. at Guy's; £1 15s. 3d. at St. Bartholomew's; £2 6s. 9d. at St. George's. Transport costs are incurred at St. Bartholomew's and St. George's because the laundries are situated at Swanley and Wimbledon, but the main reason for the higher costs is the lower output per operative per week as compared with Guy's Hospital where an incentive bonus scheme is in operation.
The lower output at St. Bartholomew's Hospital is mainly due to the inadequacy of its worn-out boiler equipment—which was inherited—and which is to be replaced under a £50,000 scheme in hand; some new machinery is also due to be installed. An experimental bonus system for increasing the productivity of operatives at the St. George's Hospital laundry was introduced last month, but it is much too soon to judge the results.
In 1965, the Minister authorised six experimental studies designed to reveal the extent to which different types of incentive schemes could contribute to increased productivity coupled with enhanced remuneration. One scheme has been operating since the beginning of this year, and three are in course of introduction, including the one at St. George's. After a trial period of operation each scheme will be evaluated to see

whether it will be possible to extend some type of bonus scheme more widely.
It is to be noted that Report No. 29 of the National Board for Prices and Incomes entitled "The Pay and Conditions of Manual Workers in Local Authorities, the National Health Service, Gas and Water Supply", recommends the introduction generally of schemes of payment relating earnings to performance for all manual workers in the National Health Service. In the short term, this would be on a fairly rough and ready basis, directly relating increases in pay to overall savings in manpower. In the longer-term, say after two or three years, any bonus scheme would depend on accurate work-study measurement and control; but this will need a large increase in trained work-study staff.
During the debate, I have dealt with many aspects of a part of the work of the hospital service which, although important, tends to receive perhaps less public attention than it deserves. Therefore, the House is indebted to the hon. Gentleman for initiating this debate. Although the hospital laundry service may cost a lot of money in terms of capital investment, I can assure the hon. Member that we are fully conscious of its importance. I hope that he will agree that I have set out in my reply a convincing case that the Minister and the Department are conscious of the economic requirements of the situation, and of the need to make hospital laundry services as efficient as possible. However, when commercial laundries can be shown to be more economic, they will be seriously considered.

It being One o'clock Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER suspended the Sitting till half-past Two o'clock, pursuant to Order.

Sitting resumed at 2.30 p.m.

CENTENARY OF CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

Mr. Speaker: I have a communication to make to the House. I received from the Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons a copy of a Resolution which was passed in that House on Monday, 8th May last. I shall now read to the House the version in English:
The House of Commons, Canada,
Resolved, That this House, acknowledging the Resolution of the British House of Commons conveying most friendly greetings and warm congratulations on the centenary of the establishment of the Canadian House of Commons and all good wishes for the second century of its existence,
Recalling the unfailing good will extended to it by the British House of Commons at the time of Confederation and throughout the century that has followed;
Mindful that parliamentary institutions, our heritage from the Mother of Parliaments, have served Canada well during the past 100 years;
Requests Mr. Speaker to express to the British House of Commons sincere and grateful appreciation for its kind greetings and congratulations.
A copy of the Resolution in both English and French will be placed in the Library together with the relevant OFFICIAL REPORT.

PRIVATE BUSINESS

LONDON TRANSPORT (No. 2) BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

BRITISH RAILWAYS (No. 2) BILL

ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL (CANVEY ISLAND APPROACHES, ETC.) BILL

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time

STANDING ORDERS (PRIVATE BUSINESS)

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [11th May] That the Amendment to Standing Orders relating to Private Business set out in the following Schedule be made:—

Schedule

Standing Order 242, line 20, at end add 'but only if objection to locus standi or such rights has been made in a memorial duly deposited as aforesaid'.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Far East Air Force (Squadrons)

Mr. Onslow: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many light bomber squadrons, ground attack squadrons and Royal Air Force Regiment squadrons, were included in the Far East Air Force in February, 1967.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): Excluding aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force, the numbers of Royal Air Force squadrons were one, one and two, respectively.

Mr. Onslow: Why, therefore, did this year's Defence White Paper suggest that there was more than one R.A.F. ground attack squadron in the Far East Air Force? How many ground attack squadrons does the hon. Gentleman expect to be in the Far East in February, 1968?

Mr. Rees: The relevant passage was designed to be a broad statement about the Far East Air Force. It is not the practice to give an order of battle. It certainly was not intended to be specific. Nevertheless, I agree that paragraph 15 might have been better worded. As to the beginning of next year, the hon. Member had better wait.

British Forces (Far East)

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Defence his estimate of the number of troops Great Britain will have in the Far East at the end of 1968.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): I have made no estimate.

Mr. Blaker: The Secretary of State himself referred to the level of troops which it was planned to have in the Far East before confrontation. Can he, for the benefit of the House, translate that expression into numbers of Service men from the United Kingdom forces?

Mr. Healey: No, Sir, I cannot do that. What I have always said was that


when confrontation came to an end—I said that while confrontation was still going on—we planned to reduce our forces in the Far East to the levels obtaining before confrontation, although not necessarily to the same pattern of forces, because the world has moved on since then and weapons are different. What I have made clear to the House and elsewhere is that during the next 12 months we propose further reductions in the Far East which, taking those working in and for the forces together, will reduce the numbers by 20,000 compared with the level in July last year before confrontation came to an end.

Mr. Humphrey Atkins: When the Secretary of State says that he is planning to reduce forces to the level obtaining before confrontation, he must be able to tell us what those figures are.

Mr. Healey: I have made it clear that it is roughly those levels, but I am not prepared necessarily to stick to the same pattern as the previous Government planned in 1963. I do not think that anybody, on either side of the House, would think that that made sense.

Mr. Marten: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the future of British forces in the Far East.

Mr. G. Campbell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on his plans for the future strength of British armed forces east of Suez.

Mr. Dickens: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the future strength of British armed forces east of Suez.

Mr. Stratton Mills: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a further statement about the future of British forces and bases in the Far East.

Mr. Healey: I would refer to the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967, and to my Answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) on 1st May. [Vol. 746, cc. 90–94.]

Mr. Marten: In view of the developing situation in the Far East, what proposals have the Government to honour their obligation under the S.E.A.T.O.

Treaty, particularly about sending military forces to Thailand?

Mr. Healey: As the House will know, the Government have made certain force declarations under certain S.E.A.T.O. contingency plans, and they propose to honour them if called upon to do so.

Mr. G. Campbell: When the Secretary of State referred just now to not sticking to the same pattern of forces in the Far East, was that simply another way of saying that the levels of forces would be different from the levels before confrontation?

Mr. Healey: No, not that the levels will be different. Of course, we have made no commitment. We may in the end change the levels. Our immediate intention, however, is to get down to the pre-confrontation level and I hope to have achieved that by April next year, considerably earlier than I expected a year ago.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the concern about the ambiguity of Her Majesty's Government's position? Could not this be greatly helped by a statement by the right hon. Gentleman indicating a presence east of Suez for a minimum period?

Mr. Healey: I do not think that there is any ambiguity about Her Majesty's Government's policy. It was fully described in last year's and this year's White Papers and I had the impression that it had the support of most right hon. and hon. Members opposite.

Sir G. Sinclair: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the strength of British forces in Malaya and Singapore in a year's time; and what rôle he sees for them under the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation or a reorganised South-East Asia Treaty Organisation.

Mr. Healey: I expect that the total of British forces in Singapore and Malaysia, service and civilian, including crews on sea service in the Far East and locally employed personnel, will be about 70,000 in April, 1968. As now, certain of these forces could be made available for operations under the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty if the need arose.

Sir G. Sinclair: Will these arrangements enable Great Britain to carry out her obligations to Thailand and Malaysia and her duties to Australia and New Zealand when they are already engaged in defending their existence?

Mr. Healey: I am not quite sure what the hon. Gentleman meant by the last few words of his Question. If he meant that British forces should participate in the war in Vietnam, he knows that that is not Her Majesty's Government's policy. As far as British commitments are concerned, I am satisfied that the reductions which we propose will not impair our ability to fulfil them.

Mr. Luard: Has the Secretary of State had discussions recently about the level of locally engaged personnel in Singapore, and will he agree that any economic assistance which needs to be given to Singapore is better given for the assistance of industry than for retaining locally engaged personnel for our forces which may not be needed?

Mr. Healey: I agree with that last point, and, as I said in the House on an earlier occasion, I have had discussions with the Governments of Singapore and Malaysia about possible plans for running down locally engaged and enlisted personnel.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Of the 70,000 given in the right hon. Gentleman's first Answer, can he say how many are civilians?

Mr. Healey: No, Sir. This is one of the matters which we are still discussing in detail with the Governments of those countries. I am not prepared to make an announcement on that until I have their consent to do so.

Sir G. Sinclair: asked the Secretary of State for Defence in view of the continued threat from the north to countries of South-East Asia, what he is doing to ensure that British forces in Malaya and Singapore learn from the experience of South Vietnamese, Australian, New Zealand, American and Korean troops in Vietnam.

Mr. Healey: Information is obtained through the defence attaches on the Staff of H.M. Ambassador in Saigon and an officer attached to the Thai/United States Military Research and Development

Centre in Bangkok. Additionally, occasional visits are paid to South Vietnam by British Service personnel to investigate questions of military interest; these visits are purely fact finding and do not involve British personnel in observing or participating in operations.

Sir G. Sinclair: Is the Minister satisfied that, through this very gossamer-like liaison, British forces in the Far East are getting the maximum from the experience being gained by the countries which I have mentioned in the war in Vietnam?

Mr. Healey: Yes, Sir. One of the reasons why we increased substantially the number of our defence attaches in Saigon was to obtain relevant information. The House should be aware that we learned a great deal about the way to deal with this type of problem ourselves during the confrontation operations—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ten years ago."] The confrontation operation was not 10 years ago, as hon. Gentlemen opposite seem to imagine. It ended last August.

Mr. Blaker: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us how many defence attaches there are on the staff of our Ambassador in Saigon?

Mr. Healey: Yes, Sir. There are seven.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what factors he took into account, when deciding upon the reductions in British force levels in the Far East.

Mr. Healey: Our own general interests, those of our friends and allies, and the need to reduce our defence and foreign exchange expenditure.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Can the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the Australian Government's views were fully taken into account, because judging by the remarks of the Australian Minister for External Affairs at the recent S.E.A.T.O. Conference, this does not seem to be the case?

Mr. Healey: We are, of course, in continuous consultation with all our allies and those Commonwealth Governments who may be affected by any reductions which we may make. We shall carry on further negotiations, particularly with the


Australian Government in the coming months, when the Australian Prime Minister is in Britain.

Aden

Mr. Marten: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the latest plans for withdrawing from Aden.

Mr. Stratton Mills: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the latest plans for withdrawing British forces from Aden.

Mr. Healey: There is no change in our plans to withdraw from the Aden base when South Arabia achieves independence; the families are now coming home and we have begun to run down our stocks.

Mr. Marten: Surely, in the light of current events, and particularly of Russia's open support for Egypt, will not the Government have a defence arrangement with the Federal Government where British forces will remain in Aden for the maximum period after independence?

Mr. Healey: I fail to see how what is happening in May this year 1,000 miles to the north of Aden need affect our plans about what we do in Aden next year.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Is it not clear that whether or not there is a formal defence agreement with the South Arabian Federation, public opinion in Britain would not stand by and see external aggression reduce the Federation to a shambles? Would not the Minister confirm that there is, and must be, a de facto understanding that we would not let that situation happen?

Mr. Healey: Public opinion in Britain is interested in many things, including the reduction of our defence expenditure and the abolition of facilities in countries where, because of local opposition, we are not able to make use of them. On the broader aspects of the Aden question, as the House knows, it will have an opportunity shortly of debating the matter and I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will then be able to give further information on Her Majesty's Government's policy.

Mr. Colin Jackson: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that there has been no change in Her Majesty's Government's policy in relation to the withdrawal of British forces from Aden by 1968? Secondly, can he say whether there has been any change in the phased programme for the withdrawal of families?

Mr. Healey: There is no change whatever concerning families, and the withdrawal is well under way. It started at the beginning of this month and one-quarter have already been withdrawn. In reply to the earlier part of the question, there has been no change in Her Majesty's Government's policy.

Mr. Powell: Is the right hon. Gentleman seriously saying that in the Government's view the possibility of hostilities at the north end of the Red Sea is irrelevant to the presence of British forces in Southern Arabia?

Mr. Healey: I say that a crisis in the middle of 1967 is not relevant to what we may do in 1968.

Mr. Dodds-Parker: What is the Secretary of State doing about defending the families of other than Service personnel?

Mr. Healey: We shall continue to give protection to British civilians in Aden as long as our forces are there.

Future Fleet Requirements Committee

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he will announce the future size and shape of the Royal Navy as a result of the deliberations of the Future Fleet Requirements Committee.

Mr. Wall: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the Government decisions regarding the report of the Future Fleet Committee.

Mr. Hamling: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will now make a statement on the future of the Royal Navy.

Mr. Healey: As stated in paragraph 42 of Chapter I of the Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1967, final decisions on the shape and size of our defence forces in the 1970s must await the outcome of discussions with our partners in N.A.T.O.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Is it not true that on 7th March last year the right hon. Gentleman said that the major decisions considering our Armed Forces had now been taken? We are now told that there is to be a new level of Armed Forces and a new shape to the Royal Navy. Did not this Committee report in August last year? When will the right hon. Gentleman come before the House and give the facts about the future shape, size and commitments of the Royal Navy?

Mr. Healey: As the hon. Gentleman knows, because I sent him the relevant extract from HANSARD, in the same paragraph as I said that the major decisions had been taken, I indicated that there would be some adjustment downwards in the level of all three armed Services.
The size and shape of the Royal Navy in the future is a matter which has required, as has the size and shape of all three armed Services, not only detailed discussions inside the Ministry but with our allies. As soon as I am in a position to give the outcome of all those considerations, I will do so.

Mr. Wall: Is the Minister proposing to publish a White Paper on the future of the Royal Navy before the end of this Session? Will he bear in mind that the vessel most required by the Foreign Secretary in the current rash of crises is the aircraft carrier, which he proposes to eliminate?

Mr. Healey: I will consider whether or not to include a statement on the future of the Royal Navy in the next White Paper on defence which I publish, whenever I publish it.
As to the value of the carrier, I have never denied that the carrier represents an immensely valuable capability in Her Majesty's Forces, and I propose to make the best possible use of it so long as we have it. At the same time, as the House debated thoroughly last year, I do not believe that we should have been justified in building a new carrier and seeking to prolong the life of our carrier force beyond 1975 in the light of the likely reduction in our commitments in that period and the fact that a carrier's jobs can be done almost as well and a great deal more cheaply by other means.

Mr. Hamling: Can my right hon. Friend say what steps he is taking to

provide for the Royal Navy the cheaper frigates which have recently been announced in certain yards?

Mr. Healey: I am afraid that my hon. Friend must await a further announcement on that matter. I recognise the need for producing the most cost-effective vessels for the Royal Navy, and I have that consideration very much in mind.

Mr. Powell: Is it not ironic that, 15 months after the House was told that the major decisions had been taken following the Government's much vaunted Defence Review, the size and shape of all our forces is in greater uncertainty today than ever before?

Mr. Healey: No, Sir. The imagination boggles to think of the uncertainty which would have been created if the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) had been the Secretary of State for Defence and in dispute with every member of his own Front Bench on what our defence policy should be.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the only type of base which can be removed without capital loss when local conditions become unfavourable is the aircraft carrier, and reapply that to his future thinking?

Mr. Healey: We have debated this matter at great length on many occasions, and the House has come to the conclusion that the Government's policy is right.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Will the Secretary of State help us by saying by what means he thinks that the present rôle fulfilled by the aircraft carrier can be performed more effectively and cheaply?

Mr. Healey: Mr. Speaker, you would probably call me to order if I sought to repeat the speeches which I made in the last two debates and which, as I said, received the approval of the House.

Prematurely Terminated Service

Sir T. Beamish: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give an assurance that men and women of all ranks in the Services who have their careers terminated prematurely as a result of Government policy, will receive


full compensation in addition to the full gratuity, terminal grant, pension or other benefits to which they are entitled by virtue of their length of service; and if he will make a statement.

The Minister of Defence for Administration (Mr. G. W. Reynolds): I share the concern of the hon. and gallant Gentleman that all those affected should be fairly treated, but I regret that I cannot yet make a statement.

Sir T. Beamish: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the widespread suspicion that the decision has already been taken to offer terms substantially less generous than those given in 1957? Will he take this opportunity to scotch this very unpleasant rumour by making it clear that compensation will be as fair and generous as it was 10 years ago?

Mr. Reynolds: If any suspicion exists, it is completely unfounded, because no decision has been taken. Once a decision has been taken, I will make a statement to the House.

Mr. Atkins: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that the redundancy payments legislation does not apply to the Armed Forces?

Mr. Reynolds: I would rather that that was put to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour, but I think that the hon. Gentleman is quite correct.

Vietnam

Mr. Humphrey Atkins: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will now allow British officers to go to Vietnam as observers so as to ensure that Her Majesty's forces are kept fully informed of all developments in this type of warfare.

Mr. Healey: No, Sir.

Mr. Atkins: Why on earth not?

Mr. Healey: Because we are satisfied that we are obtaining all the information required for our own purposes about lessons of the war in Vietnam by the methods to which I have just referred in answer to the previous Question.

Service Casualties (Notification)

Mr. Onslow: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now issue an

instruction that the next of kin of Service casualties should in future be notified personally by a representative of the Service concerned, or by the police, instead of by telegram; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Reynolds: No, Sir. I appreciate the need for the utmost sympathy in these cases, but I feel that the present procedure is the most reliable. All three Services do provide for personal contact with the next of kin to advise on the funeral arrangements and to give what other help they can.

Mr. Onslow: Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that experience suggests that the notification of next of kin by telegram causes considerable distress which might be alleviated if the message were conveyed in person rather than on paper?

Mr. Reynolds: It is considered that notification by telegram is the least unsatisfactory method of doing it. It is reliable and prompt. However, all three Services make arrangements for personal calls as well.

Mr. Lipton: While at the moment the number of casualties is mercifully small and perhaps different considerations would apply if there were full-scale operations in various parts of the world, would it not obviate a lot of unnecessary distress if personal contact were made at the earliest possible moment rather than notifying by telegram?

Mr. Reynolds: That could be argued, but the matter has been looked at very carefully by all three Services during the last two or three years. With regard to the case which I assume caused this Question to be put down, I have looked at a full report of all that was done by the Regimental Headquarters of the Irish Guards, and I was pleased to see the terrific amount of consideration given to the timing and method of informing the unfortunate widow.

Official Cars, Germany (Foreign Manufacture)

Sir R. Russell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the number of official cars used by all ranks of the British Army of the Rhine and the Royal Air Force in Germany, which are of foreign manufacture; and why all


official cars are not of British manufacture.

Mr. Reynolds: The figure is the same as I gave to the hon. Gentleman in my Answer of 6th March.—[Vol. 742 c. 212.]

Sir R. Russell: Does that include West Berlin? Are not there many more German vehicles in use in West Berlin?

Mr. Reynolds: The Question referred to the B.A.O.R., and the position in West Berlin is different, where there are a number of non-British vehicles, but in the past these have been bought from funds provided by arrangement with the West Berlin city authorities. This is being dealt with at the moment.

Armed Forces (Strength)

Sir T. Beamish: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if, in view of the damaging effect on morale of the growing uncertainty about the future strength of the Armed Forces, he will now make a statement on the Government's intentions.

Mr. Healey: I have said many times in the House that it will be necessary to reduce somewhat the strength of all three Services in the light of the Defence Review. I am not yet in a position to announce these reductions but will do so as soon as I can.

Sir T. Beamish: While I cannot imagine a more dangerous moment to be discussing cuts in the Armed Forces, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that it has been his own totally inept handling of the problem which has led to all the present damaging uncertainty, and is it not high time that he took Parliament into his confidence?

Mr. Healey: I know that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is deeply concerned about the future of the Armed Services, but I do not think he is doing anything to help by talking about damaging effects. The fact is that morale in the Services has never been higher, and his hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), who recently toured R.A.F. stations, reported to this effect during the debate just before the Recess. I think that it does no credit to hon. Gentlemen opposite to try to sow bad morale and distrust where they do not exist.

Sir A. V. Harvey: About two months ago the right hon. Gentleman said that priority would be given for the Maltese in the Royal Malta Artillery to enlist in the British Army. If the numbers are to be cut, how will these men, who have served us faithfully over the years, be given priority to serve in the British Army?

Mr. Healey: With respect, that is a totally different question.

Peace-keeping Forces (Co-ordination)

Mr. Luard: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what steps he is taking to ensure co-ordination and joint consultation on training, command procedures, and equipment with other Governments which have earmarked forces for peacekeeping purposes.

Mr. Healey: I think it would be more appropriate for action towards these ends to be initiated by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Mr. Luard: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the value of the logistic support which the Government offered for these purposes would be enormously increased if more effective co-ordination of these forces with the forces of other Governments was undertaken? Does not my right hon. Friend recognise that there are great political difficulties in the way of the solution which he has suggested of action by the Secretary-General? What steps are the Government proposing for the future for more effective co-ordination of this kind?

Mr. Healey: I can assure my hon. Friend that nobody feels more strongly than I do that it is necessary to achieve effective co-ordination of peace-keeping activities under the United Nations, but for one country—or a small group of countries—to set itself up as an independent entity inside the United Nations for peace-keeping would make the difficulty greater and not less. As my hon. Friend knows, we have agreed to provide logistic support for six battalions of the U.N. force wherever they are required, and we are doing a great deal at this moment in Cyprus to assist U.N. forces, but it is not for this country to set itself up alone to organise a U.N. peace-keeping force.

Mr. G. Campbell: Are not the Government taking some further initiative with the United Nations Secretariat to get some co-ordination discussed or prepared beforehand since the British contribution is simply a logistic one which would have to work in support of combatant troops from other countries?

Mr. Healey: We are prepared to provide any sort of force for which the United Nations asks us, and the logistic support is not exclusive. We are prepared to provide other forces if required, but, as I said earlier, this is a matter on which the U.N. Secretariat must take the lead. It is not possible to foresee what other countries will contribute forces to any particular U.N. operation in any part of the world. This is one of the things which make it difficult to deal with the problem by co-ordination between national Governments without an initiative from the Secretary-General.

Royal Marines

Mr. Wall: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what change he plans in the rôle of the Royal Marines.

Mr. Hamling: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the rôle of the Royal Marines in the future.

Mr. Healey: I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) on 8th February.—[Vol. 740, c. 317.]

Mr. Wall: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that the rôle of the Royal Marines is related to its size, and would not he agree that in terms of cost-effectiveness and mobility the Royal Marines are amongst the most efficient of Her Majesty's Forces, and will he, therefore, resist any further demands for cuts?

Mr. Healey: I know, and greatly appreciate, the hon. Gentleman's sympathy with the Royal Marines. The rôle of the Royal Marines is, in the main, to provide forces for our amphibious ships, but I would be the first to admit that the Marines are among the most efficient of all our forces on land or on sea.

Mr. Hamling: Will my right hon. Friend quell rumours in certain newspapers to the effect that the Royal Marines will be ended? Secondly, as

well as noting what the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) said about the mobility and cost-effectiveness of the Corps, will my right hon. Friend also refer to their extreme versatility?

Mr. Healey: I thought that I had done that in referring to the fact that they fight as well in the jungles as on the beaches.

Armaments Supplies (South Africa)

Mr. Woodnutt: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will state the extent of the loss to British shipyards in terms of employment and exports by the placing of an order by South Africa with the French Government for three submarines; and if he will reconsider Her Majesty's Government's ban on the supply of armaments to South Africa.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what efforts were made by his Department to secure for the United Kingdom the order for three submarines placed by the South African Government in France; and whether he will make a statement.

The Minister of Defence for Equipment (Mr. Roy Mason): We made no efforts to secure the order for these submarines since this would have been inconsistent with Her Majesty's Government's policy on arms supplies to South Africa. The fact that the French have obtained the order does not call for a review of our policy on this matter.

Mr. Woodnutt: As I first tabled this Question to the Prime Minister, and it has been transferred to the Minister of Defence who seems unable to answer the first part of the Question, which is the major part, would not the hon. Gentleman agree that this is again a case of the Prime Minister's dodging the issue by switching the Question?

Mr. Mason: Not by any means. It is my responsibility to answer this type of question on arms procurement. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman has not got any specific answer to the first part of his Question, but it would be very difficult to evaluate what loss of arms orders there are because of the arms embargo.

Mr. Paget: Will my hon. Friend say whether there has been any change in


our declared policy of refusing arms to South Africa of a nature which could be used in civil repression, and will he say just which civilians are to be repressed by submarines?

Mr. Mason: There has been no change in our policy since the Prime Minister announced the arms embargo on 17th November, 1964.

Mr. Atkins: When reviewing Her Majesty's policy towards South Africa, in view of the events going on in the Middle East, will the hon. Gentleman keep in mind that we may easily require the friendly co-operation of South Africa?

Mr. Mason: All those matters are kept under consideration.

Mr. William Hamilton: Does not my hon. Friend recognise that there is a conflict between Government policy on refusing to build ships for, or sell ships to, South Africa and allowing them to visit South African ports?

Mr. Mason: That is a different question, and there are a number of others on the Order Paper to answer this afternoon.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: What public purpose is served by having South African submarines built in France, rather than in British shipyards?

Mr. Mason: It is that the Government, as the previous Governments did in 1963 and 1964, are standing by a United Nations Resolution and a Security Council Resolution that we would avoid all arms shipments to South Africa.

service Entrants (Nationality Regulations)

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will harmonise the nationality regulations governing entry into the three Armed Forces.

Mr. Reynolds: The principles are identical, but are applied to requirements which differ between the Services.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Can the hon. Gentleman explain why it is that the sons of Polish ex-Servicemen are allowed, more or less automatically, to join the Army in a non-commissioned capacity, but not the Royal Air Force and the

Royal Navy? In view of the integration that is going on between the three Services, is not this somewhat illogical?

Mr. Reynolds: It is not only such people, but all people who do not qualify under the nationality rules generally, who can be allowed to join the Army in the non-commissioned ranks because it is possible in the Army to offer a career to any soldier without it being necessary for him to come up against classified or security problems. But in the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy it is not possible to offer someone a career in the ranks without, at some time in his career, his having to be vetted in some way or other because of security matters.

Canberra Squadrons (Germany)

Mr. Goodhew: asked the Secretary of State for Defence which of the Canberra squadrons of the Royal Air Force in Germany are to be disbanded; what type of aircraft is to be supplied to those remaining in service; and when he expects the new aircraft to be in squadron service.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: The Canberra squadrons in Germany will, in due course, be withdrawn without direct replacement, but some of their tasks will be allocated to the ground attack Phantom squadrons from 1970. In addition, United Kingdom based Fills and V-bombers would be available to Saceur in emergency.

Mr. Goodhew: Can the hon. Member tell us exactly when we are to have the Anglo-French VG aircraft, which is surely an important part of the replacement for the Canberras which he says will not fly after 1970?

Mr. Rees: We have made arrangements for the replacement of the Canberra in other ways before the advent of the AFVG.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Polaris Submarines)

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Defence on what terms it is proposed that Great Britain's Polaris submarines shall be committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Mr. Healey: It is the intention that the Polaris Force will be assigned to


N.A.T.O. and that its missiles will be targeted by the appropriate N.A.T.O. authorities. Detailed arrangements will be made in due course before the first boat becomes operational in 1968.

Mr. Blaker: Since the Atlantic Nuclear Force has now clearly been dropped, does it not seem likely that the terms on which the Polaris submarines will be assigned to N.A.T.O. will be identical with those planned by the Conservative Government?

Mr. Healey: I have no idea what the plans of the Conservative Government were. One of the rules to which I am subject is that I am not allowed to investigate the plans of the Conservative Government. We would all be a great deal wiser if I were—[Laughter.]—although not necessarily any happier. What I can say is that, broadly speaking, the terms on which the Polaris submarines will be assigned will be similar to those on which the V bombers are assigned today.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: If that rule has not been changed, how is it that the right hon. Gentleman was able to tell the House that the previous Conservative Government planned 158 TSR2s, and also to refer to the level of the forces in the Far East which had once been planned by the previous Administration? How does he know these two things if he has never looked at the files?

Mr. Healey: The House was told the first figure by Mr. Julian Amery, when he was the Member for Preston, North.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: And the second? May I have an answer to the second part of my question? How was the right hon. Gentleman able to quote the words "once planned by the former Conservative Government" if he does not know what it is?

Mr. Healey: Because the Conservative Government announced it at the time.

Anglo-French Variable Geometry Aircraft

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: asked the Secretary of State for Defence in preparing his 15 years costing, what overall figure he allowed for the production costs of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft.

Mr. Healey: My calculations allowed £500 million to cover the cost of research and development, production, support equipment, spares and operation of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft in the period to 1980.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Has the right hon. Gentleman noticed or read the Flighton of his figures? Would it not be better now for the Minister to publish exactly what these two sets of figures contain, because there is a great deal of confusion, not only in the House but in the Press generally?

Mr. Healey: I am considering how best to correct the many mistakes in the Flight article, but I can tell House that it was inaccurate in that it ignored the question of the front line and time scale of the various aircraft; it ignored the differences in the capabilities of the two programmes; it ignored the two-year inflation allowance which I had taken account of in the figures that I gave to the House, and it gave far too low a figure for the 15-years' support and operation costs.

Mr. Lubbock: In making comparisons of this kind, would not the right hon. Gentleman think it of value to use present work accounting techniques, so that the different incidence of expenditure between his own programme and that which might have been adopted by the Conservative Government shows up more readily?

Mr. Healey: I did exactly that, although I have often been attacked in the House when I referred to constant prices.

Mr. Dalyell: Will my right hon Friend enlarge on what he said about the difference in capabilities? Perhaps some of us misunderstood.

Mr. Healey: As I have announced in the House, we have no intention of replacing 158 TSR2s by 158 F111 As.

Mr. Powell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what was the result of his recent consultations with the French Government about the variable geometry aircraft project.

Mr. Healey: Proposals for the specification for the Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft and the industrial


arrangements for carrying out the project are under consideration by both Governments.

Mr. Powell: Do I take it that the Minister's expectation of agreeing the specification during his meeting this month was disappointed, and that the detailed project studies have not yet been authorised?

Mr. Healey: No, Sir. M. Messmer and I, as Ministers of Defence in our respective countries, reached complete agreement on the specification of the aircraft, the cost of the aircraft and the industrial arrangements for producing the aircraft—but our agreement was ad referendum to the two Governments.

Mr. Rankin: In view of my right hon. Friend's previous answer, will he make it quite clear that the F111K and the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft are aircraft with entirely different functons and rôles?

Mr. Healey: It is not the case that the Anglo-French VG and the F111K are cast for entirely different functions and rôles. They have similar rôles, both of strike and reconnaisance, but they have different capabilities. For instance, the AFVG will replace the Buccaneer in the maritime rôle.

Sir C. Osborne: Why do all the costs of these aircraft increase so astronomically? What is the cause of this fantastic increase in costs, and what is the right hon. Gentleman doing to protect the taxpayers against them?

Mr. Healey: I am glad to be able to tell the House that the cost of the aircraft programme planned by the present Government—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman asked what we had done about it. I would point out that on the F111K we have a fixed price not subject to increased development and research costs which may have taken place in the United States.

Fill Aircraft (Modifications)

Mr. Powell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the ceiling price which he has agreed with the United State Government for the modifications required by the Royal Air Force to the F111 aircraft.

Mr. Healey: I advised the right hon. Gentleman and the House on 1st May, 1967, that agreement would be reached on the supplemental ceiling price for the special British modifications "in the next month or so". I have nothing to add to this. Negotiations are still going on and the House will be advised of the outcome as soon as they are finished.—[Vol. 746, c. 126–7.]

Mr. Powell: Why is it proving so difficult to get agreement on this?

Mr. Healey: The problem is not the difficulty of our getting agreement with the United States Government. Extremely complex negotiations have to be undertaken between the United States Government and the large number of firms which are concerned in producing these changes and amendments. If the right hon. Gentleman will look back at the history of any aircraft project in this or any other country he will see what a complicated business it is getting final agreement on the last detail in such a matter.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House why the contract does not also cover a fixed price for aircraft that replace any lost in combat or in training? This could prove a great leak in the sale.

Mr. Healey: Because the requirement of 50 aircraft which we have identified and propose to meet under the terms of the F111 arrangement takes into account what we think will be the natural wastage.

Mr. Dalyell: Does the Minister accept Mr. McNamara's figure of 3·7 million dollars for the airframe alone, in the event of Britain's wanting to buy more F111s.

Mr. Healey: I have made it clear that I have no intention of buying more F111s.

Marriage Allowance

Mr. G. Campbell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what proposals he has for amending the qualifying allotment for marriage allowance for ranks of corporal or equivalent and below; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Reynolds: I cannot yet add to the Answer given to the hon. Member by my hon. Friend the then Under-Secretary of


State for the Army on 22nd June, 1966.—[Vol. 730, c. 572–3.]

Mr. Campbell: As it is almost a year since the Minister stated in the House that the question was under review, is it not high time that the matter was decided by the Government, especially as it is of much concern to S.S.A.F.A.?

Mr. Reynolds: This matter is still being looked at. In my view, it is not as urgent as a number of other problems which have to be dealt with—and my views in respect of it are completely the opposite of the hon. Member's.

Military Medal (Ex-Servicemen)

Mr. Eadie: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what recent representation he has had about ex-Servicemen who are holders of the Military Medal and are not in receipt of a gratuity.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army (Mr. James Boy-den): Since the beginning of the year, I have been in correspondence with a number of hon. Members on this subject. I have also answered Questions from my hon. Friend the Member for Bothwell (Mr. James Hamilton) on 13th February, 1967 and from the hon. Member for Har-borough (Mr. Farr) on 1st and 22nd March, 1967.—[Vol. 741, c. 36. Vol. 742, c. 494. Vol. 743, c. 263.]

Mr. Eadie: Does not the Minister agree that the people who are concerned in this matter feel that the whole issue is grossly unfair, and that because of age in itself they are becoming a diminishing number? Is not this a case for a generous reconsideration of the whole matter?

Mr. Boyden: No, Sir. The matter has been considered many times. The cost and the administrative effort required to deal equitably with the First World War awards would be out of all proportion to the results.

Mr. Lipton: In view of the comparatively small number of surviving gallant holders of the Military Medal from the First World War, can my hon. Friend say how much it will cost to treat all holders alike?

Mr. Boyden: It would cost £600,000 for gratuities and £156,000 per annum continually. It would be inequitable to

deal with those living without dealing with the estates of those who are no longer here.

Malta (Defence Expenditure)

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what total reduction in British defence expenditure in Malta is expected in 1967–68, compared with 1966–67; and what percentage of the overall total of defence expenditure, worldwide, this represents.

Mr. Healey: Less than half a million pounds, or about 0·02 per cent, of the Defence Budget.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: With hindsight, does this relatively small saving really justify all the fuss and bother with the Maltese Government and the reduction in British defence capability throughout the Mediterranean?

Mr. Healey: The hon. and gallant Member must recognise that the saving is so small this year precisely because of the fuss and bother and that we have re-phased the programme to take into account the needs of the Maltese people.

Service Men (U.K. Maintenance Cost)

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a further statement on the average cost per man per day involved in maintaining a private soldier in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Boyden: In answer to a Question on 12th April, I told the right hon. Gentleman that the average cost was £3 12s. a day. I regret that there had been a typing error and the correct answer is £3 2s. I am sorry for any inconvenience or misunderstanding that this may have caused.—[Vol. 744, c. 1200.]

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that correction and his courtesy in notifying me of the error. When capital sums are also taken into account, is it not clear that there is no economy whatever in withdrawing troops from Malta to the United Kingdom?

Mr. Boyden: My right hon. Friend has dealt with this thoroughly on previous occasions. The answer is: yes, there are considerable economies.

Mr. Powell: Is it not most inefficient and improper that a material error in an Answer given in this House should not be corrected nor the attention of the Member to whom it was given drawn to the error until nearly a month has elapsed?

Mr. Boyden: I told the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) immediately it was drawn to my attention—[HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] I think 12 days later—and the Department certainly took every step to correct the error and bring it to my attention. Naturally I am sorry for it, but one cannot avoid typing errors sometimes. No one in the House jumped on me to say that the figure was so manifestly absurd as to require a correction.

Arms Salesman

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: asked the Secreretary of State for Defence if, in view of the Resolution of the General Council of the United Nations Association deprecating the appointment of an arms salesman by Her Majesty's Government, a copy of which has been sent to him, he will abolish this appointment.

Mr. Healey: No, Sir. Her Majesty's Government have consistently emphasised that it is their firm intention to work for peace and disarmament, and the appointment of the Head of Defence Sales is not inconsistent with that policy.

Mr. Jenkins: But does my right hon. Friend not realise that this resolution of the United Nations Association is entirely contrary to that point of view? Does he not recognise that the "merchant of death", as he used to be called by his hon. Friends, is still a character and that Zaharov, the original merchant of death, was an amateur compared with the arms salesman whom he has appointed? Is not the economy over-attached to the sale of arms, and would it not be better diverted to other products?

Mr. Healey: I recognise that the United Nations Association of Great Britain disagrees with Her Majesty's Government on this matter, but that is not the United Nations. If countries require arms for self-defence, particularly allied countries, we have the same right

to offer arms for sale to them, unless there are over-riding political considerations which make that undesirable.

Suez Canal (British Ships)

Sir J. Langford-Holt: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what instructions have been given to commanding officers of Her Majesty's ships about compliance with the Egyptian Government's claim to rights to search all ships passing through the Suez Canal.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. Maurice Foley): It is not the practice to divulge confidential instructions given to H.M. Ships.

Sir J. Langford-Holt: Does the hon. Gentleman therefore say that, contrary to the President of the Board of Trade's failure to give any instructions to civilian ships, commanding officers of Her Majesty's ships have been given contingency instructions?

Mr. Foley: It would not be right for me to forecast the actions of the Govment in situations which might or might not arise in future. I can, however, say categorically that no ships of Her Majesty's Government have been searched or stopped or delayed since the statement issued by the United Arab Republic Government.

Mr. Paget: In view of the Prime Minister's statement, is it not the right of British ships to proceed in these international waters, and are they not entitled to the defence of the British Navy when proceeding on their lawful occasions?

Mr. Foley: The Question, with respect, relates to Her Majesty's ships, and I have given the precise position—that none of Her Majesty's ships has been stopped or searched and that it is not our practice to divulge confidential information such as instructions to captains of ships.

N.A.T.O. Defence Arrangements (Southern Europe)

Mr. Gardner: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation defence arrangements in Southern Europe will be necessary following the change of Government in Greece.

Mr. Healey: As far as I am aware, none, Sir.

Mr. Gardner: In view of recent events in Greece, is not my right hon. Friend a little worried at the fact that the front line in that part of South-East Europe is manned by the present regime? Is he satisfied, in view of the fact that the Greek military forces are now otherwise engaged, that the N.A.T.O. commitments in that part of Europe can be met?

Mr. Healey: I would not disguise from the House—my noble Friend made this point in another place—that there is widespread concern throughout the Alliance at recent events in Greece, but I have no reason to doubt the efficacy of the Alliance in that part of the world as having been affected by recent events.

Handley Page Jetstream Aircraft

Mr. Goodhew: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to order the Handley Page Jetstream aircraft for use in the Royal Air Force.

Mr. Mason: None at present.

Mr. Goodhew: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this is a very economical replacement for some of the ageing communications and training aircraft in the Royal Air Force and that the company has procured many export orders which would be helped, in the direction of foreign air force orders, if the British Government were to order as early as possible?

Mr. Mason: I am aware of all those considerations, but we have no plans at present to buy a replacement for the aircraft which the hon. Gentleman mentioned.

Mr. Onslow: Is the hon. Gentleman looking for any British aircraft for the R.A.F.?

Mr. Mason: We are looking at two for the Varsity at the moment, anyway.

Arms and Equipment (Stockpiling)

Mr. Kershaw: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what arrangements he is making for the stockpiling of arms and equipment to be available for expansion of the forces in an emergency.

Mr. Reynolds: Arrangements already exist to provide adequate arms and equip-

ment for the planned expansion of the forces in an emergency.

Mr. Kershaw: But, in regard to B.A.O.R., is it not futile to expect this to be efficacious? With the Minister's "48-hour war", is not the strategy looking nonsensical?

Mr. Reynolds: The plans are there and can be carried out in the event of a N.A.T.O. simple alert or such other warning as is given.

South Africa (Royal Navy Visits)

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions in the last two years seamen serving on Royal Navy ships visiting South African ports have been charged with offences against South African law; how many men were involved; and how many were subjected to corporal punishment.

Mr. Reynolds: I know of no members of the Royal Navy who have been charged with offences under South African law during the last two years.

Mr. Hamilton: That reply will need a certain amount of clarification. Can my hon. Friend give an undertaking that if and when British ships visit South African ports, whether there be coloured or white seamen on board, our Government will not allow those seamen to be subjected to the laws of apartheid, a policy to which the Government are unanimously opposed?

Mr. Reynolds: Any British citizen, whether Service or otherwise, visiting any other country naturally has to abide by local laws.

Mr. Lubbock: Would the hon. Gentleman not be big enough to admit that the Government have made a grave mistake in subjecting British citizens to the indignities of the South African racialist laws and now take steps to cancel this visit?

Mr. Reynolds: The hon. Gentleman appears to have got the wrong question.

Mr. Winnick: asked the Secretary of State for Defence why British Navy ships are going on an official visit to South Africa; what instructions have been


given to the crews about internal conditions in South Africa; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Boston: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will cancel the forthcoming naval visit to South Africa unless the South African Government guarantees that full privileges will be accorded to all Royal Navy personnel; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now take steps to stop the forthcoming visit of Royal Navy ships to South Africa, in view of the fact that such a visit would be tantamount to condoning the policy ofapartheid.

Mr. Reynolds: The visit is in exercise of our rights and responsibilities under the Simonstown Agreement, about which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy spoke on 8th February. The ships concerned are returning from service in the Far East and will also visit the Falkland Islands and South American ports. Members of the ships' companies who might be liable to discrimination in South Africa have been given the option to withdraw before the visit; none will be sent against his will. The programme for those going ashore is being planned to include entertainment on a multiracial basis for all members of the ships companies.

Mr. Winnick: Although the Tories are not interested in anti-racialism, is my hon. Friend aware that a large number of people in Britain consider it shocking and disgraceful for a Labour Administration to be allowing ships to go on a goodwill visit to a Nazi-like State? Has this matter gone to the Cabinet and has it been given the personal approval of the Prime Minister?

Mr. Reynolds: I am aware of the feeling on this matter of a large number of hon. Members. Indeed, my hon. Friend has himself been telephoning my office every 10 minutes since last Monday. [Interruption.]

Mr. Winnick: Resign.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Let us get on with Questions and Answers.

Mr. Reynolds: I have also discussed the matter with my hon. Friend. Her Majesty's Government have taken this decision to exercise our rights and responsibilities under the Simonstown Agreement. I believe, and Her Majesty's Government believe, that the arrangements we have made will ensure that we do not subject people who are legally claimed to be coloured in South Africa to the apartheid laws if they wish to contract out of that particular matter. This visit, which is under the Simonstown Agreement, does not in any way alter the long and often expressed views of Her Majesty's Government on the general question of apartheid.

Mr. Boston: Would not my hon. Friend agree that it is important for Britain not to give the slightest impression of condoning racial discrimination and that we must act consistently, especially in view of the robust and commendable attitude taken over Basil D'Oliveira and the M.C.C. tour? While my hon. Friend was somewhat reassuring in the final remarks of his reply, will he ask for a guarantee from South Africa to the effect that all our personnel will be afforded full privileges?

Mr. Reynolds: I am in considerable agreement with the remarks of my hon. Friend and I agree that the two matters are closely linked together. The programme for this visit is still being prepared. What I have seen of it I am satisfied with, but I will be pleased to make it available to hon. Members, perhaps in answer to a Question or perhaps by placing it in the Library, once it is finalised.

Mr. Hamilton: Would my hon. Friend say specifically what Her Majesty's Government hope to achieve by this visit? Can he say how many coloured seamen are involved in the matter; how many of them have contracted out or otherwise? Does not my hon. Friend understand that the policy of the Government on racial matters cannot any longer be taken seriously if this visit is allowed to continue?

Mr. Reynolds: I understand the feelings of hon. Members on this matter.

Mr. Faulds: Then act on them.

Mr. Reynolds: As I have explained, arrangements have been made for people who are legally classed as coloured under South African law to contract out of this visit if they desire to do so. I understand that one Pakistani Royal Navy officer has decided that he would rather not go on this visit and that one Indian seaman has decided likewise. As for the other coloured people concerned, numbering 18 in all, they have all, to the best of my knowledge, agreed to go on the visit; and I gather that one of them has a number of relatives in South Africa.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Is the Minister aware that we would be more convinced about the indignation being expressed by his hon. Friends if they showed equal concern for keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open to international shipping?

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Is my hon. Friend aware of the strong feeling that exists in some seaport towns, particularly that being expressed by overseas communities in them, about this matter and of the suggestion that the recruiting facilities for the Royal Navy may be withdrawn?

Mr. Reynolds: I accept that from my hon. Friend, although I was not aware of it.

Mr. Lubbock: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that these coloured seamen and officers are being placed in a very difficult position in being forced to make a decision about whether or not they will go ashore? Does not he realise, from the Questions he is being asked today and from the large number of letters that have appeared in the newspapers condemning this visit, that the Government have made a grave mistake and that this visit should now be cancelled?

Mr. Reynolds: No force is being placed on the officers, sailors and other people concerned. They have the option to contract out if they so desire. They may remain on board ship while in a South African port or they can go ashore. It is entirely up to them. I am well aware of the strong feelings that have been expressed on this matter by hon. Members, by organisations and by other bodies outside. However, Her Majesty's Government believe, and I be-

lieve, that the interests of the United Kingdom, from defence and other points of view, would be benefited if we maintained the facilities available to us under the Simonstown Agreement.

Mr. G. Campbell: While appreciating that it is necessary for the Royal Navy to carry out its training and operational duties, have not the Government very badly mishandled this visit?

Mr. Reynolds: There has been a lot of slightly inaccurate—I use the word "slightly" with my tongue in my cheek—reporting in the newspapers about the way in which this has been handled. Had it been more accurately reported I believe that there would not have been quite so much indignation expressed, although I realise that a lot of indignation exists in any case over this matter.

Mr. Orbach: Will my hon. Friend ask the Prime Minister to grant the same facilities to white seamen as are being offered to coloured seamen in view of their interest in the question of apartheid?

Mr. Reynolds: We are giving these facilities to contract out only to people who might suffer under the apartheid legislation.

Mr. Hamilton: On a point of order. In view of the grossly unsatisfactory nature of all the answers given on this subject, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Military Corrective Training Centre, Colchester

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Defence why press photographers were barred from the recent visit, by hon. Members and the national and local press, to the Military Corrective Training Centre, Colchester; and if he will arrange for photographs of the controversial canvas suit to be released to the press.

Mr. Reynolds: As my hon. Friend's Question rather suggests, the temptation to dwell on pictures of the controversial canvas suit would have been irresistible. I preferred to rely on the balanced testimony of hon. Members and the experienced journalists who visited the Military Corrective Training Centre.

Mr. Driberg: If there was nothing to hide, why not let it be seen?

Mr. Reynolds: I made arrangements for it to be seen by about seven hon. Members of the House and 16 journalists.

Mr. Driberg: And the public generally?

Young Recruits (Length of Service)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what progress is being made by the Committee studying the question of the length of unbroken service by sailors, soldiers, and airmen, signing on as recruits between the ages of 15 and 18; whether the Committee will receive evidence and opinions from Servicemen and ex-Servicemen who are or have been directly involved in this situation, and from hon. Members on behalf of their constituents; how soon he expects to receive the recommendations of the Lord Chancellor's Committee on the age of majority; and how soon after the receipt of such recommendations he expects to be able to announce the results of his review of this policy.

Mr. Reynolds: The Committtee is making good progress. I should be pleased to receive from right hon. and hon. Members any contribution to its work. The Committee on the Age of Majority will report to my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor. I shall wish to take account of its conclusions but will announce the result of my own inquiries as soon as possible afterwards.

Mr. Driberg: While I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what he said about the number of hon. Members who are interested in this matter, is there not something to be said for the suggestion contained in the second part of my Question, about direct evidence from people who know exactly the impact of the appalling existing situation?

Mr. Reynolds: A lot of this direct evidence and many of the views which exist on this matter have been collected by the organisation of which my hon. Friend formed part of a delegation which came to see me. I expressed the view to them that I express today; that I will be pleased to receive any information which my hon. Friend or any other hon.

Member or organisation would like to send to me.

Married Quarters

Mr. Goodhart: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many married quarters he will seek to rent and how many he will seek to purchase during the next three months in order to accommodate the families of Servicemen returning from overseas; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Reynolds: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the details that I gave the House on 5th May [Vol. 746, cols. 953–64]. It is not practicable to break this programme down into quarterly periods.

Mr. Goodhart: In view of the possibility that our forces in Aden will soon be involved in a general Middle Eastern conflict, will the Minister say that the policy of evacuating Service families will be expedited?

Mr. Reynolds: Arrangements for evacuating families from Aden were announced about six months ago. A timetable was laid down and this was started three or four weeks ago. We intend to keep to that timetable, and at present I see no reason for altering it.

Malaysia (South Vietnamese Trainees)

Mr. Goodhart: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many officers and men from the South Vietnamese army have received training during 1967 from British forces stationed in Malaysia.

Mr. Healey: 125 officers. No men.

Mr. Goodhart: I hope the right hon. Gentleman is aware that the training given by the Jungle Warfare School is very much appreciated by the South Vietnamese Government.

Mr. Healey: indicated assent.

J. T. Phillips (Death)

Mr. Murray: asked the Secretary of State for Defence why the parents of artificer apprentice J. T. Phillips were not informed by his Department of the date of the adjourned inquest on their son.

Mr. Foley: The date of the adjourned inquest was conveyed to the parents by the boy's commanding officer.

Mr. Murray: Is my hon. Friend aware that a great deal of concern and worry was caused to the parents of this boy through lack of information from the Navy Department? Will he see that the regulations governing this matter are tightened up?

Mr. Foley: It is normal practice for the commanding officer to write to the parents. In this instance the father was written to on the 13th stating that there would be an adjourned inquest on the 19th. He replied on the 16th saying that he would not be able to attend.

Mr. Murray: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make public the Report of the Naval Board of Inquiry on the accident at Cawsand Bay on 9th April, 1967.

Mr. Foley: No, Sir. It is not the practice to publish reports of Service Boards of Inquiry.

Mr. Murray: Is my hon. Friend aware that the parents of this 16-year old boy were left completely in the dark about how this accident occurred? Is he further aware that these parents were unfortunate enough to read in The Timeslast week a mention of Russian ships in connection with the accident? Would it not be to everybody's benefit—these parents and other youngsters—if the full facts were known?

Mr. Foley: I want to make it quite clear that there was no security aspect whatsoever in respect of this unfortunate incident. My Department wrote to my hon. Friend on 26th May indicating that as soon as we had the fullest information of the inquiry we would pass it on to the parents concerned.

R.A.F. Hospital, Aden (Civilian In-patients)

Mr. Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will abolish the charges of £9 or more a day payable by British civilian in-patients of the Royal Air Force Hospital in Aden.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Lipton: May I express the thanks of all sensible people to the Government

for having dealt with what was an intolerable imposition on British civilians in Aden in the present difficulties that prevail?

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand that the President of the Board of Trade wishes to answer Question No. 75.

TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS (KENNEDY ROUND)

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:

75. Mr. BRUCE-GARDYNE: To ask the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the outcome of the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations in Geneva.

The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Douglas Jay): With permission I will now answer Question No. 75.
The essential elements of agreement in the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations were reached on 15th May. The Secretariat of the G.A.T.T. is now engaged in compiling the detailed results. I shall as soon as possible present to Parliament a White Paper setting out these detailed results so far as they affect this country. In the meantime, I can give the House a general account of what has been done.
Reductions in industrial tariffs will be very substantial. So far as can be judged now, the average reductions made by the major trading countries in their tariffs on industrial goods will be over 35 per cent. This compares with the average of about 7 per cent, achieved in the previous Dillon negotiations completed in 1962.
The bilateral arrangements between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, the United States and Japan provide for reciprocal reductions which are estimated to average 37 per cent., 38 per cent, and 33 per cent, respectively, and affect well over 70 per cent, of our exports to them. British exporters will also benefit from reductions in m.f.n. tariffs negotiated bilaterally between other participants.
Large reductions in chemical tariffs have been agreed, and the United States has undertaken to seek legislative authority for the abolition of the American


selling price system which affects trade in benzenoid chemicals. As a contribution to the final settlement, which called for concessions from all the main participants, the United Kingdom agreed to reduce both its ad valorem and specific duties on iron and steel by 20 per cent.
The world-wide reductions in tariffs will begin to be made in 1968, and will normally be spread over five stages.
A new code of practice for dealing with allegations of dumping has been agreed which should be of considerable benefit to British exporters.
For the first time in the history of such negotiations, the Kennedy Round settlement includes a substantial agricultural element. The essentials of an arrangement covering trade in cereals have been agreed. These provide for minimum and maximum prices for wheat; the minimum price is above that of the existing international wheat agreement, but below current price levels. They also provide foi a food aid programme totalling 4½ million tons a year for the benefit of the developing countries. The British contribution to the cost of this programme will be 5 per cent.
The less developed countries should gain considerably from the settlement, which included reductions of barriers to trade in tropical products, primary materials and manufactured goods of interest to them.
I regard the outcome of these protracted negotiations as highly satisfactory and of great advantage to British industry. The high degree of success achieved must be attributed to the wisdom and patience of the negotiators, and notably of the Director General of the G.A.T.T., who played a vital part, particularly in the final stages.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: I thank the President of the Board of Trade for his statement, and endorse his expression of satisfaction over the remarkably wide-ranging settlement that has been reached, but can he tell us how long it will take for these tariff reductions to be brought fully into effect? Can he tell us what effect he thinks the agreement will have had on the Government's application for membership of the Common Market? In this context, has he noticed the comment of M. Jean Rey that the British delegation's attitude of constant support

of the United States and opposition to the Common Market in the closing stages of the negotiations—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Questions must be brief.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: —have reduced the prospects of a successful British application?

Mr. Jay: As I said, the reductions will start in 1968 and will be spread over five years. The industrial common external tariff in the E.E.C. will now be reduced as the result of the negotiations, whether the United Kingdom joins or not.

Sir K. Joseph: Will the President of the Board of Trade accept that we on this side welcome this notable success, and join in his tribute to all concerned, including our negotiators?
I have three short questions* Mr. Speaker. First, why has there been no cut in respect of lorries and tractors, which are important parts of British exporting industry? Why have the Government not succeeded in persuading other industrial countries to increase their textile quotas? In view of the apparent dissatisfaction of the less developed countries with the outcome, will the Government undertake to renew the initiative so successfully taken by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition at U.N.C.T.A.D. in Geneva in 1964?

Mr. Jay: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his welcome. We recognise that this effort was supported in all parts of the House.
As to the lorries, we pressed this aspect extremely hard but the E.E.C. was unwilling, right to the final day of negotiations, to make any concession, and there was, therefore, nothing further we could do.
Although the full details of the results are formally confidential until the agreement has been signed, considerable reductions in tariffs on textiles have been made by the other industrial nations, which will be of great benefit to the less developed countries. The negotiations on the quota are, strictly, separate from the Kennedy Round negotiations, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, but they are going forward and we shall continue to press them.
It would be a mistake to think that the developing countries do not gain by the agreement, because when industrial tariff cuts are made under the M.F.N., they are automatically extended, without reciprocity, to the developing countries. This is a great advantage. But I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are pressing forward with the position in regard to U.N.C.T.A.D., to which he referred.

Mr. Sheldon: While offering congratulations to the negotiating team which produced this success, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he is aware that it is very difficult to get a true measure of the successs until the detailed results in the actual tariff categories are made available in a White Paper?

Mr. Jay: We shall certainly do this. As soon as we have the necessary detailed documents from Geneva, I shall publish a White Paper giving all details relating to the United Kingdom.

Sir C. Osborne: If the average reduction in industrial cuts is 38 per cent., is it fair to deduce that the need to go into the Common Market on economic grounds is greatly reduced?

Mr. Jay: The figure the hon. Gentleman refers to is 35 per cent., not 38 per cent. Despite this agreement, of course, there is still a tariff barrier between the E.F.T.A. countries, on the one hand, and the E.E.C., on the other.

Mr. Luard: Can the President of the Board of Trade say whether the exception which the Common Market countries demand on lorries and larger vehicles is accepted as final by Her Majesty's Government, or are negotiations still continuing?

Mr. Jay: I doubt whether anything is ever final, but the Kennedy Round negotiations are finished. We shall not be able to get a concession on lorries on this round of the negotiations.

Mr. Bessell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Liberal Party always gives a cordial welcome to any proposals which reduce tariffs, particularly when they help to increase our exports? May we also be associated with the congratulations he has extended to the Director General for the part he played in these successful negotiations?

Mr. Maxwell: Will my right hon. Friend tell the House what concessions the American negotiators made on their notoriously unfair tariffs on chemicals on the so-called A.S.P. system? Further, can he tell the House whether it is a fact that the main reason for the success of the negotiations was the strength and unity of the negotiators of the E.E.C. countries?

Mr. Jay: The position on the American tariffs is that there will be some quite material reductions forthwith and unconditionally. Secondly, the United States Government have undertaken to recommend to Congress the abolition of the American selling price system. It that goes through, further reductions will be made by the other countries concerned.
As to the success of the negotiations, I think that we had probably better give equal credit to all the parties concerned.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Will the effect of this agreement be to reduce the average level of the common external tariff of the European Community to 7 per cent.?

Mr. Jay: I should not like to confirm that exact figure off the cuff. There will be a reduction of 33 per cent, or 35 per cent, in the industrial tariff.

Sir S. McAdden: While congratulating the President of the Board of Trade on the successful outcome of these negotiations, may I ask whether he will regard our undertakings in this matter as being binding on us as distinct from the previous agreement on tariffs and trade signed by the then President of the Board of Trade and rejected by him within a week of his becoming Prime Minister?

Mr. Jay: I think that the hon. Member has got the facts considerably distorted. I am not quite sure to what he is referring. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The hon. Gentleman is sometimes not very explicit. These tariff changes are binding on the parties unless a complex procedure under the G.A.T.T. is made out.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: In view of what my right hon. Friend has said about the E.E.C. tariff wall, and his previous statements, would he agree that it would be more beneficial, on balance, to remain outside that wall than to get inside it?

Mr. Jay: I think that that is another question.

Mr. Patrick Jenkin: With reference to the last point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-East (Sir K. Joseph), will the Government give an undertaking to bring to the next U.N.C.T.A.D. discussions in Delhi, in March next year, the utmost priority, as the initiative must be resumed if that body is ever to fulfil the high hopes we had for it at the beginning?

Mr. Jay: I entirely agree and that is what we are doing.

Mr. Hall-Davis: Will the President of the Board of Trade say whether the new code on dumping to which he referred will have any specific relevance to the situation in the textile industry?

Mr. Jay: This has no material effect on our existing anti-dumping procedure. What it means is that other countries will come into line with our procedure, which will be of substantial advantage to us. Therefore, it has no effect on textile imports to this country, if that is what the hon. Member has in mind.

BALLOT FOR NOTICES OF MOTIONS

Simplification of Government and Reduction of Taxes

Mr. Donnelly: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 9th June, I shall call attention to the need to simplify government and to reduce taxes, and move a Resolution.

Greece

Mr. Gregory: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 9th June, I shall call attention to the situation in Greece, and move a Resolution.

Rising Cost of the Labour Government

Sir S. McAdden: I beg to give notice that on Friday, 9th June, I shall call attention to the rising cost of the Labour Government, and move a Resolution.

ADJOURNMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Whitlock.]

MIDDLE EAST

3.44 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): One of the newspapers opened its leader this morning with a remark that it would be a considerable—1 think it said notable—amount of self-restraint if we left the word "Suez" out of our speeches. Without going quite so far as that, I wish to say to the House that the situation in the Middle East, while looking less tense than it looked at the weekend, is nevertheless still very highly charged. If, at the end of this debate, we have left the general temperature at least no higher than it is as we find it, I think that that will be a sufficient compensation for any dullness there is in our speeches during the day.
For most of what I have to say, and no doubt in the debate which will follow, we shall be discussing the situation between the Arab countries and Israel, but I want right at the start to remind the House that the political, economic and strategic interests of too many countries are involved in the Middle East for it to be other than extremely difficult for a war, once started in that area, to be confined to the countries immediately concerned. If we are to get the present Arab-Israel crisis in perspective we must see it in a wider context.
It is indeed true that this greater risk of war which we face today stems not so much from any increased enmity between Israel and the Arab States—bad though that is—not so much from any failure of the United Nations in precipitously withdrawing the United Nations force, but from the fact that into this area over quite some time now there have been pouring vast quantities of guns, armour and aircraft, not for the purposes of the local conflicts within the area, but for purposes of changing the global balance of power.
That is why it must be the basis of what I have to say that, even though we are now talking mainly about the Arab-Israel dispute, and ways of preventing that flaring up, it would be a bold man who would say that just to settle today's immediate problems would remove the continuing risk of war in that area.
Having said that, and despite the startling suddenness with which the crisis blew up, behind it is the intractable and longstanding dispute between the Arab countries and the State of Israel.
It is 20 years since the United Nations first tried to tackle this problem. Despite many efforts, it has not been possible to find a permanent settlement; but, even so, it is here that the United Nations has more than anywhere else in the world been able to play a vital and constructive rôle in keeping the fires damped.
From 1957 until a year or so ago, there had been no serious flare-ups. In the South, between Egypt and Israel, the United Nations Emergency Force provided a buffer between the two sides, so that there have been almost no incidents. It also kept a detachment at Sharm el Sheikh on the tip of the Sinai peninsula.
It was on the basis of the understanding that the detachment would remain there, and on the basis of firm declarations that there would be free passage for ships into the Gulf of Aqaba, that the Israelis finally withdrew their forces from Sinai in early 1957.
On the armistice lines elsewhere, there were more incidents, but the United Nations Chief of Staff, with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation and its corps of observers, worked hard and with considerable success to keep the temperature down.
Over the past year or so, however, a new and more dangerous pattern of incidents emerged: groups of terrorists, infiltrated into Israel, have placed explosives on roads, bridges, railway lines. The amount of damage and the loss of life have not been great, but they have caused the Israel Government, in their turn, to mount retaliatory action against the territory of neighbouring countries from which they have come.
We have always made clear our view that the Governments concerned have a duty to prevent the mounting of attacks from their territory against their neighbours; that it is inexcusable to disown responsibility for the attacks, and even more inexcusable to praise publicly their perpetrators, as the Syrians have done. But we have always made equally clear

to Israel our view that retaliation was not the right answer and that it was dangerous because one could never know where it would end.
Unfortunately, in the Security Council, the highest organ of the United Nations charged with the maintenance of peace, there has been a frustrating situation. We and others have tried to avoid partisanship, to pass judgments of cases on their merits in the light of the evidence supplied by the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, and to get all parties to co-operate in preserving the peace. The Soviet attitude has, however, been different. Twenty years ago they supported the resolution in the General Assembly which led to the creation of Israel. In 1955, however, they switched their policy—one can hardly avoid saying, cynically—and they have since then been wholly one-sided in their action and in their behaviour. When the Israel Government are at fault, they are rightly criticised in the Security Council, and a resolution embodying that criticism can be passed. When an Arab Government are at fault the Soviet veto is used against any resolution criticising that Government.
For example, last autumn, when the Israel Government took to the Security Council a complaint about a terrorist raid in the north of Israel, no action ensued. Soon after that the Israel Government mounted an attack on the Jordanian village of Samu and we strongly and publicly criticised their action at the time as unjustified and inexpedient, and in this case the Security Council passed a condemnatory resolution. Clearly, there has been no equity in this situation, this double approach.
This pattern of incidents and retaliation has continued this year. The Secretary-General of the United Nations tried to calm the situation by using the machinery of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission which had until then been boycotted for many years by Israel. We supported him fully in this initiative. The Commission met on several occasions, but despite the efforts of the Commission terrorist attacks in Israel were renewed. After an incident in the demilitarised zone south of Lake Tiberias, in early April, Israel attacked Syrian defensive positions from the air.


In purely military terms, this action appeared to be successful, but the danger of escalation in all this was clearly patent. Apart from the usual propaganda machine, it should be recognised that during this period the United Arab Republic, despite the fact that it came under attack from other Arab States, nevertheless acted with notable restraint. About the middle of May Israeli leaders spoke strongly of the latest incursions from Syria and warned that they could not continue to tolerate them.
Perhaps on account of these statements it became widely, but, according to our information, erroneously, believed that some large-scale attack on Syria was imminent. It was then, on 14th and 15th May, that the Government of the United Arab Republic started to take large and ostentatious military precautions. On 16th May they took the very grave step of demanding the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. I have already spoken of the rôle of this force and will refer to it again in a moment if I may. It was set up in 1956 to supervise the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. It had remained on the Sinai frontier ever since as a buffer between Israel and the United Arab Republic.
There will, no doubt, be endless legal argument about the juridical position of President Nasser's action, but, in my view, this is not the point. One can sympathise with the Secretary-General confronted with that demand, but it cannot be right that when a fire is known to be imminent the fire brigade should be ordered to depart.
Not only that, but there are wider implications. Even if the U.N.E.F. has not been the sole reason for the relative quiet which has been maintained over the past 10 years, nevertheless it has obviously played a very large part in it, and has shown what can be done by the United Nations in peacekeeping. But to remove the force in this way was bound to cast doubt on the credibility of such efforts elsewhere, and, thereby, risk intensifying other problems and other tensions in other parts of the world.

Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Mr. John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell) rose—

Mr. Brown: May I go on a bit, perhaps?
Nevertheless, the decision was taken, and the Secretary-General decided, without consultation with the appropriate organs of the United Nations, that he had to accept the withdrawal of the force. This action clearly altered the whole situation in a very important and material respect.
Having achieved this result, possibly with unexpected ease, President Nasser announced on 22nd May that, following the removal of the U.N.E.F. detachment from Sharm el Sheikh, his Government intended to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, and to the carriage of strategic goods to Israel.
There are two serious aspects to this. In the first place, the Israel Government declared as long ago as 1957 that they would regard interference with their shipping as an aggressive act entitling them to take measures of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. There was, therefore, grave risk of a military conflict arising out of this situation. But, secondly, there was a wider aspect. This is not a matter which concerns only Israel and the United Arab Republic. It is also a matter of direct concern to all maritime nations interested in the unfettered movement of peaceful shipping in all parts of the world.
Our delegate to the General Assembly in 1957 declared that
the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway, through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.
He went on:
Her Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping, and they are prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.
Other delegates made similar, in some cases even stronger, declarations. Incidentally, some of those declarations make very interesting reading now, and Members may care to look at them. They are contained in the official records of the United Nations General Assembly (XI Session Plenary Meetings 1956–57, Volume 2), which is available in the Library. As the House knows, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister reaffirmed the Government's position in similar terms on this subject last week.
This is not just an arguable legal matter. It carries great political and


economic consequences. Its repercussions could affect the rights of navigation in many parts of the world, including, be it noted, some of the maritime exits from the Soviet Union.
It is worth noting just in passing that this decision was announced while the Secretary-General of the United Nations was actually on his way to Cairo to discuss with the United Arab Republic Government means of dealing with the grave situation which had arisen.
As the House knows, I went to Moscow at that very time, and during my talks with Russian leaders I was convinced that the Soviet Government, despite their public statements and their very one-sided approach, were, in fact, very concerned about the Middle East situation and very anxious to help to prevent it from getting out of hand.
I made clear to them the importance we attach to immediate steps to get restraint observed by those in the area and the need to use any time thus gained to find acceptable solutions to the problems created, especially that of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.
I also took the opportunity when giving an open, public lecture in Moscow—one of the few opportunities yet granted to a representative of a Western Power—to make the same point in public. This is what I said:
Your country is a very great power. This is a fact. It imposes on you great responsibilities. In particular, it imposes the responsibility of using that power to see that peace of the world is maintained. To discharge this requires both restraint and creative imagination. I ask you to approach the situation in the Middle East with this responsibility in mind.
As members of the United Nations, we, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, including, as I have said, the Soviet Union, welcomed the admission of Israel. We must continue to try to find some way in which Israel can live without fear of her neighbours and her neighbours can live without fear of Israel. This is just as much a Russian responsibility as it is for any of the other countries of the world.
At the same time, the French Government proposed that there should be discussions between the United States, U.S.S.R., France and Britain to seek a solution to this problem. We for our part

warmly welcomed this proposal and so informed the three other Governments. However, I regret to tell the House that the Soviet Government have declined to take part in such discussions.
In all this background there has been some discussion of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. I explained Her Majesty's Government's attitude to this Declaration in answer to a Parliamentary Question on 19th December last, and the position remains unchanged since then. The Declaration was a statement made by three Governments about their intentions with regard to the supply of arms to the area. It also declared their opposition to the use of force in the area and their intention to take such action as they thought fit if force were used or if there were a threat of force. At that time the three Governments concerned were virtually the only suppliers of arms to the area and Britain herself had forces in several countries in the area.
The situation has entirely changed since that date. We do not now claim to play any special rôle in the Arab/Israel dispute. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Her Majesty's Government have a duty to support efforts to keep the peace everywhere; we are deeply concerned with peace and stability in the Middle East, and we have, of course, important national interests there. But we regard the United Nations as primarily responsible for peacekeeping. I am in these words paraphrasing what was said by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, in 1963, and reaffirmed by my right hon. Friend the present Prime Minister.
These, then, are the recent events and some of the considerations against which we have had to decide the course of our own actions. But our actions have not only to match the events of this particular crisis as it develops. They have to fit into the broader setting of our Middle East policy as a whole.
Our interests in the Middle East, notably those affecting our trade and our investment, as elsewhere, depend on the maintenance of conditions in which peaceful and orderly development in the area can proceed. There are some areas of the Middle East where we can contribute directly to the maintenance of these conditions. The Persian Gulf is a


clear example where our contribution has been both crucial and successful.
South Arabia presents, on the other hand, a more complicated and difficult example, but there, too, we are still striving to find the basis for these conditions; and I do not despair of eventual success. But we shall be debating that subject separately on another occasion.
There are two persistent features of the Middle East situation which threaten this peaceful and orderly development. They are the bitter hostility of the Arabs towards Israel and the deep-seated division within the Arab world. As I said earlier, there is also the extent to which others from outside are intervening in the situation. We deplore these conflicts and have no wish to take sides in them. But since they dominate so much of the Middle East scene, as recent events have demonstrated, I should like to state clearly our attitude to each of them in turn.
I do not want to be drawn into the endless argument about the rights and wrongs of the termination of the Palestine mandate and the creation of the State of Israel. It was certainly not a happy experience for this country.
But all that was a long time ago. It is a matter of great regret that it has not been possible to heal the wounds from those days and to make a final peace settlement. We understand the feelings of the Arab peoples on this subject; and as a major contributor to U.N.R.R.A. we are acutely aware of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. We would like to see a fair and full settlement of that whole problem.
But, having said that, the State of Israel has now been a member of the United Nations for nearly 20 years, recognised by most Governments of the world, and the Soviet Union were among the very first to do so. Two and a half million people live in Israel. This fact cannot now be ignored and recognising this cannot reasonably be attacked as "taking sides in an Arab/Israel dispute".
We trade with Israel, as we trade with her Arab neighbours. We have friendly relations with the Israel Government, as we have, or wish to have, friendly relations with all her Arab neighbours.
In the same way, we do not seek either to be involved in or to encourage the

dispute which has been dividing the Arab countries into two hostile camps. In our relations with the Arab countries we desire to develop our connections and our relations with the Arab States, of whatever political complexion, to recall and continue our participation not only in their attainment of freedom, but also to further the achievements of constructive Arab nationalism.
I recognise in Arab nationalism one of the most significant forces for change in the Middle East today. I have striven, for instance, to make an ally of it in South Arabia, and, despite setbacks, I shall continue to strive for that.
But, equally, I recognise that no one party, no one country, and no one group of countries, has a monopoly of Arab nationalism. It is at least as strong a driving force in those who seek for peaceful change as in those who seek to pursue their aims by methods of violence.
We must not fall into the trap of regarding, or allowing others to regard, our Middle East policy as a struggle to the death between ourselves and President Nasser. I got to know President Nasser over a long period of years, and I have a high regard for him. At the same time, I am not blind to his errors. I believe that he has long been following a profoundly wrong course in South Arabia, and I believe that in the last two weeks he rashly adopted a policy in the Middle East which could endanger, not only himself and his country, but the peace of the whole world.
We are not setting out—to use the colloquialism—to "topple Nasser", as hon. Members opposite once foolishly attempted to do. But neither are we prepared to accept that he has the right to topple another Middle Eastern nation at the risk of plunging us all into war.
Against this background, our aim in this present crisis, it seems to me, must be to prevent the confrontation which now exists from bursting into a conflagration, and to seek with others a negotiated settlement achieved by peaceful means. There are many possible solutions by which the Gulf of Aqaba might be kept open on terms which both Israel and Egypt could reasonably be asked to accept; and any solution must also satisfy our own interests and those of other maritime nations concerned with shipping in those seas.
I am under no illusions about the difficulties either of maintaining the peace or of achieving out of it such a just and equitable settlement. Neither must we, in my view, necessarily confine our efforts to achieving it to only one forum. We must pursue our objective by every diplomatic means available to us. Clearly, the most appropriate and, ultimately, were it available, the best way to work for this settlement would be within the machinery of the United Nations.
Despite all the setbacks which the United Nations has received, the Charter does set out the basic principles which should govern the policies and actions of nations. Moreover, the main purpose of the Charter is to guarantee the integrity of all members of the United Nations, both great and small, and, just at this moment, a small country, the State of Israel, is being threatened.
We are proud of being a founder member of the United Nations and of being one of the permanent members of the Security Council. We believe that the strength and development of this great organisation are essential to world peace. In the Middle East, the area which is now so disturbed, the men of the United Nations Emergency Force have made a real contribution to preserving peace for nearly a decade. I make no apology for returning to this, as I think that it is worth dwelling on it for a moment. Their sudden removal symbolises the crisis that has so suddenly broken upon us.
Here was a military force with men from Yugoslavia, India, Canada and the Scandinavian countries which had worked together as a team and was probably the best United Nations peacekeeping force that had ever existed. Its disappearance is, at once, a sharp blow to the United Nations and to international law and order.
I must emphasise again that the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force at a moment when it was most needed was one of the most serious aspects of this whole business. The United Nations could play a tremendous rôle in peacekeeping. Until its members can agree among themselves as to how this is to be done—and here the Security Council has an absolutely vital part to play—the rule of law in the world will be gravely jeopardised.
We welcomed the initiative of U Thant in going to Cairo, and his report draws attention to all the dangers of the present situation, including the explosive position in the Gulf. It makes various proposals for remedies. What is most needed now is a breathing space to enable these proposals to be fully considered and to enable the United Nations to exercise its unique rôle as a conciliator.
In this moderating rôle it must urge conciliation on both sides, on the Egyptians and on the Israelis. It is in order to gain this breathing space that Lord Caradon and others are working so hard at the present time to get support for a resolution in the Security Council which urges restraint and conciliation.
The Secretary-General referred in his report to the need for all concerned to
exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension".
We would consider as acts of belligerence any unilateral act to close to the Gulf of Aqaba or any acts of aggression committed by either side on the Israel-Arab border.
The main task of the United Nations is, in fact, to work hard to reduce tension on both sides and, if that is possible, to secure a reduction in the forces which have now gathered on all the frontiers.
Once this conciliation and thinning-out process gets under way, there will be an urgent need for some new form of United Nations presence which would help to keep the two sides apart, as U.N.E.F. did during the last 10 years.
Such a United Nations presence might take many forms. It could grow out of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, which played an important rôle on the Egyptian-Israeli frontier before it was succeeded by U.N.E.F. It might be some entirely new body. Whatever form emerges, I believe that the Secretary-General should in any case send his personal representative to the area to help with the task of conciliation. I hope that U Thant will be able to find somebody of real political stature and experience to carry out this very difficult task.
I am sure that the responsibilities of any new United Nations body should extend to both sides of the frontier so as to be, to that extent, independent of any one of the countries concerned. The Israelis


have, unwisely, in my view, rejected this in the past, and we have made our view inescapably clear to them in the last few days. These are the kinds of directions in which we think the United Nations must continue to work
Our policy, as I have said, is to work in the United Nations and through the United Nations. But, at the end of the day, the United Nations is only the sum of its members, and there are clear limitations on it at this moment.
Speaking for ourselves, we could not be satisfied with a situation in which a numerical majority in New York are satisfied with an inequitable settlement which will merely ensure that an Arab-Israel war is inevitable sooner or later. Therefore, we have not confined our diplomatic activity to New York. We have also been in touch, both directly and through our Ambassadors, with other Governments in their own capitals.
Although we should not make the mistake of assuming that there are not other grave dangers which could spark off a war, nevertheless, as I have said, the centre of the present crisis seems pretty clearly to be the Gulf of Aqaba. The immediate crucial problem is freedom of navigation there. We are, therefore, in the closest touch with other maritime countries which share with us a vital interest in the freedom of the seas.
We have explained our own position to these other Governments. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said at Margate on 24th May, this is still as it was in 1957—that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. As he also said:
Her Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping and is prepared to join with others to secure a general recognition of this right.
Our recent diplomatic exchanges have shown that many other countries, as in 1957, share our views on this right of free passage. We are now discussing with them what we and they can do together to assert this right and to secure its general recognition. My noble friend Lord Caradon has already publicly stated our position in the Security Council of the United Nations. But we cannot be sure that the Security Council will be able to agree on a clear and unequivocal

statement of the position as we and others see it.
We have, therefore, decided to consult other like-minded nations about the issuing of a clear declaration by the international maritime community that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway into which and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Such a declaration, whether in an outside or a United Nations forum—preferable as the latter would be—would, I believe, have a substantive part to play in maintaining and prolonging the restraint which at present enables peace to be held in the area.
By so doing, it would give us the extra time to try to find the longer-term solutions about the use of the Gulf—including possibly a special convention enshrining its status, as applies to some other international waterways. But we must, of course, face the fact that action in the United Nations, or declarations made by nations outside the United Nations, may not be enough to secure the right of innocent passage to which we and all maritime nations attach such importance.
It goes without saying that we certainly hope that they will. I trust that it also goes without saying that we shall use every diplomatic effort to see that they do. But we would be failing in our duty if we were not now consulting others concerned about the situation that would arise if these initiatives I have outlined were to fail.
During the last week, while the House was in Recess, the Middle East moved close to the brink of war. Only those of us who were involved deeply in the events of last weekend know how close we came to seeing acts of war from which the waves of destruction might have spread out to engulf us all. Through the efforts of several countries, including, I am proud to say, our own, this horror was averted.
But although none of the countries of the Middle East has yet stepped over the brink, the abyss remains. Time is desperately short. Unless the international community shoulders fully its responsibilities and asserts itself to secure quickly a just and equitable settlement, a crisis more grave and threatening will inevitably be upon us. To avert this, I pledge the untiring diplomatic efforts of this country.

4.23 p.m.

Mr. Edward Heath: The House greatly appreciates the fact that the Government have arranged this debate on the first day after the House has reassembled and, in particular, before the Prime Minister leaves for his discussions with the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. As the Foreign Secretary has said, we are debating a situation which has arisen in the Middle East during the Recess. This is not the debate on Aden, which is still to come—although it is to some extent impossible to separate entirely the situation in Aden from the remainder of the situation in the Middle East.
I am sure that the Foreign Secretary was quite right to emphasise in his speech the gravity of the present situation. I believe that what we are debating is without doubt potentially the most dangerous international situation since Cuba—much more dangerous than the Indo-Pakistan conflict, unpleasant though that was, because the interests of other Powers were not directly involved in that conflict.
In some ways, I think, this situation is more dangerous even than the war in Vietnam. This, in my view, is because, in South-East Asia, the forces of the Powers involved are, to a considerable extent, under control and every step, though involving risk, can be carefully weighed before it is taken. Indeed, this proved to be true of Cuba, where there was a direct confrontation between the two super Powers, but where there was always a means of communication between them.
The situation in the Middle East today is quite different. The forces involved are not under any direct control of the major Powers, who may themselves become involved. This seems to me to be the root of the immense danger which exists at the moment. There are dangers that raids and counter-raids—for example, by the Palestine Liberation Army from the Gaza Strip—will, now that the United Nations Emergency Force has been removed, escalate into war. There is the danger of provocation leading to counteraction and then full-scale conflict. There is the danger that, in desperation at the ineffectiveness of international action in the face of an economic blockade, Israel will decide to "go it alone".
The Foreign Secretary has made a very important statement in his definition of belligerence and aggression, in which he said that any attempt to block the Straits would be a belligerent act. This, of course, is an immensely important statement in relation to any action which followed the unblocking of the Straits by Israel in the event of no international action having been taken.
Surely, one of the problems in the Middle East is always what is the definition of "aggression". This has become one of the fundamental problems about the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration—although the right hon. Gentleman has made it clear that, as far as Britain is concerned, the Declaration is not in force.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned another point in connection with the definition on which I would like to press him further. Perhaps the Prime Minister can amplify. As I understood him, the Foreign Secretary said that the Government would not be able to accept a majority at New York in the United Nations which meant an inequitable settlement. It must be the judgment of the Government whether a settlement is inequitable, or whether a resolution is inequitable. Therefore, in certain circumstances, the Government would find themselves having to reject such a settlement, which would presumably mean the use of the veto or a decision not to carry out a resolution of the United Nations. This is a very important statement. It may well prove to be justified, but, if it is possible in the present situation, I would like the Prime Minister to amplify the statement.

Mr. George Brown: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be replying later, but I would not want any misunderstanding to arise. The words I used were "We could not be satisfied with a situation in which a numerical majority are satisfied", etc., etc. That means that, if such a situation were to come about, we would have to find ways and means of trying to improve upon it. That is different from the words the right hon. Gentleman has used, which said that we could not accept, etc.

Mr. Heath: I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary. This is an important


statement from which serious consequences could follow. When he says "etc. etc." he is presumably referring to an inequitable settlement and, therefore, if the judgment of the Government were that a settlement was not just, they would have to take further action to bring about a just settlement.
There is another danger which we cannot ignore in the present situation. It is that "President Nasser and the Arab countries will come to believe that having got rid of the U.N. Emergency Force, completed their own build-up—now very substantial—secured Soviet support, in public at any rate, and with Great Britain apparently in the process of withdrawing from certain Middle East commitments and the United States preoccupied in South-East Asia, this is the moment when they should finally attempt to liquidate the State of Israel from the Middle East. I do not believe that this is a danger which in the present heady atmosphere can be entirely ignored. Therefore, these are the very real dangers of the present situation which the Foreign Secretary was absolutely right to emphasise throughout his speech.
There is one further all-important fact. In this explosive situation both the United States and the Soviet Union appear to have very firm commitments, the United States to the territorial integrity of the countries of the Middle East. As I understand the President's declaration, it is a singular form of the Tripartite Declaration. In addition, there is the United States commitment to freedom of access to the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet Union has commitments to Syria and the United Arab Republic. If I am incorrect in this, perhaps the Prime Minister will correct me when he winds up the debate, but perhaps otherwise he can confirm that these are the present commitments of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.
These commitments lead to the most dangerous situation of all. The two greatest Powers involved are not in direct confrontation, as at Cuba or over Berlin, but indirectly through forces over which their control is much more remote and much more limited. It is right, therefore—and I agree with the Foreign Secretary—that, first and foremost, every pressure must be brought to bear on the countries of the Middle East to exercise restraint.

That has been done by the United States, by the Secretary-General, by Lord Caradon at the United Nations, and it may have been done by the Soviet Union itself.
If a conflict breaks out, not only is there the risk of the major Powers becoming involved, but there will also be grave damage to the Arab countries as well as to Israel. In particular—and this is a point which has been somewhat overlooked—Jordan, to which we no longer have any commitments, is now in the unhappy position of having both Iraqi and Saudi forces on her soil and with the new defence agreement King Hussein may very well find it much more difficult to hold back in any conflict which breaks out, with the consequent temptation, which we have always feared and which may prove almost irresistible for the Israelis to move up to the bank of the Jordan. This is another very serious aspect of any conflict which may break out. There is the danger, of course, to the oil pipelines and the danger in some countries of nationalisation of the oil companies and the expropriation of their property, and for Britain there is the danger of the removal of a substantial quantity of sterling deposits.
This is surely a formidable catalogue of the risks which are confronting so many countries because of the situation in the Middle East. The question is: what has brought this crisis about? At the beginning of his speech, the Foreign Secretary said that it was a long build-up. The Syrians alleged that the Israelis were about to attack and that the Israeli forces were mustered. I know of no evidence for that and I was very glad to hear the Foreign Secretary's confirmation that there was no evidence. The Secretary-General stated that that was the view of the U.N.T.S.O. general and he set it out fairly in his report. Nor do I know of any evidence—and the Foreign Secretary gave none—that the Israelis threatened to eliminate Syria.
It is true, as the Foreign Secretary described, that in April there were incidents between more aggressive Syrians and retaliation from Israel, but there was no evidence produced of an impending conflict of heavy forces being mustered to make an attack. But the fact that President Nasser wanted to move his forces in Sinai up to the Israeli frontier in


support of his ally Syria seems to have been the main justification for the request for the removal of the United Nations force.
The fact that the justification did not really exist is bound to make one ask what was the motivation for withdrawing that force. Whether President Nasser expected the withdrawal to take place, or whether he made the request as a bluff to show willing to his ally, expecting to be refused, we do not know; nor do we know what would have happened had he been refused. That we cannot know, because the United Nations force was at once withdrawn.
The House has already shown, in response to what the Foreign Secretary said, that it regards the withdrawal of the force as a most extraordinary incident. When I was at the Foreign Office, with my right hon. Friend, we supported the election of U Thant. I have always supported him personally both at the Foreign Office and since. I have great admiration for him and happy personal relations with him. But the United Nations force was set up by the Assembly in November, 1956. Although the location was negotiated by Mr. Hammarskjöld in 1957, the force was set up by the Assembly itself.
It was said that it was necessary to withdraw the force. Having studied the resolutions and the aide memoire, I am not entirely convinced that that was so. Even if it were necessary to withdraw it in the circumstances, how can it have been right to agree to accede to its withdrawal straightaway without taking the matter to the Security Council or to the Assembly, to alert them to the situation which would arise following the withdrawal of the force and to enable them to take action to deal with the situation while the withdrawal was taking place? To me, it is entirely incomprehensible. I believe that the force should never have been withdrawn without putting the matter to the Security Council or the Assembly. I fear that its withdrawal was a major error of judgment.
However, five things have flowed from it. First, it has exposed the Middle East to a much greater risk of conflict. Secondly, it has enabled the Gulf of Aqabato be closed. Thirdly, it has undermined the confidence of Israel which, for 10 years,

has been brought to believe that the United Nations was its main security. This was an invaluable asset to have gained after 1956 and that asset has now been lost. Fourthly, it has given President Nasser personally an immense increase in prestige because of the way in which the force was withdrawn.
The consequences can already be very clearly seen. The other Arab States have already had to make adjustments to their policy, whether they wished to do so or not. The King of Jordan, in what is really an attempt to save his throne, has had to make a defence treaty which will give the U.A.R. much greater influence in Jordan. Kuwait has had to send troops. These are the consequences of a rapid readjustment of policy. Let us assume that a conflict is avoided. Then, as a result of the withdrawal of the force, the influence of the U.A.R. will increase right along the Gulf and down to the tip of Southern Arabia. These are very grave consequences to follow from the removal of the force.
Fifthly, it has brought into question the position of United Nations forces elsewhere, as the Foreign Secretary has said, and perhaps I can be more specific where the Foreign Secretary has to be more guarded and mention Cyprus, in particular. In the terms of the resolution, the position of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is negotiated with the consent of Archbishop Makarios. If the same interpretation were to be put on an immediate request by Archbishop Makarios as was placed on this, without consultation with the Assembly or with the Security Council, on his own understanding the Secretary-General would withdraw that force. I should like the Government to make it plain that they will now state at the United Nations that there will be no change in the status of that force in Cyprus until the matter has been debated, if there should be a request, in the Security Council or in the Assembly.
Quite rightly, the Foreign Secretary asked himself what, in this situation, were British interests. I should like to confirm some of them and perhaps add others. First, I believe that the British interest is to have good relations with both the Arab countries and Israel. We cannot accept that it must be a choice of one or the other. As a country, we


can never accept that. As a nation, we have worked very closely with the Arabs. We have helped to create Arab States in the same way as we helped to create Israel. When I was at the Foreign Office I worked closely with Arab leaders as well as with Israeli leaders.
What is more, I have never believed that it is impossible to establish reasonable relations with President Nasser and the U.A.R. I know that the Foreign Secretary has set his heart on doing that, and I do not quarrel with him in that respect. But I believe that it can be done on only one basis, which is for Britain to make it clear what British interests are in the Middle East and the commitments which we accept, and that we shall adhere to them, and that we have the means to carry them out. If we do that, then I believe that President Nasser will respect it. If the position is made absolutely clear, I believe that is possible. I do not believe that British interests and genuine U.A.R. interests are incompatible. Indeed, I believe that the interests sometimes are the same.
Therefore, may I say, in passing, because I have no wish to be controversial, that I believe that the weakness of the present position in trying to establish relations of this kind is Aden, since it appears that a power vacuum has been created there, and, wherever there is a power vacuum in the Middle East, President Nasser has no alternative but to step in. I believe that Aden is now the weak link in the whole of the Government's policy in the Middle East and in trying to establish reasonable relations.
Secondly, Britain has a general interest in the peace of the area, not only because of the danger of being dragged in to a much wider conflict but because of our investments and commercial interests there. Oil is still important, though less important than it was; let us recognise that. But, with the exception of the Gulf States, we no longer have direct commitments in the Middle East.
The Foreign Secretary made a remark which I was very glad to hear. He said that we are able to carry out certain obligations in the Middle East. He defined the Gulf area as the place where we can do it. He said that we have had a crucial and successful part to play in the Middle East. I agree with him entirely. I was very glad to hear him, as

Foreign Secretary, say it. It is of interest to note that we were able to do it because of the agreement which we negotiated with Kuwait in June, 1961, which entirely respected the independence of Kuwait. Kuwait then became a member of the United Nations. We were once called upon to carry out our obligations, which we did successfully. When that was seen, the effort was never required again. I believe that the same thing could have been done in Aden. Therefore, we look to the United Nations to take action in cases of conflict other than those specific commitments which we have.
Thirdly, Britain, as a maritime Power, has an interest, together with other maritime Powers, in the freedom of navigation. The Foreign Secretary quoted the statement which we made as a Government in 1957. I am glad that it has been endorsed by the present Government. Freedom of access to the Gulf of Aqaba was maintained until a fortnight ago by the United Nations. Therefore, it must surely believe in freedom of access. It must be a fundamental belief of the United Nations.
We look to the United Nations, and we are entitled to do so, to reinstitute it. It is interesting to go back to Hammarskjold's aide memoire to see that he said at the time that no question of belligerent rights should in future arise after the settlement of 1957. Surely the Government are entitled to say to the United Nations that they should still adhere to the recommendation of the then Secretary-General on which the general settlement was based.
But what happens if the United Nations fails to take action? The Foreign Secretary has clearly faced that question. He has said that he would attempt to get a clear declaration by the maritime Powers of the position. This is to be welcomed. He is in consultation with other maritime Powers now. What steps are to be taken by the maritime Powers in order, to use the phrase, "to exert their rights"? The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister must realise that this is the key to the whole question. I do not press the right hon. Gentleman on it at this point. It would be wrong to press him in the debate. But he knows only too well that, first, there must be no delay and, secondly, that the House


looks to the Government to take the necessary action to ensure that this declaration is implemented if necessary.
I return to the very serious general situation. At the moment, the peace, if it can be described as such, is precarious and can be shortlived. It will last for only a limited time. Restraint will be exercised in the Middle East only for a limited time unless results which, in the Foreign Secretary's words, are equitable, can be produced. It is difficult to be optimistic about the outcome of the Security Council. There has been much criticism of the first meeting called by the Canadians and Danes. I believe that the first meeting was absolutely justified to alert the world to the situation which was arising. I wish that it had been called much earlier.
It would be best if U.N.E.F. could be reinstated—no doubt that is the Foreign Secretary's view—and extended to the other Arab-Israeli frontiers. I agree with him in urging the Israelis to accept part of it on their own side of the frontier, or, perhaps less good, to strengthen the Truce Supervisory Organisation and its subsidiaries and extend it to the Egyptian-Israeli border.
But we must face the fact that it is difficult to see President Nasser accepting U.N.E.F. again, or accepting a force of that nature. The Truce Supervisory Organisation would not be dealing, nor would a force on the frontiers alone, with Sharm el Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran. Therefore, there must be a separate solution of that problem, which should, if possible, be negotiated. Even if the Powers make their declaration and implement it, it cannot be a long-term solution. There must be finally a negotiated answer to the problem of the Straits of Tiran and Sharm el Sheikh.
If the United Nations Security Council does not produce a solution, what then? I was glad that the Government accepted the proposal of a four-Power conference. I regret that the Soviet Union rejected it. But, although there cannot be a formal conference, there can be informal discussions between the four major Powers at the United Nations as a location in an attempt to get a settlement of the Middle East problems. It may well be that the French, who have succeeded in maintaining good relations

with both the Arabs and Israelis, have a particular part to play in this. But, certainly, Her Majesty's Government should be able to play their part in a four-Power conference in a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.
It is possible—I got a glimmer of this from the Foreign Secretary's opening remarks—that the Soviet Union will see the danger of conflicts between forces outside their own control and, therefore, will want a negotiated settlement. Perhaps the right course is to try to lift the problem from the immediate though very important detailed questions of the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip to the higher level of the whole of the Middle Eastern problems between the Arab countries and Israel. It might be that in this way there would be a better chance of getting a negotiated solution to deal with the problems which concern Britain.
I would not think of putting forward details in a debate of this kind, because they can be worked out only after soundings at somewhere like New York, where there can be constant discussions between the Powers concerned. But it may be right to lead it to the higher level of world problems and not limit it to the Middle East. When the two super Powers are involved in problems across the world, it may be possible to settle more than one of them by taking them together.
At first sight, this may appear to be vastly ambitious. But, on the other hand, by raising the whole level of discussion it may prove easier between the two super Powers to get a general negotiated settlement. Only if the Soviet Union is involved is Soviet pressure likely to be brought to bear on the U.A.R. to reach a settlement which the Foreign Secretary will be able to accept as equitable. Only if the United States is involved will there be a balance in the negotiation which is likely to produce a settlement of any kind.
We have been discussing—these are my final words; I do not wish to be too long—the immediate questions of the freedom of navigation, the attempt to strangle a small country economically and the risk of conflict between Arab and Jew. There are, however, two much bigger questions which are fundamental and remain to be answered. The first is whether this will develop into the attempt to wipe out Israel once and for


all. Surely, the United Nations, which recognised Israel at once, and the Powers which helped to create Israel, cannot possibly allow a small independent country to be eliminated by those surrounding her.
There is, secondly, the question whether this is an attempt to extend Soviet influence throughout the Middle East and down to the lip of Southern Arabia. That was the fear which I felt in the opening sentences of the Foreign Secretary's speech today. He indicated that this was but the end or a stage in a very long build-up of arms, presumably by the Soviet Union to the Middle Eastern countries in order to establish her own influence.
If that is the real threat, again it is only the United States which has the paramount part to play in this situation. That we must recognise. I urge Her Majesty's Government to support the United States in seeking a negotiated settlement for a more permanent peace in the whole of the Middle East, as well as for maintaining the rights of the maritime Powers and the existence of small countries, whether Israel or Jordan, and to keep them, if they can, free from the Soviet influence and domination which. the Foreign Secretary has indicated today, we have every right to fear.

4.52 p.m.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on the tone and temper of the speech which he has made today and on the practical proposals which he has put forward. He will, I hope, forgive me if later I add some further suggestions about the action which we might take.
Long years ago, I had a strange introduction to the problems of the Middle East. At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, I was converted to Zionism by Lawrence of Arabia and the Emir Feisal. I was head of the League of Nations section in the British delegation. A Cambridge friend, Eric Forbes Adam, was head of the mandate section negotiating the Palestine Mandate with Dr. Weizmann. I found it hard to think that a Jewish National Home could be imposed on an Arab country. I thought that the Mandate would be a millstone around the shoulders of the League.
At last, Forbes Adam made me meet Lawrence and the Emir Feisal. They said: "Yes, we want the Jews in Palestine. We want them to come. In race, we are cousins. They will bring us capital, brains and knowledge. Together with their experts, we will make our desert countries blossom like the rose."
Until the slump of 1929, it worked as the Emir had predicted. But in 1929 there came mass unemployment. The world markets for Israeli exports dried up. Hitler and Mussolini trained saboteurs to stir up trouble and to wreck the splendid works which the Zionists had built up.
For nearly 40 years the Israelis have had Arab enmity added to the other vast difficulties which they have had to face. And yet they beat them all. They have made a country that is the admiration of the world. As the Leader of the Opposition has said, it would be an irreparable loss—and, above all, to their Arab neighbours—if the State of Israel should disappear. Yet that is precisely what we may be facing now.
The Israelis are 3 million against 50 million; 250,000 troops against half a million; 800 tanks against 1,800. And Israel has other handicaps which, perhaps, are worse. Many in the world remember that in 1956, under the lamentable encouragement of France and Britain, she launched a war against the United Arab Republic. Israel refused to have the United Nations forces on Israeli soil. She broke up the U.N.'s Mixed Armistice Commission. And, alas, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has said, the Arabs have long-standing and bitter grievances against her, which she has made no real effort to put right.
I want to argue, as did my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, that from the present grave crisis a real and lasting settlement should be made, and that another temporary truce in the conflict is most emphatically not enough.
A real settlement seems Utopian today. Nasser has been using dangerous, unforgivable language. James Cameron reports from Tel Aviv that there is not a soul in Israel who is not convinced that war must come. Israel's Foreign Minister, the wise and clever Mr. Abba Eban, says that "every sacrifice" to keep the Strait of Tiran open must be made—


"alone if we must, with others if we can."
Of course, the rights of Israel in Tiran must be upheld. I want, however, to consider what would be the cost to Israel of war over Tiran. What would be the cost in relation to the trade which passes through Eilat? It is a tiny port; there is no railway; and only 200,000 tons of shipping come there every year. The oil that comes through Eilat is less than 10 per cent. of the Israeli needs. It is costing Israel £70 million a week to keep her forces mobilised. How long would it require Eilat's trade to balance, to make good, that appalling loss? The trade of Eilat for a generation would not make up for the loss involved in a single week of war. If war begins, the oil from Iraq stops and it may never flow again.
I repeat that, of course, the rights of Israel in Tiran must be upheld. I warmly support what the Foreign Secretary said about a united declaration by the nations of what he called the maritime community." But I suggest also something more. I think that it would be surprising if President Nasser refused a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court. He offered to send the question of the Suez Canal to the Court in 1956. If the Security Council does not now ask for an advisory opinion, if Russia should obstruct it, the Assembly can ask, by a simple majority, that it be done.
The Court set a very useful precedent about the Strait of Corfu, when the Labour Government sent their claims against Albania to the Court in 1947.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: We were never paid.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am obliged to the hon. Member. I was just about to say that we have never had the money which the Court awarded for the damage to our ships. Since 1947, however, I believe that it is true to say that the right to use the Strait has never once been challenged.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Sir Ian Orr-Ewing indicated assent.

Mr. Noel-Baker: That might well happen again if we got an advisory opinion from the Court about Tiran. While I welcome what my right hon. Friend said about a declaration by the

maritime community on the Straits of Tiran, which I think is strong and wise action, we should also demand with all our energy that the Court shall give its verdict, too.

Sir Barnett Janner: I appreciate the point which my right hon. Friend is making, but does he realise where Israel is standing at present, does he realise the forces surrounding Israel, and does he think that any reference to the Court at this stage, after the definite statements which have been made by Nasser and others in respect of the right of passage through the Straits, would have any point and that Israel or any other country could wait for a verdict of that description?

Mr. Noel-Baker: My hon. Friend is learned in the law. I cannot believe that it would not be wise for us to have a ruling by the Court in favour of the rights of Israel. I have said that I support a declaration by the maritime community which the Foreign Secretary proposes, but I maintain that it would be wise also to take the course which I have proposed.
The United Nations should do that at once. It should also persuade the Israeli Government to reactivate the Israel-U.A.R. Mixed Armistice Tribunal, for which the U.A.R. delegate asked in the Security Council on Monday of this week. As the Foreign Secretary said, certainly we should still strive to interpose some United Nations screen, on both sides of the border, by one of the devices which he suggested, between the forces of Israel and her Arab neighbours. If I understood my right hon. Friend, the Israeli Prime Minister in a speech in the Knesset last week seemed belatedly to propose something of that kind. Certainly, the U.N. Council should, with all its authority, endorse the Secretary-General's warning that any act of force by any party will be a violation of Charter law.
Suppose all this succeeds and war is averted. Is that enough? I echo the Foreign Secretary. In this present crisis, surely we can see that it is not enough to patch up a fragile truce, as the United Nations did in 1947 and again in 1956. What is needed now in everyone's interests—in the interests of Israel, of the Arabs and of the world—is to establish a solid and a lasting peace. That means concessions by Israel and by the Arabs.
I take what in my opinion are the two most important points.
The Arabs claim that Eilat and the Israeli strip of coast were seized by the Israeli Army in 1947 in violation of the United Nations partition plan, and after it had been agreed and signed. According to their London spokesman in a letter to The Times on Monday, they call this
… an example of Israeli military expansionist policy in defiance of the U.N. rule.
I believe that that view can be upheld in history and in law, but is it all—

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: May I draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention to a reply which appears in The Times Magazine today, pointing out that Egypt never held this portion of land? In fact, it was taken from Jordan, and the armistice withdrawal was signed 14 days later, so that it was not done after the armistice with Egypt.

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am very well aware of that point, but it seems not to affect the argument which I am trying to make. I am saying that, even if the Arab argument can be upheld in history and in law, is that all that the Arabs should consider now?
Looked at in terms of 20th century commonsense, it is in the overriding interest of the Arabs, as the Emir Feisal told me so long ago, that Israel should prosper. Israel will prosper better if she has an outlet to the East, as will Jordan and the U.A.R. I believe that that is something which should mutually be agreed in a real settlement.
My second example is on the other side. It was referred to by the Foreign Secretary. I quote again from the letter written to The Times by the Arab spokesman in London:
Israel, by acts of force, had rendered the 1·5 million Arab inhabitants of Palestine as homeless refugees. It has arrogantly and persistently defied the U.N. over their repatriation and compensation for nearly 20 years. This human tragedy is the real cause of tension and danger to world peace in the Middle East.
I believe that he is right and that this human tragedy is the basic cause of the fear and hatred which, on both sides, now exist.
British responsibility is great. We invented the Balfour Declaration. We made

the Jewish National Home. We held the Mandate for nearly 30 years. When we gave it up, we had the duty to save those whom we had governed from the fate of homeless refugees. If the Middle East is ever to know peace, the problem must be solved. It would pay the West to provide a fund of £100 million to try to get real justice for these unhappy men. It would pay Israel to make a great and generous effort to try to meet their grievance and wipe out the bitter memories of the last 20 years—

Sir B. Janner: Does my right hon. Friend not realise that these refugees have been held on the border in a most uncivilised and disgraceful manner and that there were not anything like the present number at first? Does he realise, further, that they themselves left Israel when their people were attacking Israeli people?

Mr. Noel-Baker: I am fully aware of that, and my hon. Friend knows of my love and admiration for the Israeli people which I have shown over the decades since the Jewish home was first established. However, whatever the rights and wrongs on either side, I believe that Israel should now help to try to solve the problem which we face.
Much could be done by Western capital invested in the future of these refugees, who, with training and with skills, could go to other Arab countries and a new future and a new life which would be valuable to them and to the world.

Sir B. Janner: If the Arabs would have them.

Mr. Noel-Baker: The Middle East requires a great new start, and it must be made through the Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. But if it is to be made, the Governments will have to change the way in which they have used the U.N. up till now. It is hard to call on Nasser to respect the Charter, if it has been broken by greater powers at Suez, in Hungary, in Laos, at the Bay of Pigs, in Santo Domingo and in Vietnam. Law ceases to be law when the strong and powerful consistently set it aside.
It is in these events that we can find the real causes of the crisis in the Middle East today, and restoring the binding force of the United Nations Charter is the first and greatest of our problems now.
Second, I say to my right hon. Friend that he cannot just call in the United Nations to stop a war at the last desperate moment, when the shooting is about to start. The Israeli crisis has not taken us unawares. I offer some random headlines from the Press. The Times of 16th November, 1966, said:
Israel accuses Syria of plotting Arab War.
On 20th November, the Sunday Times said:
Israel's attack on Jordan jolts Middle East to Left".
On 21st November, 1966, The Times said, "Jordan Wants Sanctions", and on 22nd January, 1967, the following headline appeared in The Times:
Shots fired across Syria border with Israel. Damascus alleges attack.
Why did not the Governments, why did not our Government, which has so great a stake in Middle Eastern oil, take some major action to stop this drift to crisis, which began at least nine months ago? I know that there have been sporadic meetings of the Security Council, and that we have told our Ambassadors to urge restraint. There have been patched-up resolutions in the Council to get us round an awkward corner, even if they lead us nowhere when we are round.
With respect, that is not how the U.N. was meant to work. The Council was to be the meeting place of the Ministers with power, the Foreign Ministers who carry authority at home and in the world. The meetings were to go on, not at odd intervals, but day by day, or week by week, as they did in 1946 when Ernest Bevin and Secretary Byrnes used the Council to get the Russian Army out of Northern Iran.
I venture to suggest a course of action to the Foreign Secretary, to supplement the admirable proposals which he has made. I believe that he would do well to go himself, without delay, to the Security Council; to invite the Foreign Ministers of other members to do the same; and to make it plain that he will stay there one week, two weeks, three weeks, whatever is required, to sort out the issue. There is nothing so important that he can do. I think that he should ask the parties to state their case on every matter in dispute, and that he and other members should probe and argue every question that is brought up. Their de-

clared object should be that of which my right hon. Friend has spoken, a long-term settlement and peace.
All that should be done in public in the Council. Delegates speak far more responsibly, they quarrel less, and it is easier for them to yield to argument and to make concessions, when discussions are held in public, than when they are held in private. This is why Lord Robert Cecil said in the League Assembly long ago:
Publicity is the life-blood of the League.
It has been proved a hundred times in the last half century that that is true.
Some hon. Members may think it a paradox, but I believe that nothing could so calm the fierce hysteria of the Israeli and the Arab peoples as the searching, sustained, top-level, international debate which I have described. And after that debate—and here I elaborate on something which my right hon. Friend suggested—I believe that the Council would do well to adopt the procedure successfully followed when the Council stopped the war between the Indonesians and the Dutch in 1948.
The Council should appoint a U.N. Commission of distinguished, impartial and experienced men to visit all the parties, to probe the history and the facts, and to put forward recommendations to the Council for a lasting settlement to be made. The Commission need not consist of more than four or five people. It could include such men as Halvard Lange, for twenty years Foreign Minister of Norway; perhaps the ex-President of India, if he would serve; Senator Henri Rolin of Belgium—men known throughout the world for their ability and their integrity. A plan prepared by men such as these might well transform the situation, and make it far easier for the Foreign Secretary at future meetings of the Council to bring the full success which seems so Utopian today. Let us be quite clear. Soon, or late, the alternative to a real settlement is war, with all the lasting devastation it would bring, and perhaps, though the world should certainly prevent it, but it might happen, the death of Israel as well.
The Middle East is only part of the general world crisis—in that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. What is happening now


would not have happened if in Cuba, Santo Domingo and Vietnam the Charter had not been set aside. We must rehabilitate the Charter. We must reactivate not only the Mixed Armistice Tribunal, but the whole of the U.N. as well.
We can do much ourselves. I believe that the time has come to apply to Aden the UN. procedure which I have suggested for the Middle East. I believe that for far too long we have sought to settle the Aden problem by ourselves. It is an international question, affecting many nations, of the kind for which the United Nations institutions were set up. So is Vietnam. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have made great efforts, by private pressures, to bring the conflict to an end.
But there is only one power in the world that can do it, the power of the public opinion of all the nations in all the continents, voiced in a resolution of the General Assembly of the U.N. It is for questions such as these, which threaten small wars or major wars, that the U.N. institutions were set up. If we fail to use their full resources we abandon the attempt to bring law and order into world affairs.
Let me try to summarise what I have said. Brotherhood between the Arabs and Israelis is still the highest interest of them both. Only the U.N. can bring about this great result. The U.N. should not be called in to solve disputes at the last moment before the guns begin to speak. It must be used, and fully used, as soon as dangerous tension first appears. It can only give its right results if the leading spokesmen of its members, the men with power, play their full and personal part.
It is in the U.N. Council and Assembly that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary can do most to restore law and order to our near-anarchic world. They promised, when they took office, that they would do it. Let them count the man-days which senior members of the Government have spent in the institutions of the U.N. since 1964. Let them count the days which senior Ministers have spent in N.A.T.O., CENTO, S.E.A.T.O., or talking in foreign capitals about the Common Market. Let them count the days which they have spent

in the White House and in the Kremlin. I believe that, in some measure, they have sacrificed their finest platform and failed to use the greatest instrument they have for good. Europe is important. But Israel, Aden, Vietnam, the arms race, and the agony of the hungry nations, are the survival of mankind.

5.19 p.m.

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: The House will be grateful to the Foreign Secretary for a very balanced analysis and the temperate speech with which he opened the debate. If I may say so without appearing to be patronising, because such is not my intention, I think that in moments of crisis that is the sort of speech which one expects from a Foreign Secretary. That was the sort of speech which he gave us and for which we are very grateful.
I agree wholeheartedly with the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that the decision to bring about a peremptory withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force was an error of judgment on the part of the Secretary-General, and this tragedy is seen in all the greater perspective when one considers the very valuable work which the U.N. has done in the area.
Anyone who has seen U.N.R.W.A. working in the refugee camps in the Arab countries and anyone who has seen U.N.T.S.O. in action along the borders with Israel cannot but realise the tremendous achievement which the United Nations has to its credit in that part of the world.
The right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) has a long and distinguished record of support for the United Nations and, before it, the League of Nations. But I believe that we can fall into the great danger of making such meticulous use of the machinery as in the end to frustrate the spirit of the Charter. I have no doubt that the reference to the International Court would be a protracted operation, and that during the currency of those hearings a preventive war could well break out by Israel itself. I will give way to the right hon. Member if I have misquoted him. I appreciate that he put forward other practical suggestions, such


as the attendance of the Foreign secretary in the Security Council and the dispatch of a high-powered commission of international statesmen. I accept that, but I suggest that it is in no way a derogation of one's support for the United Nations merely to point out the danger of over-reliance upon [machinery and under-reliance upon operating in the spirit of the Charter.
One of the great difficulties is the series of imponderable motives which we have to deal with in this situation. When, on 17th May, President Nasser called upon U Thant to remove the United Nations force, what was the motive in his mind? Was it to re-establish his supremacy in the Arab world? We know that the Islamic League had been regarded by him as a competitor for the affections of the Arab States. We know that for a long time relations with Tunisia had been strained, and that certainly the war on the broadcasting ether, was intense with Jordan. We know that after the 7th April attack by Israel, Syria was extremely critical of Egypt for not going to her defence, and also that many Arab countries, not least Saudi Arabia, were critical of the presence of 50,000 Egyptian troops in the Yemen, and also of some of the methods used in that terrible war.
Alternatively, was it something more? Had we reached a situation in which Nasser felt that if he was strategically strong enough to wipe out the State of Israel, and thereby revenge the defeats of 1956? Or was it, perhaps, the motive of Soviet Russia to compensate for her loss of prestige in the Far East by asserting her own supremacy in the Middle East at very little cost to herself? If the latter, the visit of Mr. Gromyko to Cairo at Easter takes on a new and very sinister connotation. If it was merely the first—the political objective of re-establishing supremacy—have events gone too quickly and got out of control as far as Nasser is concerned?
Nasser may well have wanted a political gain, but was he prepared to risk the commitment of the United States Sixth Fleet and a possible confrontation between Russia and the United States of America? We do not know, but we have to consider these imponderable motives and, so to speak, operate on

all three in order to consider what political settlement can be brought about.
Certain factors are not in dispute. First, this action could not have happened without Russian support. To what extent we do not know, but certainly there must have been some Russian support—and certainly complete Russian knowledge.
Secondly, this is the one policy that is capable of uniting the whole Arab world. It is the only factor in the whole of the Middle East which can unite the Arab countries.
Thirdly, although very grave threats have been made against Britain and any other country that goes to the assistance of Israel in regard to oil supplies, and about the future of the Suez Canal, the Arab world should bear in mind the fact that although it would be a very grave economic setback to be deprived of Middle Eastern Oil supplies and to have to rely perhaps solely on Africa, Venezuela and the Gulf and, possibly, Iran, on the other side of the coin the Arab world has to find a continuing supply of oil customers. Therefore it is a two-edged weapon.
Certainly the dependence in 1956 on oil from the Middle East is nowhere as great today, with the establishment of larger oil tankers and alternative sources of supply. Likewise, whilst the tolls from the Suez Canal accounted for only 4 per cent. of the gross national product of Eygpt, the closing of the Canal or, alternatively, a boycott by canal users would isolate Egypt more politically from the rest of the world than she would care to contemplate. Therefore, whatever the rights and wrongs, the Arab world should realise that the threats it is making today against the western world and others are just as grave in their political and economic consequences to the Arab world itself as they are to those they seek to threaten. If anything they are graver.
If the declared object of the Arab world is to destroy Israel—and I believe that this is genuinely the feeling in Cairo at the moment; certainly it is believed in Israel at the moment—we must realise that so far there has been a staggering forbearance by the State of Israel. I do not believe that we can count on that forbearance for more than two or three further weeks. The political position of


the Eshkol Government would be completely untenable. Therefore, it is all the more vital that there should be a swift diplomatic initiative and that the political position of this country, America and others should be made crystal clear.
There is no question but that the longer the delay the weaker the position of Israel and the more powerful that of the Arab world. At the moment 20,000 Egyptian troops are being withdrawn from the Yemen; Russian ships are going through the Dardanelles; Algeria is sending troops, and Syria, Tunisia and Jordan are prepared to provide them also. It is vital for any Arab leader to survive that he should toe the Nasser line. Therefore, we must realise that failure on the diplomatic level will either unleash a preventive war on the part of Israel, or, alternatively, cause Israel to withdraw, losing all faith in international institutions, and to concentrate on building herself up as an independent nuclear power, with all that that entails.
There is no doubt that the Gulf of Aqaba is of supreme economic significance to Israel. It is her link to Africa, Asia and to countries like new Zealand and Australia. But it is of far greater political significance, because it is a symbol of the pressure which the Arab world is seeking to bring to bear upon the State of Israel. If Egypt succeeds in this blockade it will be the first step, which will be followed by others. It could well lead to the blockade of Israel's Mediterranean ports. It will be a sign for increased incidents on the Israeli border. It could even give fresh impetus to diverting the waters of the Jordan and rendering much of the area round the Sea of Galilee totally incapable if being put to agricultural use.
If a Soviet-backed move of this sort in the Middle East was successful, within one year the Soviet Union would be the only major Power in the Middle East with any influence. A fortnight ago there were only two hardliners in support of Nasser—Syria and Iraq. Today, those who have been comparatively cool-headed—countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Tunisia—have been forced into the Egyptian orbit—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]—for the very simple reason that the attempt to destroy Israel which is the declared objective of the Arab States, is the "Clause Four" of the Arab

League, which no country would dare to go against. Therefore, the problem is concentrated on Aqaba, but it is the symbol of the wider threat. Both sides regard it in that light.
I believe that the Prime Minister was entirely right at Margate to make this country's view unequivocal and clear. It was also right to quote the speech of our delegate in the General Assembly on 4th March, 1957. Sir Alan Noble said that the position of Aqaba was quite different from that of any other international waterway, and that the other instances quoted by Mr. Krishna Menon did not apply. He said:
… the Gulf of Aqaba is not only bounded at its narrow point of entry (that is, the Straits of Tiran) by two different countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but contains at its head the ports of two further countries: Jordan and Israel. This simple, undeniable fact is in itself enough to put it in a different category to any of the inland waters mentioned by Mr. Krishna Menon.
This applies only, I believe, to that particular international waterway.
May I ask two questions? First, what are our moral obligations towards Israel, and, second, what should we now be doing diplomatically? I do not take the view that the Tripartite Declaration is dead and buried or that the mere fact that Russia is now a political force in the Midle East or that we and the Americans and the French are no longer the exclusive suppliers of arms in any way removes the continuing moral obligation in the Tripartite Declaration.
It was by force of that Declaration that the three Governments
… take this opportunity of declaring their deepest interest in, and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition of the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in the area. The three Governments, should they find that any of those States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would consistently with their obligations as members of the U.N., immediately take action, both within and outside the U.N., to prevent such a violation.
I do not believe that the events of 1956 or the changing balance of power in the Middle East are sufficient excuse for devaluing the currency of moral obligations.
Therefore, no amount of legal sophistry can sweep away the continuing moral obligation to go to the assistance of a


nation whose frontiers are threatened or invaded, which was a moral obligation undertaken by this country and France and America in 1950. I hope that we will not take the view which a prominent German statesman pressed on this country in 1914 that our obligation, signed almost 100 years before, to go to the defence of Belgium was merely a "scrap of paper". We do not want to see Israel used as a second Czechoslovakia. Therefore, we have a continuing moral obligation. The care with which President Johnson used the phrase "within and outside the United Nations" clearly shows that America regards the Tripartite Declaration as having a continuing moral effect upon the Government of the United States.
There are many similarities between the present situation and that which obtained over Cuba in 1962. It is a very unpleasant and dangerous situation. There is nothing meritorious—certainly nothing very radical—in being weak and wet in such a situation. I was not one who screamed when President Kennedy took very firm action in 1962 when missiles were pointing at the heart of the United States. Nor, I hope, would I have been one who screamed, if I had been old enough to be in the House, when Sir Winston Churchill was pointing out the dangers on the continent of Europe in the thirties. We are at the moment in a similar situation.
Given that moral obligation, what should we be doing? Obviously, we should attempt, at first, to act through the United Nations and to build up a new emergency force. If Egypt is genuine in saying that the reason for her action is a threatened invasion of Syria, and if the Israelis are also sincere in saying that they have no intention of invading Syria, let them be persuaded to have a United Nations force on Israeli soil on the frontier with Syria—[HON. MEMBERS: "Both sides."]—both sides, if possible, but, if that cannot be done, on Israeli soil.
If we could step up U.N.T.S.O., that would be a possibility. If we could reconstitute the Mixed Armistice Commission which died in 1955, that also would be a possibility. But I doubt whether, without the agreement of America and Russia, one would get a

resolution through the Security Council or a two-thirds majority under the Uniting for Peace Resolution in the General Assembly.
Therefore, we may have to act outside the U.N., because the machinery of the United Nations cannot be used to give effect to the spirit of the Charter. The right hon. Member for Derby, South spoke about Arab refugees. I should be much more impressed had the Arab States themselves made greater efforts to settle the Palestine refugee problem and had the U.S.S.R. provided one kopek in the last 20 years towards the cost of helping the refugees.
There are two twin pillars which should be the policy of the Government. The first is that we cannot support a preventive war by Israel. The second is that there cannot be a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. This could well bring about a confrontation between Russia and America and this is a very real possibility. It would be for both to pause and consider whether this is something for which they are prepared to risk a third world war. President Nasser has already achieved tremendous political advantages even if the situation were to-recede at this moment, though he may be too far committed to do that at present. If the Arab States want reassurance about the frontiers with Israel, they should be given it, and by a United Nations presence. I believe that this is negotiable.
But if we do not succeed in preventing this blockade, I face quite frankly, that may well mean the dispatch of British. American or other forces into the Gulf of Aqaba. I accept that. One cannot start saying that one is not in favour of a blockade unless one is logically prepared to face that. If not, let us wash our hands of the whole matter. Let us just leave Israel and say, "We are not prepared to do anything about it; we have no obligations and we do not mind what happens in the Middle East."
The best chance of avoiding that is to make it clear beyond peradventure, publicly or privately, that this will happen and that it is going to happen but that, at the same time, the question of security for the Arab countries and their frontiers with Israel is something upon which they are entitled to receive satisfaction. I believe that if this blockade is allowed to


continue, within six months there will be an escalation of incidents and the situation will be much more difficult, with a much greater chance of preventive war.
In the Security Council on 29th May Lord Caradon said there were four points to be tackled. The first was:
… how can tension be relieved and immediate dangers of conflict removed.
I believe that there is no alternative but for an expression of firm intention to be given. The second was:
… how can the rights of free and unimpeded passage through the Straits of Tiran be guaranteed and assured.
I believe that that can happen only if there is a firm declaration by the maritime Powers; a clear intention that action will be taken if it must be taken. The third was:
… how can effective United Nations measures and machinery to keep the peace and prevent violence and conflict through the whole area best be worked out for the future.
That will be a long-term problem, but I hope that the events of the last few days will cause even the big Powers to realise that this part of the world is a very dangerous place and that, in the Middle East, it is in the interests of all Powers to see that some kind of international peace-keeping is done. The fourth was:
… what new and additional action can be taken to prevent such dangers to the peace recurring in future years.
If we are not careful, we will confront ourselves with the most appalling problems. Apart from Israel, we will face problems of our influence in the Middle East, of our economic position in the Middle East and of our oil supplies.
It is not merely our economic and political interests which are at stake. Anyone who goes to Israel cannot fail to be tremendously moved by the achievements of that country, just as anyone who goes to Egypt cannot fail to be moved by the great economic advances which have been made by that country in the last 10 to 15 years. However, we are speaking of a small, embattled democracy. It would be a tragedy if we were to say that 10 or 20 years after 6 million Jews were extinguished on the Continent of Europe, the conscience of the world was so untroubled that it did not say that the Jewish people were entitled to a strip of the

world's surface for their national homeland. That is what is at stake.
One of the most moving things in Israel is the approach to the Shrine of the Heroes, a shrine to commemorate the 6 million Jews who died in the last war. As one approaches it one sees the trees which have been planted by people from all over the world—for the most part European and for the most part Christian. They were people who had been traced through Israeli records as having given shelter to Jewish people during the war, very often at risk for their own lives. They were asked to go to Israel and each to plant a tree as a gesture of the reconciliation of Israel towards those countries guilty of the torture and massacre of the Jewish people during the war.
Is it too much to ask, after 10 or 15 years, for there to be the same spirit of reconciliation between Arabs and the Jewish people? I believe that even if that cannot happen, this country has a firm, binding, moral obligation to defend this small country from extinction. If we were to fail in that obligation the crime which we would commit would be nowhere as enormous as the crimes committed during the war, but would rank as one of the many crimes which have been perpetrated over the centuries against the Jewish people.

5.43 p.m.

Mr. Will Griffiths: The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party made such an interesting speech that it is difficult to know on which point to comment first. I will be referring to some of the points he made, particularly to those he mentioned in his emotional peroration.
I share with him the feeling he expressed about what happened to European Jews. I would only add that the guilt does not lie on the Arab people but much nearer at home; but I will say no more about that now. Before coming to the main burden of my speech, I wish to refer to some of the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. It is, perhaps, a pleasant change to be able to say how much I enjoyed much of his speech and certainly the whole mood of it. His caution, reservation and desire to keep all options open for peace were highly commendable, and while I have certain doubts about some


of the points he raised, I thought that most of his remarks struck absolutely the right attitude.
There have always been in the House, certainly since I arrived here, hon. Members like my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) who have persistently and sincerely put the Zionist point of view. I quite understand that. Sometimes I have been with him, as he knows, although today I have no intention of putting myself in the posture of a spokesman for either an exclusively Arab or Israeli point of view about current events in the Middle East.
I try, to the best of my ability, to think like an international Socialist. If I were asked for my ideal solution for this troubled region, I would say that I would like to see a Palestine in which Jew, Arab and Christian could live harmoniously together in a society in which Socialist principles, political and economic, were generally accepted.

Sir B. Janner: Sir B. Janner rose—

Mr. Griffiths: I hope that my hon. Friend will let me get going before intervening.
Perhaps some day that may come to pass. However, it is not a realistic assumption to make for the foreseeable future. I believe that some Arab leaders share the view that it is possible to have what one might call a multi-racial society in this area. The difficulty is that the antagonisms between Israel and her Arab neighbours are so deep that no Arab leader would dare publicly express that view at the moment.
Despite the Foreign Secretary urging us to keep off the Suez issue, I cannot resist referring to it, because the recent rush into print and speech by some of the guilty men of the Suez aggression of 1956 is one of the most disagreeable byproducts of this situation. We are told by some of them today that Egypt's actions prove how correct they were in 1956, on which occasion they disgracefully deceived Parliament and the people by pretending that they were taking action to stop a war which, in fact, was promoted to seize the Suez Canal.—[Interruption.] Now, in 1967, they pretend that their action was to preserve Israel from her neighbours. It is about time that they admitted the truth, which

is becoming increasingly recognised by the accumulation of unimpeachable evidence.
The fact is that the present crisis is a direct result of their use of Israel as an aggressive weapon against Egypt in 1956. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish."] It is all very well for hon. Gentlmen opposite to say "Rubbish", but they must remember that the events of 1956 were condemned by the United Nations and by the Labour Party. I am simply referring to what happened. I repeat that the present crisis is, in my opinion, a direct result of the Tory's use of Israel as an aggressive weapon against Egypt in 1956. [Interruption.] This is a free House of Commons and I am entitled to state my view—and I shall say why. It is the conviction of Arab nationalists everywhere that Israel was created as an instrument of imperialism and not as a refuge for persecuted Jews. [An HON. MEMBER: "What is the hon. Gentleman's view?"] In my view, it was a bad day for Israel when it lent itself to that sinister conspiracy. Every event since—

Mr. F. A. Burden: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I should like to ask him whether he asked Colonel Nasser what his intention was towards Israel, and whether the hon. Gentleman would agree that when I interviewed Nasser in 1954 he said, "I will never rest until Israel has been exterminated and the Jews have been liquidated." I ask the hon. Gentleman whether he put that question to Colonel Nasser and, if so, whether that is still Colonel Nasser's view?

Mr. Griffiths: I will speak on those matters in my own time and in my own way—but I will tell the hon. Member—

Sir B. Janner: Answer the question.

Mr. Griffiths: I will come to it in my own way and in my own time. I will not allow my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West to teach me how to make my speeches in the House of Commons. I will make them in my own way. I am not avoiding the question. I was simply saying, when I was interrupted all round—and I now again say—that the use of Israel at the time of Suez was a provocation to Arab nationalists everywhere. Does anyone disagree with that statement? It was a provocation,


not to me but to the Arab nationalists. That is what they say—

Sir Myer Galpern: Does my hon. Friend believe it?

Mr. Griffiths: That is what they say—[Interruption.]—it is just as well that we should try to understand what they are saying, and that is what I am now trying to tell this House of Commons.
Every event, since the creation of Israel, from the Israelis' seizure of Eilat after the 1949 armistice, to which reference has already been made, to Mr. Eshkol's threats against Syria earlier this month—[HON. MEMBERS: "When?"]—is seen by the Arabs as part of a design further to erode their territory. That is how they see it, and this is what I am saying. There is ample documentary evidence. There are lots of newspaper reports, if anyone doubts what I say, of what spokesmen in Israel were saying about Syria early this month. [Interruption.] I am only trying to say that this has had its effect on this crisis.
Talking about hon. and right hon. Members opposite and how they put it, let me refer to an article in the Sunday Express at the weekend by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg). I know that nowadays he is always popping up, either larding the Eamonn Andrews Show with banalities or writing this kind of nonsense in the Sunday Express, which is honeycombed with historical inaccuracies. For instance, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
When Nasser nationalised the canal it did not thereby absolve Egypt from the obligation to keep it open. When he failed to do so, Israel developed its Red Sea port so as to make navigation of the canal by its ships unnecessary.
The fact is that Nasser nationalised the canal in 1956 and Israel seized Eliat a few years before that.[Interruption.]
Again, the right hon. and learned Gentleman says:
In 1956 Nasser tried to block access to Elath by the erection of guns commanding the Gulf of Akaba on the Sinai peninsula. The result was the Suez war.
Is anyone saying that that action was a direct cause of the Suez war? Did it not have something to do with the actions of Lord Avon and his supporters on the other side of the House? Is not

that a piece of pocket history that is, as it were, slightly off-beat and distorted? That is all I wish to say on that subject.
Much talk naturally centres round access to the Gulf of Aqaba. It is a matter of historical fact—and do not let hon. Members ask me my view, because it is a matter of fact—that Nasser did not commence to block the Gulf of Aqaba. It did not start after the Egyptian revolution of 1952—the Gulf was being blocked even in the days of Farouk. There were still—

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I think that where he makes a mistake relates to the fact that the Port of Eilat did not even start to be developed at the time of which he speaks. I went there myself early in 1956, and there were only a few wooden huts and no port facilities whatever, because the Gulf of Aqaba was blocked, with gun emplacements at its entrance. It was only after the United Nations Emergency Force took over and made sure that there was no such blockage that Israel invested a vast amount of time, money and effort in making Port Eilat something worth while and very valuable to her economy.

Mr. Griffiths: I am sure that that is so. I only say that it was occupied before the Suez aggression—before 1956–57. Hon. Members opposite must not seek to date all their arguments from 1956. This policy was going on for some years before that, and Eilat, although not developed, was seized by Israel a very considerable number of years before 1956–57. Does the hon. Member accept that?

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Not as a port, but earlier.

Mr. Griffiths: The place was seized?

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Yes.

Mr. Griffiths: Right—we are agreed on that.
Last Friday I returned from a short visit to Egypt—[Interruption.] I was accompanied by three of my hon. Friends, and I want to explain how the visit came about and why we went there. [Interruption.] If the House of Commons wants to listen to only one point of view it will not be living up to its high reputation. I have been in the House a number


of years, and I am not unused to being in a minority. I shall continue my speech to the end, and I do not care whether I am interrupted by the Opposition or from my own side—I shall continue to put my case to the best of my ability.
The object of our visit was not related to the events that overtook us in this dispute between Israel and the U.A.R. We went to Egypt because some of us believe that it is high time Members of Parliament—and particularly members of the Labour Party—understood a little more about what is happening internally and socially since the Arab revolution was carried through in Egypt in 1952. I can tell my hon. Friends that the dispossession of the land owners and the dispossession of the wealthy has gone to very great lengths indeed in the U.A.R. There is much in the internal actions there which ought to appeal to every Socialist. [Interruption.]
It was to look at the internal situation that we went to Egypt. We saw a very great deal that was of enormous interest and benefit to us. We had the experience while we were there of the crisis and the international crisis building up. We had the opportunity of being received by President Nasser. [Interruption.] I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary today speaking in terms that held out the possibility of friendship with President Nasser, something for which he has been derided over and over again by hon. and right hon. Members opposite—and I hope they are not to be joined by my hon. Friends. I thought that the House might be interested to hear my recollections of how I think the Egyptians see the present situation and its origins. I am sorry if some of the comments I have to make about the origins and so on—some were referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)—exasperate people, but I have to report them because this is how one important party in this conflict sees the issue.
First, I refer to the actual incidents which provoked the mobilisation of the Egyptian armed forces and their movement into Sinai. This was a culmination and escalation of the regular border incidents on the Egyptian border, the Lebanese border, on Jordan and

especially in Syria. There have been hundreds of these on both sides.

Mr. J. J. Mendelson: I am most reluctant to interrupt my hon. Friend, and I do so with great respect, but it is quite untrue to say that there have been attacks of terrorism on both sides. There have been 31 attacks from Syria into Israel before the recent retaliatory act. With his record for the truth, my hon. Friend should tell the truth here.

Mr. Griffiths: My hon. Friend has misunderstood. I have said that there have been a whole series of border incidents in which both sides have been involved. [HON. MEMBERS: "No, one side."] I know that the Arabs have constantly been sending bands into Israel across the various borders, but what does my hon. Friend call it when on 7th April the Israeli Air Force with tanks and troops was committed into a large-scale battle, what they called reprisal over the border into Syria? Is not that an incident?

Mr. Mendelson: The Syrian Government have declared publicly that as a prelude to the ensuing destruction of Israel they would send armed bands into Israel. If they defend themselves 31 times that is defence and the other is aggression.

Mr. Griffiths: I am simply saying that there have been repeated incidents, and I am unhappy about them all. I am trying to explain the point of view of one of the contending parties. To pretend that this is all black and white is manifestly absurd. I quote to the House and to my hon. Friend a report in The Guardian by Mr. David Hirst on 14th May which said:
The danger of an Arab-Israel war has grown slightly more serious during the past few days. Israeli warnings have become almost routine in recent months, but this week they took on a more ominous pattern when an informed source was quoted as talking about the possibility of marching on Damascus and overthrowing the present regime.

Sir B. Janner: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Hon. Members: Give way.

Mr. Griffiths: No, I will not give way again.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. May I remind hon. and


right hon. Members that a large number of hon. Members wish to speak in this debate and interruptions prolong speeches.

Mr. Griffiths: Precisely because of that I do not want to give way more than is absolutely necessary. These incidents, call them what you will, terrorist raids or reprisals, were in fact happening. Whether the House believes it or not, we were told that Egypt believed that by the middle of this month there was a serious threat of an Israeli invasion of Syria. The Egyptians believed that mobilised along the Syrian frontier were 13 or 14 brigades. [HON. MEMBERS: "Did you believe it?"] I am not saying what I believe. I am putting to the House what other people have told me. I am doing so because I thought it of interest for the House to hear another point of view. They were satisfied that this would happen.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South referred to the rôle of the C.I.A., which seemed very sinister. I must confess that at one time when some of my hon. Friends saw the hand of the C.I.A. in every sort of overthrow of what they regarded as a progressive regime anywhere in the world I was sceptical, but I am not so sceptical now. We have the well-documented case of Santo Domingo, and the recent examination of the C.I.A. in Guyana revealed by the "Insight" column in the Sunday Times.
All I say is that some sources in the U.A.R. say that the C.I.A. is playing a rôle in this situation. They say that the C.I.A. were encouraging Israel to have a go at Syria. When I was told this I was sceptical and asked for proof. I shall tell hon. Members what was said. I was told that this was put to the American Ambassador in Cairo. He was told that the C.I.A. was intervening in these matters, whereupon the Ambassador expressed his scepticism. Then the Egyptians said, "We have a tape recording of your agents' conversations. We shall play it to you". Whereupon the American Ambassador said, "I do not think I would like to hear it now. I will ring up Washington and see what they say". After ringing up Washington he said, "I do not think I would like to hear it after all." I know that these things can have an effect, but in view of what has hap-

pened in recent years, I am not so sceptical about the r61e of the C.I.A. as I used to be.
I want to comment on the business of the United Nations force in the Middle East and to point out that it was only on Egyptian soil. It was never on Israeli soil. I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Liberal Party say that if a United Nations force is interposed between the contending parties again—as I hope it will be—that force will be stationed not only on Egyptian soil but on Israeli soil.
I want to say a word about the dominant position which the Egyptians have occupied since the United Nations withdrew on the Gulf of Aqaba and the position on Sharm el Sheikh. The House ought to hear the Egyptian point of view about this. [HON. MEMBERS: "We know it."] I am not sure that the House does know it. From the Egyptian point of view, the reoccupation of Sharm el Sheikh represents the recovery of the last piece of loot which was held by any of the three collusionists who carried out the Suez aggression in 1956. That is how they see it, because, of course, Israel simply got there as a consequence of the Suez aggression in which this country, France and Israel participated in 1956. The Egyptians say that it was acquired by that conspiracy and that aggression and that now they are back where they were before 1956. They point out that a state of war still exists between the U.A.R. and Israel. They pointed out that Israeli ships were denied access to the Gulf even before the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and that passage has arisen since 1956 simply because of the Israeli occupation during the Suez war of Sharm el Sheikh, from which they only withdrew after the installation of a United Nations force ensured the continuance of a policy which suited them. Thus Israel benefited by the 1956 aggression, which was condemned by the United Nations, condemned by the Muslims of the Commonwealth, condemned by this party, and at least half of the nation. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Incidentally, as far as I understand it, the Egyptians anyway have no intention of stopping food supplies but simply oil and raw materials.
Let me say that as far as I am personally concerned—and I invite my hon.


Friends to go and look at the record—as those who agree with me know, over a long time in this party and in my membership of the House, I have at times had to take an extremely unpopular line even in defiance of the Government—for instance, over Palestine, and when we had a Labour Government; and if today I am saying unpopular things from the point of view of one of the contending parties or of some Members of the House, it is not, I beg you to believe, a view which I hold or want to see maintained—

Mr. Edward Lyons: Then why put it?

Mr. Griffiths: I am putting a view which I certainly thought a matter which the House of Commons wants to consider in seeking to find a solution, which I also want to find.
Let me say right away that, never mind the dangers of escalation, it would be an enormous tragedy if the people who built up the kibbutzes in Israel, and if the people in the United Arab Republic slaving away on the Aswan Dam today and building their conception of Socialism in their own country, were denied the fruits of their labours, and certainly I am not going to be a party to a policy which destroys that. I am simply telling the House, however unpopular it may sound, what are the views which, I gathered during my recent visit, were held by one of the contending parties in this highly critical situation.

Mr. Burden: Will the hon. Member answer my question?

Mr. Griffiths: There is a question which has been referred to earlier without causing any great jeers—it was referred to by the Leader of the Liberal Party, and in particular it was referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South—and that is the problem of the homeless Arab refugees. For nearly twenty years 1½ million of these people have been denied repatriation to their homeland, and also compensation. If anybody starts to howl at that one let me say that I accept that more could have been done to assimilate them into the neighbouring Arab countries, and it may well be that they have been main-

tained there in their misery in Jordan and the Gaza Strip simply as a propaganda instrument. That may well be so, but it does not alter the fact that many hundreds of thousands of them were driven from their homes at that time, and the United Nations, for which most of my hon. Friends have a regard, and quite rightly, has repeatedly said that these people ought to be taken back into what is now the State of Israel. One really cannot help but recognise that this is the background of the conflict today.
The President of the United Arab Republic, President Nasser, insists that he will not attack first. I believe him. Israel has apparently been prevailed upon to withhold military action. [Interruption.] He has simply moved his troops inside his own territory. That is all he has done. I am very glad to see that so far restraint has been shown by all the contending parties in this dispute, because in this situation are all the ingredients of a world-wide catastrophe. But we have a little time.
I am afraid that, mostly as a result of the policy of hon. and right hon. Members opposite, British policy in the Middle East lies in ruins. In my opinion, under successive Governments we have paid too much attention and given too much support to the feudal kings and sheikhs of the Arab world, people who, inevitably, sooner or later, will be consigned to the dustbin of history. We must realise and accept the facts of the Arab revolution, accomplished or burgeoning. If a new appreciation, a reappraisal, of President Nasser's rôle and intentions had taken place even three years ago, matched by a rapid military withdrawal on our part from the Persian Gulf and South Arabia, I believe that Britain's influence for peace would have been greater today. Of what use are our aristocratic allies, Feisal, for example, today? It is a supreme irony. The Foreign Secretary deplored the sale of arms to the Middle East. So do I. Here we are selling the most sophisticated weaponry to Feisal and Saudi Arabia, and which, in the present situation, might be used against Israel, and I, too, hope that an embargo will be worked out between the Great Powers on arms sales to the Middle East. But even these feudal aristocrats are bound to bow to the gale of Arab nationalist opinion.
I apologise for having taken so much time, but I have been very much interrupted, and I was determined to finish my speech, and I will finish it on this note. I believe that the policy which the Government ought to adopt in the short term is this. I do not think we ought to take sides with either the United States of America or with the Soviet Union. We ought to display an independent initiative. I agreed with the Foreign Secretary when he welcomed the proposal by France for the four-Power conference. I share with him his disappointment at the rejection of this suggestion by the Soviet Union. I think he ought to persist in working with France, which recognises two sides to this problem. I believe, too, that the Foreign Secretary might examine the possibilities of having a private conference, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, between France, Great Britain, Israel, and the United Arab Republic, which, I believe, could rapidly solve the confrontation in the Gaza Strip, and then, if restraint is still exercised by all concerned, the more difficult problem of Aqaba.
Now, before I sit down, I will give way to the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden).

Mr. Burden: May I ask the hon. Gentleman if he will answer the question I put to him during the earlier part of his speech? Did he ascertain from Nasser whether his view still is the view he gave to me in 1954, that he will never rest till he has eliminated the State of Israel and annihilated the Israeli people?

Mr. Griffiths: I will answer that without hesitation. As far as I understand it, from the questions put to him, it is certainly not President Nasser's view. He gave me no impression at all that that was his view. I hope I have answered the question. I do not know why my hon. Friends behind me were so unaware of my reputation and actions as to think that I was afraid to answer the question.
Again I apologise for having taken so long.

6.19 p.m.

Mr. Sandys: I do not propose to follow the hon. Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths), except to say that the House

always likes to hear both sides of a question; but, with all respect to the hon. Gentleman, I do not think that Colonel Nasser's case has been much assisted by his speech.
I find myself in general agreement with the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But on this occasion I do not intend to write him a letter about it. [Laughter.] As the right hon. Gentleman said, this is not basically a dispute between Arabs and Jews. The present dangerous situation has primarily been brought about by a combination of two things—first, the struggle for power within the Arab world and, secondly, Russia's desire to secure a dominant influence in the Middle East.
Colonel Nasser has for sime time been pursuing his ambitions in various ways, though without very much success. He tried to unite some of the Left-wing régimes under the umbrella of the so-called United Arab Republic; but that was a complete fiasco. He tried to engineer the overthrow of the King of Saudi Arabia and the King of Jordan; but that did not prove to be quite so easy as he expected. He tried to conquer the Yemen; but he failed there also. To restore his damaged prestige, he has now called a holy war against the Jews.
As the Foreign Secretary said, the divisions and suspicions between the Arab countries are as deep and as bitter as ever. But, in the present emotional situation, no Arab can afford to appear halfhearted in his support for Colonel Nasser's action against Israel. Every Arab leader has been obliged, as we have seen, to jump on to the band wagon. Having thus been swept suddenly to the pinnacle of popularity and influence, Colonel Nasser will obviously not climb down in a hurry, more especially since he does not stand alone.
He would never have dared to act as he has, had it not been for the support of the Soviet Union. For some time the Russians have been actively building up the strength of Egypt's armed forces. A reference was made to this by the Foreign Secretary. In the Yemen the Russians have been backing the Egyptians up to the hilt. Without any prospect of payment, they have supplied them with MiGs and Ilyushins. Several thousand Russian technicians are encamped near


Sana'a; and there is growing evidence that a Soviet submarine base is being built on the Red Sea, at Hodaida.
There is no doubt ahout what all this adds up to. Colonel Nasser is intent on building an Arab empire. Having failed to achieve this on his own, he is now trying to ride in on the back of Russia. As for the Russians, they see the opportunity to become a dominant Power in the Middle East, and they have found in Nasser the perfect tool for their purpose.
There is no doubt that they have won the first round. It is no good pretending otherwise. The United Nations force has been unceremoniously kicked out, one of Israel's principal ports has been blockaded, and so far the only reaction has been words of protest and caution.
Having achieved this limited, but none the less impressive, success, it suits them down to the ground that both sides should now be urged to exercise restraint. For the present, they ask for nothing better than the maintenance of the existing position. But the Jews are unlikely to accept that. They have so far shown remarkable restraint. For this they deserve the gratitude of the world.
However, we should not assume that they will submit indefinitely to the closure of one of their main accesses to the outer world. Unless the Gulf of Aqaba is reopened, through action at the United Nations or otherwise, it is probable that Israel will try to break the blockade by force of arms. That would inevitably lead to a full-scale war with the Arab countries, and it is difficult to see how Britain could fail to be involved.
We should remember that we have military forces throughout this area—in Cyprus, Libya, Bahrein and Sharjah, not to mention Aden. As regards Aden, I assume that the Government will grab with both hands the excuse provided by the present crisis to rescind their foolish decision to withdraw our forces in January.
In the event of an Arab-Israeli war, nobody can predict the attitude of Russia; but, once hostilities have broken out, the possibility of a clash between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, with all that that might entail, cannot be ignored.
Our central objective should therefore be to prevent the outbreak of an Arab-Israeli war, the wider consequences of which could be disastrous for the whole world. However, those who agree with this must face the fact that, if an Arab-Israeli war is to be prevented, the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba must be lifted, and fairly quickly.
How is this to be done? The action so far taken by the Government has, in my opinion, been absolutely correct. The Prime Minister reaffirmed that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway, and the Foreign Secretary has today added the important statement that the blockading of the Gulf would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a belligerent act. The Government are also right in seeking a solution both inside and outside the United Nations.
But what do we do if these efforts at conciliation fail? One course is to do nothing, to ignore the assurances which have been given and to wash our hands of the consequences, as we did with Czechoslovakia. Some of us who were in the House at the time of the Munich crisis cannot help comparing the two situations. But history never exactly repeats itself. One of the big differences—and there are many others—between 1938 and 1967 is that then the Czechs were persuaded to accept Hitler's assurance that he had no further territorial ambitions. The Jews today could never be fooled into believing that the Arab squeeze will end at Aqaba. In fact, Nasser has made it painfully clear—I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) has just said—that his objective is nothing less than to wipe the State of Israel off the map. Incidentally, when flying in an Arab Airways aircraft the other day, I noticed that the map they provided showed on it the name of every country save one, which was left nameless. That country, of course, was Israel.
For the Arabs, this is a deeply emotional issue. To that extent, I agree with the hon. Member for Manchester, Exchange. But for the Jews it is a question of life or death. They will fight for their survival even if they are deserted by the whole world; and, once war has started, no one can say where it could lead us.
The alternative is to do what the Prime Minister indicated in his speech at Margate, when he said that Her Majesty's Government would
promote and support international action to uphold the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba".
I was very glad to hear from the Foreign Secretary today that the Government are concerting ideas with other maritime nations. If it is decided to break the blockade, it will, presumably, be necessary to provide armed escorts for ships entering the Gulf. In that case it is possible that Egyptian shore batteries may open fire. If so, the escort vessels would, no doubt, have to shoot back. It may be said that this could create an explosive situation. Maybe, but it is something which we may have to face.
If we should be confronted with a choice of risks, on the one hand, the risk of allowing the Middle East to drift into war and, on the other, the risk involved in breaking the blockade, I have no doubt that the second of those two courses is incomparably the less dangerous.
I hope, however, that, before any decision of this kind has to be taken, a further intensive effort will be made to devise a formula which could provide the basis of a mutually acceptable solution—probably not perfect, and perhaps only temporary. That, I understand, is the Government's immediate objective.
It is right that hon. Members outside the Government should take the opportunity of this debate to express views on the action which might be taken if negotiation fails. But, so long as any hope remains of finding an agreed solution, either through the United Nations or through diplomatic channels, it would not be right to press the Prime Minister to tell us more about the Government's intentions.
For the present, we can do no more than stress the gravity of the situation and the serious consequences which would ensue if it were allowed to get out of hand, and express the sincere hope that, even at this late stage, good sense will prevail.

6.34 p.m.

Sir Barnett Janner: What the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) expressed in his peroration certainly

accords with the feelings which I have and which anyone in a position similar to mine has on this matter. I had intended to speak on certain matters in this debate, but they have been covered by other right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken, particularly by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe), the Leader of the Liberal Party.
My right hon. Friends in the Government know that this is a matter of very deep concern to me and to every Jew throughout the world. It is not an issue which involves Israel alone. It is one of deep concern to all Jewish people, who saw the slaughter of 6 million of their kith and kin and of deep concern to civilised people everywhere. In Israel today, there are many men and women who now bear no traces of the terrible circumstances through which they passed as helpless children in the forests of Germany, they bear those traces no longer because they were tended in Israel, which has been and is a humane, civilised, cultured country, one which believes in democracy and humanity. It has tended those people, the very people who are being threatened today by Nasser and others, and brought them from a state of virtual instability to a life in which they can be good citizens indistinguishable from all others living in that country today.
Everyone in the House knows this, including my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths), who has just gone out. No hon. Member and no person outside who has ever visited Israel could endorse the foolish remarks made by my hon. Friend when he called upon another country to establish a democratic State—I am not quoting his exact words—a Socialist State. Good heavens—if ever there was a State in which Socialist ideas, irrespective of what may be felt polemically in this House, were brought into effect not in any aggressive sense, but in the hope that the nation as a whole would prosper and everyone would have the benefit of communal life and common understanding, that State is Israel. Israel has been, perhaps, the one country in the Middle East which has managed to establish that life. This must be clear to everyone, whether Socialist, Liberal or Conservative.
I was deeply hurt by what was said by my hon. Friend. He was for many years aware of the truth of what I am now saying and he supported these views, but, because of a petty visit to the tyrant of the Middle East, he was persuaded into giving to the House opinions which everyone knows are nonsense.
I cannot help thinking back to the days when I stood in this Chamber, together with such men as the late Winston Churchill, and tried to explain the true nature of what Hitler was doing, writing as he did and expressing the intentions he expressed, starting his nefarious and subhuman work under the very nose of the civilised world, while, at the same time, denying that he was doing it. I recall having begged the House to understand what was happening.
What is happening today? Is this a new move on Nasser's part? I ask my hon. Friends who went to see Nasser: why did they not tell him that over the radio, on the television and in his speeches he was, day after day, for years, inciting the whole Arab world against this innocent set of people who, he knew, had no intention of extending their territory in any way, or harming any neighbours?
President Nasser has used the Arab refugees as a pawn in order to be able to satisfy his own vicious intentions. He has made no bones about those intentions. It has gone on year after year. It is unbelievable that anyone should imagine that the question as to why he has now advanced on Israel can in any way be answered except by the fact that for many years, while saying that he would do it, he was afraid of Israel until he could intimidate the rest of the Arab countries into standing behind him.
This is similar to the bullying attitude that Hitler adopted. I am sorry to speak in these terms. I am as anxious as anyone, just as the Israelis are anxious, that peace should prevail. Time and again Israel has made advances towards the Arabs asking their leaders to come to the table and argue the thing out. They have offered to consider with the Arabs how the problem of the poor people who have been kept on Israel's borders as pawns could be solved.
Of course, it is a terrible situation for the refugees. But there were not 1¼ mil-

lion at the time the Arabs attacked the Jews in Palestine. There were about 500,000 or 600,000. They were begged by Israel to remain. They were told that they would be unmolested. But they went across the border believing that Israel would be defeated in a few days. They left because these leaders, who are feudal lords—let us not mistake this issue—had asked them to leave, promising that the Jews would be thrown into the sea.
But the Jews of Israel had the same spirit as those poor people who were in Hitler's camps. Their spirits were indomitable, like those of their predecessors who appeared at the time of the Maccabees and other heroes. They would not stand for it. Indeed, they had no alternative but to remain where they were.
Hatred has been whipped up against the Jews in Israel, but what has Israel done to deserve it? Is there anyone in the House or in the world who could deny that, if ever there was a jewel in the crown of the United Nations, it is Israel? Has Israel ever attacked anyone without having to do so? What is the good of my hon. Friend talking about aggression by Israel? How much longer, for example, could he expect these innocent and sturdy workers on the land, whose only enemy that they could see were the ravages of nature on the soil of this small piece of land less than the size of Wales, to stand still in face of daily attacks by marauders? Let us ask ourselves that question.
We asked that question at the time of Hitler. Can we afford to stand still now? Do we really believe that the action taken in the Gulf of Aqaba, unless it is stopped, will stop at that? What is to stop this man Nasser, who was cursing and intimidating Jordan only a week or two ago, from preventing vessels reaching Israel and, in the end, preventing anyone in the Western world from going anywhere near Israel?
Perhaps I can be excused for being somewhat emotional. I have been in the Zionist movement for many years. I honestly believed that Jewish people would make good on the land, that they would make good if they had a place on earth to which they might have gone at the time of Hitler if it had existed in the form in which it should have existed and in which it exists today. I was more than pleasantly surprised when I saw what


I have believed in actually being brought into effect successfully.
When it came to the question of informing colleagues in this House it was my privilege to take a delegation of M.P.s of all parties to Israel—the first unofficial Parliamentary delegation, to see the Jews as they are—to find out for themselves whether Goebbels was right or not. Israel has justified its existence. What are we going to do about it?
I wish that my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange had been here. I would like to give him a few of the facts which should persuade him quickly of the true position. Syria instituted the concept of a popular war of liberation involving the financing and training of guerrilla commandos and sending them on missions of destruction in the territory of the State of Israel. Why did my hon. Friends who met Nasser not tell him of these things?

Mr. James Dickens: I know that my hon. Friend speaks with great feeling. He will recognise that our discussions with President Nasser were confidential. He pointed out that at this critical juncture he would be making extremely important statements about the situation in the Middle East. We gave him our assurance that his confidence would be respected.
However, the question which my hon. Friend has now raised was raised by us with President Nasser and vigorously pressed. I give him my assurance on that. I hope, that my hon. Friend will accept that I made the strongest representations in Cairo for the withdrawal of anti-Jewish posters which had appeared in central Cairo and was given by President Nasser a categorical assurance that they would be taken down.

Sir B. Janner: I am obliged. I myself would have accepted that and I am happy that my hon. Friend has told us.

Mr. Speaker: Order. It will help the Official Reporters if the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) addresses the Chair.

Sir B. Janner: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps I am feeling a little more emotional than I should. I hope that the House will understand.
During the past two years, 113 attacks by mining and sabotage have been perpet-

rated by marauders acting under Syrian orders. Since July, 1956, Israel has despatched 43 notes to the Security Council on this situation and has conducted unceasing talks with Powers in the United Nations in New York. The Egyptian pretext for massing troops in Sinai was unfounded. Both the United Nations and the Powers have informed Egypt that Syrian allegations that Israel was concentrating troops on her border were false. The Syrians themselves refused to submit to United Nations inspection on both sides.
I could quote much more, but I do not want to take more time than is necessary. It is essential, however, that we should realise with what we are dealing. We are dealing with the problem of a little democratic country which is trusted by the United Nations and which is practising what the United Nations would want. To those of us who know the situation, it has come as a great blow that the Secretary-General saw fit to move away at a critical time when, in accordance with arrangements which had been made, he was supposed to have stayed and to have had consultations. That is the picture of what besets the world today.
Does anyone think that if Israel is destroyed—and heaven forfend that it should be, because the world would lose much—that would be the end of the matter? I know that my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are doing everything that they possibly can, supported by the whole House, to cope with the situation, but I beg them to understand that this embattled nation of 2,500,000 brave and courageous men, women and children cannot stand the strain of prolonged deliberations.
The Israelis have lost before, because Hitler deprived them of the means of defending themselves, but in the concentration camp of Auschwitz, and places like that, they fought armed forces with their bare hands. We cannot expect such people, who have done nothing wrong, to sit for prolonged periods and wait while the pincer movement gets them so entrapped that they cannot get out.
I appeal to my right hon. Friends to get to the maritime nations and do what can be done, but for heaven's sake to act as quickly as possible.

6.53 p.m.

Viscount Lambton: We have had very many remarkable speeches and, with the exception of one, the House has been almost united in its determination that aggression should not be justified.
In many ways this has been a more distinguished debate than the last on the Middle East, because then, although the whole crisis of the Middle East was boiling up, the Foreign Secretary did not so much as mention Israel once in the whole of his speech. It seemed a most curious omission at the time, and I do not think that we can be quite certain that this total neglect of the Israeli problem by the Foreign Secretary in his pursuit of Nasser during the last two or three years has not gone some way towards creating the present crisis.
This, above all, is a time for facts. It is also a time of escapism, because when one is faced with such extraordinary consequences as might occur there is a natural desire to back out from any action which might result in war. I should, therefore, like to speak as plainly as possible and without any inhibition.
Once again, Egypt has violated an international treaty and has threatened established order. We have had this assault by Nasser upon the future of Israel and he is using Israel as an instrument for the domination of the whole Arab world. For the first time, Russia and Egypt are working together openly, hand in hand, and their interests are mutual. As my right hon. Friend has said, for years Nasser has tried to establish an empire on his own. He has not succeeded and he is now attempting to do it with the aid of Russia. Whether he will succeed is a matter of opinion.
This is the background against which we must consider this matter. It is also important that before we shy away from the consequences we appreciate what Israel itself is thinking. During the next weeks, the whole future of Israel will be decided, whether it is to continue or to be totally destroyed. As Israel sees it, these next few weeks are absolutely crucial. If the Western Powers, the United States, this country and, one hopes, France, will definitely stand by their declaration to ensure that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba are free for the

transit of all ships, then Israel can survive, but if, on the other hand, there follows this a period of talking, then a period of more talking with proposals for a compromise, then the Israelis will believe that they are condemned and that their condemnation is simply being put off.
They see the situation as developing with maximum pressure being put on the United Kingdom and America not to allow Israel to move. I imagine that there will be sabotage in the oil fields connected with the West. Inevitably, there will be endless pressure upon us to convince us that we should not support Israel in any way, because we will lose our oil interests by so doing.
All this can be seen and the hope and belief of Russia and Egypt is that they will cause us to compromise and to patch up some sort of solution which may pass for a day or two, but which, in the long run, will inevitably mean in their eyes the abolition of Israel, for the Israelis regard anything but the absolute assurance that these waters shall be territorially free for them to travel in as a definite step forward by the axis of Cairo and Moscow. As my right hon. Friend said, there is no doubt that if one compromise were accepted by Israel now, another would be demanded.
What Israel is asked to do is to pay Danegeld and we know that once Danegeld is paid it has to be paid again and again. There is no chance whatever that, even if it wanted to, Egypt could stop upon this path of aggression towards Israel. It cannot afford to do so. The momentum is forward, and if there is a compromise to which America and this country agree, the inevitable result will be that Nasser will momentarily turn his attention from Israel to further down the Gulf, to the Yemen and Aden. How is he to be resisted there? How are other Arabs in the Yemen and Aden and the Gulf to resist the pressure of the man who will have been made the hero of Arabia by his diplomatic defeat of the enemy of Arabia, Israel?
There is no doubt that the issue facing us is simple. If we give in to Nasser's demands now and allow him to refuse entry of ships to the Port of Eilat in Israel under any conditions, then Israel is condemned. Israel realises this and will inevitably move itself. If Israel


moves, what is at stake then? What will happen? One can imagine Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria attacking. Almost inevitably, Israel will then move down to the banks of the Jordan. The figure of half million Arabs who are in Israel will then swell to 1½ million.
What happens when the peace is declared, as it probably will be declared, as it always is declared when the United States and Russia confront each other with neither wanting war? The problem of Israel would then be not decreased, but greatly increased. We should then have to try to work with countries on whose oil our economy is dependent and which would be far more bitter towards us than they are at present. There will be the prospect of even greater disruption and violence if Israel is forced to declare war on Egypt.
The only way in which we can prevent that is to be absolutely categoric that the Gulf of Aqaba must be a free water. If that is so, there is hope. If not, I honestly believe that there is no hope for the avoidance of war.

7.1 p.m.

Mrs. Margaret McKay: I feel that this is one of the most tragic moments in recent history. I find it very difficult to speak on this problem, following what has been said by the leader of the Zionists, with whose emotion for his people I deeply sympathise and the terror of whose people I thoroughly understand, particularly when I stand here as the devil's advocate.
I was very pleased that the Foreign Secretary, in referring to the problem of the Gulf, had some constructive proposals to make. I was afraid that he might restrict his remarks to the problems of the Gulf of Aqaba and passage through the Gulf. I was delighted to hear that he was seeking a solution to the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba in concert with other nations and in the spirit of the rights of international waterways in general and not in the spirit of the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba in particular. I welcome his remarks in that connection. If the problem of the Gulf can be isolated and removed to the International Court it will help us to turn our minds to the basic problem—the wider issue of Israel-Arab relations.
The rôle of the Soviet Union in this tragic situation is generally understood in the House. In my opinion, the aims of the Soviet Union are wider than have been mentioned. I think that the Soviet Union is not merely interested in creating problems for the Western Powers in relation to their oil interests, or in wooing the Arab States away from the West. I think that it has ambitions in Africa and that troubles in the Middle East facilitate its passage through to Africa. I am sure that that is one of the aims behind these manœuvres.
Although it is perhaps difficult to say this, I feel that there has been an overemphasis on the rôle of President Nasser. I appreciate his imperialist ambitions. I cannot forget, and I hope that the Arab States will not forget, such incidents as the recent bombing of Najram. However, I feel that, whether the Russians or Nasser are there or not, the problem of the existence of Israel as a State would still remain.
I am of Irish descent, and the Irish have a long yen back to the past. Therefore, I can fully understand how the Jewish people longed for a return to their home. But one must also understand that the Arabs had lived in that territory from pre-Christian times and that from then until the last 20 years they had lived happily with the Jewish people.

Sir Barnett Janner: Sir Barnett Janner rose—

Mrs. McKay: I beg my hon. Friend's pardon. It is difficult to speak after such an emotional, moving and knowledgeable speech by my hon. Friend. I beg him to give me the privilege of developing an argument which is very difficult to develop.
Although, as I have said, I am speaking in the rôle of devil's advocate, I am doing it with the deepest understanding of the other side's problems. But there are two sides. It is in the long history of peaceful co-existence between Jew and Arab until the last 20 years that the hope for the future lies. As long ago as the Middle Ages, at the time of the Crusades, the Jews of Europe were fleeing to the Arab countries for sanctuary. Until the last 20 years they had lived peacefully together, and the sacred places of Christianity and the Jewish religion have been protected by the Muslims.
We have had today remembrances of Dachau and Oswiecim. I have been to Poland and I know what that means. But we must remind ourselves that it was not the Arab States which invented gas chambers or concentration camps, or the other horrors of that era. That sin is on our conscience. It is this which gives me hope that there is still the possibility of the problems between the two peoples being solved. It does not help to bring about a solution if hon. Members talk about Arabs exterminating Jews. This is not the spirit of the Arab people. The two peoples lived together happily for many centuries. It is a completely different thing to be opposed to the imposition of a foreign State, as the Arabs see it.
I have been doing my damndest in the House to try to get an understanding between the two sides. I have tried in the House to form Anglo-Arab associations because the Arabs are so bad at stating the case, if they have one. The present conflict was entirely predictable. I knew that it would come, although I did not think that it would come so quickly. I hoped that by bringing Members of Parliament together we would be able to get a balanced view. However, the Arabs have a genuine case which I do not think has been very well put today. I am sure that I shall not be able to put it very well. I do not propose to go through the history of it all.
The case has been put before this House in the past. As long ago as 1939 a White Paper was issued which, in my opinion, could very well form the basis of some suggestions which might help us in our negotiations between the two sides. As long ago as 1939 this House conceded that the Arabs had a case. It conceded that the troubles in the Middle East arose out of our broken pledges to the Arabs.
That White Paper made realistic and imaginative proposals to resolve the dispute between the two sides, to protect the rights of the Arabs, prevent their subordination and preserve their independence. It might be that that same White Paper could today form the basis of progressive proposals to resolve the dispute.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: My hon. Friend must be aware that the massacre of Jews all over Europe was subsequent to that White Paper. She must also be aware that the existence of the State of Israel is no longer a negotiable issue.

Mrs. McKay: It was a very great pity that both Israel and the Arab world rejected that White Paper. Had it been accepted, I am sure that we would have that found the two sides living amicably together. I am sure that it would be worth the consideration of the House to go over that White Paper and its suggestions.
Every suggestion which is made seems so unsolid, so nebulous, but at this stage we cannot know what negotiations are taking place between Governments. As has been said, we cannot ask what the diplomatic exchanges are. Nevertheless, the tenor of the debate, from both sides of the House, has been that we must try to achieve a peaceful method of negotiation and urge restraint and intensify our diplomacy to avoid precipitation of more dramatic and dangerous situations.
I am, however, delighted that in the debate there seems to have been agreement that the suggestion by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, that is Israel might well consider granting permission for a United Nations emergency force on her territory as well as on the other side of the border should have general acceptance. Although the withdrawal of the emergency force was precipitate, I cannot see how Israel can object to the withdrawal of a force when she has never allowed that force to occupy her territory.
I hope that the general feeling of the House will be accepted and that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will put forward these proposals as one of the bases of a possible settlement.

Viscount Lambton: I am not sure which side the hon. Lady is taking. Would she say whether she is on the side of the Government when they declare their belief that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba should be open to Israeli shipping?

Mrs. McKay: I made my point quite clear when I said at the beginning that


I was glad that in concert with other nations we were seeking a common solution in the spirit of the rights to international waterways in general. If the hon. Member does not understand that, it is just too bad for him.
Throughout the debate there is common agreement on one point: that we should try to achieve a settlement by peaceful means. Our problem, however, is that no solid and concrete proposals have been placed before the House. Nor, perhaps, is it possible that they can be placed before us.
I have been wondering whether it is not possible to make some kind of bargaining points, whatever the situation. Some bargains will have to be struck, whether before war or after. Certainly, it would be far better, if possible, to put bargaining points now to President Nasser, who, I understand, is a man who likes a good bargain, in the hope that while we are trying to prevent war at least we can be trying to prevent it by objective and constructive proposals.
I wonder whether it is possible to bargain with Egypt on one or two points: for example, that entry to Eilat should be open and free to Israel, too, in return for an agreement for staggered admission of the poor refugees back to their homeland. That would be one bargaining point which might be considered. It might be naïve—I am merely a back bencher and we do not have the full facts; but it is a constructive proposal and it might be one which could be considered.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) proposed that we should invest something like £100 million in settlement of the problem of the refugees. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend knew that one of the factors of provocation in this dispute was that the United Nations has cut, or is proposing to cut, the existing very meagre allowance. I would be very happy if any means could be provided to help in this problem of assisting with the refugees.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I follow closely and sympathetically what my hon. Friend is saying, but is it not the fact that the existence of refugees on the borders of any country is a world problem and not a problem for Israel alone?

Mrs. McKay: I was saying that I was in sympathy with the proposal by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South that money should be invested in the refugees. I should, however, like to correct a statement made earlier by another hon. Member that in Jordan the refugees were not allowed to work. In Jordan they must, and they do, work, because they have to contribute to the economy of the country.
I wanted to say this, in particular. War will not solve this question. There is an atmosphere in the House, it appears to me, as if the Arabs want war. No Arab wants war any more than any Israeli wants war. I say this and I know it to be true. I can quote, just as others can do, from Arabs, one of whom has stated, for instance, that one day of war would throw the Lebanon back ten years. They cannot afford it any more than Israel. They, too, are wasting on arms the resources of their country—

Sir B. Janner: Sir B. Janner rose—

Mrs. McKay: —which they need for construction.
The House has been told what magnificent economic development there is in Israel. It has not yet been put before the House what magnificent economic development there is in the Arab States. Kuwait, for example, has one of the finest social welfare systems in the world. Other countries in the Arab world are developing along the same lines. None of us wants to see either Israel destroyed or the economic advancement of these other countries destroyed. It would be just as tragic for every nation, not only Israel, if there was war in the Middle East. We have to use every diplomatic manoeuvre that we can to prevent war, in everyone's interest. Eventually, the entire issue is one for the United Nations.
In the meantime, is it possible for Britain to play a greater mediating rôle? I do not know how far she has gone. None of us can know. But there is a special rôle which Britain can play at the present time, because the present Government are not tainted with the crimes of Suez and, to that extent, we have capital in the Arab world which will allow us to negotiate with them. With that at the back of our minds and, as far as possible, with Britain not taking sides, I hope that


we shall be able to go forward to a peaceful solution.
I do not see how anyone can imagine that either side wants war. No one wants war, because, at the end, it will not be Israel alone which will be destroyed, but the Arab States as well. The only people who will gain are those who are manoeuvring behind the scenes, trying to get through to Africa, and who are responsible for so many of the troubles in the Middle East. We do not want to see in the Middle East any parallel with the Baltic States, nor do we want another Hungary, but that is the only outcome unless a solution is obtained by peaceful means.

7.21 p.m.

Sir Henry d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: The hon. Member for Clapham (Mrs. McKay) described herself as the devil's advocate. I must say that the devil finds very charming advocates, though not always very persuasive ones. There are one or two points in her speech which I wish to take up with her, because I am sure that she did not intend to mislead the House.
The famous White Paper of 1939 was rejected by the Arabs, and the Jews in Israel had no say in the matter. Whatever was the origin of the dispute, it has been entirely overclouded by the past holocaust and the years following it. As the hon. Lady will understand, that has left a wound with the Jewish survivors. It was a traumatic experience and is something which cannot be washed out simply because it happened a number of years ago. An enormous slice has been taken out of all Jewish life, and this traumatic experience will remain with the Jews for a generation yet.
I want to tell the hon. Lady that I have been responsible over the last 18 years for dealing with heirless Jewish property in Germany. The concept of heirless property is unknown to Christian communities. The fact is that the heirless Jewish property in Germany affected every family which had lived in that country. If he survived himself, every Jew who lived in Germany or in the countries surrounding her could number a member of his family in that holocaust. When dealing with Jewish people today,

the hon. Lady must remember that they have that experience and that it is something about which they know.
One other comment which I want to make to her is that when she talks about the Arabs wishing to be on good terms with the Jews, I see exactly what she means, because I know what those terms were. If she had been to Morocco and seen the conditions in which Jews lived, she would know. It is true that they lived in perfect safety. They were protected by the Sultan. They plied their own trades and they made special contributions to his exchequer. However, they lived a life which was cut off from the rest of the Moroccan world and in conditions of great squalor and degradation. That is not a solution which the Jews of today can accept.
The problem is a double one. No one could pretend that Israel would be brought to her knees by the deprivation of the Port of Eilat for three or even six months. Other arrangements can be made for a short time. All the processes which the hon. Lady and the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) suggested of bringing in lawyers and studying the position could be considered if there was any guarantee that a legal solution would be accepted by the Egyptians. However, the Egyptians has said in categorical terms that they control these waters and that no one else shall control them.
Like the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner), I have not sat through this debate without being deeply touched by the tone of speeches from both Front and back benches which have been moving in their appreciation of the fearful dilemma which the Jewish people in Israel and outside are faced with today.
I would remind the hon. Member for Clapham that, going back in history, it has always been the ambition of the Arabs to return not to the so-called 1947 boundaries but to the position which obtained before 1917, because they want to abolish the State of Israel. It will be remembered that 1917 was the date of the Balfour Declaration and the proclamation of the Jewish National Home. The Arabs want to go back 50 years, and, if the hon. Lady reads her history, she will realise that, from the time that


the Jewish National Home was proclaimed, trouble between Jews and Arabs began.
Over the last 50 years, relations between Jews and Arabs have not been happy, because, historically, the Arabs regard the Jews as inferior people who should be kept in the ghetto. The Arabs are not inhuman. I am not equating Colonel Nasser with Hitler, but Arab opinion of the Jews is that they are not fit to consort with Arabs in normal life.
As I have said, we have this double problem. If it was a question only of the Gulf of Aqaba, it could be referred to a court of law. Israel could get along without it for six months or so. However, at the moment, Israel is under a very heavy menace. The invading armies surround her, and air forces have flown in from the neighbouring Arab States, waiting for the word "go". Israel is totally mobilised. She is a country with a population of 2,300,000, and every man between 20 and 40 is mobilised. That has put a fearful drain on Israeli manpower. There is no business or production going on in Israel because her whole productive force is mobilised for her defence.
How long can Israel maintain that position? It is said to be costing her £10 million a day. Israel does not possess the means of a continental Power, so anyone in the Chamber can guess about how long she can hold out at an economic cost of £10 million a day. Clearly, it is a limited period and, in that limited period, it must be made safe for Israel to demobilise. If she does not demobilise within two months, I have no doubt that Israel will face the dread arbitrament of war.
The object of the Arabs is not to go back to the 1946 boundary, but to abolish the National Home altogether. All the time gained is of value. Looking down the barrel of a machine gun for days on end does not lend enchantment to the view, and this must apply to both sides. Nevertheless, in this matter time is not on our side, and we must remember that the Israelis have lived like this for many years.
It really is an unbelievable tragedy that they who have done so much to save lives should now see them likely to be lost; that they who have built towns should now face the prospect of their

being destroyed; that they who have planted the crops may well see them smoking in the fields. Indeed, according to the papers, they see them smoking in the fields already.
For the last 30 years I have been involved in the creation of Jewish agricultural colonies in Israel. I have seen them grow, and I have derived infinite pleasure from seeing children and grandchildren playing their part on the land. All this may go into the melting pot, but, as I have tried to make clear to the hon. Lady the Member for Clapham—I do not think that many other people need this clarification—the Jews today, with the experience of the war behind them, are not going to attend Munich. They are not going to be at the receiving end of an act of appeasement. They will undoubtedly defend themselves.
What is the position of this country? I think that the further hon. Members are from power and office, the more clearly they are able to express themselves. I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), and my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton), made the point very well. The situation can be saved by decisive action by this country in pursuit of its obligations under the guarantees that we have given in respect of the Gulf of Aqaba, even though we may divest ourselves of the three-Power pact. We have given a categorical undertaking in respect of the Gulf of Aqaba, and we must honour it. What is more, we should make it clear that we are going to do so, otherwise the game will be lost, and we shall be involved in war, with all its consequences.
If I were asked to reconstruct the situation, I would guess that when President Nasser asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to withdraw its forces he did not expect an immediate reply. He probably thought that the withdrawal of the U.N. forces, after being argued in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, would coincide with our abandonment of our only possible base in the area, Aden. I think, therefore, that there may be some salvation in the fact that we are at least in a position to honour the pledge that we gave about the Gulf of Aqaba, if we so desire. If this situation had arisen a year later, and we had lost Aden, we could not have


honoured that pledge, and there would have been no hope at all. That is the one gleam of hope.
In 1948, when the State of Israel was proclaimed, it was invaded by Arabs from all sides. The Israelis fought back with a minimum of weapons, and the Arabs were defeated. The State of Israel was then recognised by Russia and the United States, and the rest of the nations followed. In 1956, Russia and America put an end to the Suez attack. I pray that if Russia and America combine again they will do so before war breaks out, and not wait until it has started. But I am not despondent. This year is the fiftieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Next year we shall celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the proclamation of the State of Israel, and I expect to be there for it.

7.35 p.m.

Mr. Desmond Donnelly: In intervening in this debate, I must declare a constituency interest, in that I have the honour to represent the largest oil port in the country. The economy of many of my constituents—and indeed their lives—is closely associated with many of the oil-producing Arab States, and we have an extremely good relationship with them. People come and go. They live their lives there for a period and then come back to my constituency, and vice-versa.
I hope that none of the few words with which I shall detain the House will be interpreted as an expression of the views of any of the oil companies, separately or collectively. Indeed, the broad view of the oil companies is that they can survive regardless of the political situation. I am not sure that this is a sound appraisal of the situation, and it is on more sound lines that I hope to direct my remarks.
I propose to say a few words about the changed circumstances in the Middle East since the war, then to say something about some of the dangers which are implicit in the situation, and then to speak about what I consider to be Her Majesty's Government's specific responsibility in this matter.
There have been a number of remarkable changes in the Middle East during

the last twenty years. The first has been the emergence of Arab nationalism. This is not unique to the Middle East. It has happened all over the world amongst emergent countries, but nevertheless this locomotive to nationalism has pulled very strongly in this area.
Secondly, there has been the injection of the State of Israel into this area, which has inflamed this nationalism still further. We heard a very moving speech by the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid) just now, which followed an equally moving speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham (Mrs. McKay), and we heard my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) but I do not approach the matter from their specific points of view. It is not a question of being pro-Jewish or pro-Arab. It is a. question of the appraisal of the situation. And whether one wants the State of Israel to exist or not, the fact is that it does and, as one hon. Gentleman opposite said, it is no longer a negotiable factor. It is there, and we have to come to terms with it. One may have sympathy with the Arabs in their feelings of resentment, but the State of Israel is there and we have to recognise the implications of it.
The third major change has been the sudden emergence of the great wealth which has been generated by the oil revenues. These have transformed the political and economic climate, and the prizes available in the Middle East for predatory movements. This new factor has changed the situation very considerably indeed. Many people think of the oil States as being poor. Some of them are, but others are extremely rich. As my hon. Friend the Member for Clapham said, Kuwait has the finest social service in the world, and it spends three times as much on the education of its children as is spent by this country or the United States. When one talks about giving them aid and assistance, one has to realise that they may be very much richer per capita than we are.
Finally, there is a new and more recent factor which has emerged in Middle Eastern affairs. It is the gradual replacement in the power vacuum which has been left behind by the British Government as they have retreated from position to position by the Soviet Union. We have seen the defence agreement with Iraq. We


have seen the defence and economic agreements with Egypt. We have seen the building of the Aswan Dam. Some of the ineptness of Western policy has contributed to this, but these are the factors. There has been the recent arrangement with Syria. Although there was a power vacuum in the Middle East at one time, it is very nearly filled today by the Soviet Union. We must take note of the implications of this fact in the policies which we propose to follow in the future.
The Leader of the Opposition said that we should try to lift this discussion out of the narrow question of the Israeli-Arab conflict and look at the wider questions of the Middle East. That is absolutely right. It was implicit in the speech of the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), with every word of which I agreed. We cannot split the Middle East into separate compartments. The struggle for power in the Arab world, the emergence of Col. Nasser as the Leader of Arab nationalism, and his attempts to sustain his position as the leader, are just as relevant to the situation in South Arabia as to the conflict with Israel. We therefore have to take a wider look.
What will happen if we proceed as we are at the moment? The first fact we must remember is that Col. Nasser has won his first objectives. It is not incumbent upon him to take any new action. The responsibility for the initiation of action rests with the Jews or with other countries and not with Nasser. He is in a very strong position so long as others are not prepared to take action.
What will happen? As the right hon. Member for Streatham said, Nasser has won the first round, but, as was implied by the hon. Member for Walsall, South and my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West, this cannot be the only round. Unless the Western Powers are prepared to take action to ensure the freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba the Jews will have to take action and, as the hon. Member for Walsall, South said, there is a time limit, and it is running out. The longer action is delayed the greater the danger will be.
The newspapers this afternoon refer to the Prime Minister's extreme caution. I am in favour of caution. I applaud what my right hon. Friend said in his statement last week about the freedom of

shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. But that caution, not only in respect of Her Majesty's Government but the United States Government, cannot be expressed in the form of inaction without the greatest dangers being involved. We must face that fact. Inaction is as bad as wrong action, and it could have dire consequences.
What happens in respect of our specific responsibility? We are gradually withdrawing from different parts of the world, but at the moment we are one of the two major Western Powers in the Middle East. We may not be in the Middle East indefinitely, but we are there tonight. We have substantial military stores and equipment in Cyprus. We have an aircraft carrier at either end of the Suez Canal. We have considerable naval forces in the Red Sea. We have considerable military equipment, strength, and aircraft available in Aden. Therefore, whether we like it or not, we have power in the area at the moment, and the responsibility that goes with that power. If we do not take action a heavy responsibility may lie upon us.
As was implicit in the Foreign Secretary's remarks today, steps must be taken to ensure free shipping within the Gulf of Aqaba. There can be no compromise about this. If we compromise we are lost. There has been an agreement since 1957. People tend to forget that the freedom of shipping in this Gulf came as a quid pro quo because of the ban on the passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal. It was part of the original agreement that was reached.
I have listened to most of the speeches in the debate and from them, as well as from my sensing of opinion in this country, I say that Her Majesty's Government will have the fullest possible support of the British people if they take a determined line in ensuring that this Gulf remains free. There can be no compromise about this. Although it involves risks, the risks must be faced. There is no alternative. There are times when we have to choose, and this is a time when we have to choose to do what we consider to be best in the long-term interests of the area. We must be prepared to accept the risks.
But that is only the first stage. I now refer to the position of Her Majesty's


Government in Aden. The right hon. Member for Streatham referred to it. The case is now patently clear for our reconsideration of the form of military guarantee that we give on the British withdrawal from Aden. We have tried to work with Colonel Nasser. I remember the days when there was a conflict in the Cabinet of the party opposite, when Sir Anthony Eden—as he then was—sought to make an agreement with Nasser over Suez. He was a protagonist of the agreement with Nasser.
People tend to forget this, just as they forget that there was a time when Churchill sat like a Buddha at the Cabinet table objecting to any agreement. Finally, Sir Anthony Eden had his way and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez was signed. I was one of only two Members of my party who voted for the agreement. The other has moved to another place. This was a strange trio. The agreement was negotiated by Sir Anthony Eden and supported by Lord Brockway, as he now is, and myself. One could not have a stranger trio than that.
Then Sir Anthony Eden found that he could not work with Nasser, and the Labour Party thought that because we had not been associated with Suez we would find it easier to work with the Egyptian régime. Have we found this to be the case? Are the words emanating from Cairo today any more moderate than they were several years ago? Not a hope! We must recognise that if we leave the South Arabian Peninsula in a few months' time without making adequate arrangements for stability a heavy responsibility will rest upon us.
There is no point in agreeing to grant freedom to countries unless we are prepared to see that that freedom is not transient. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary disagreed with me the other day on this point, but what is the objection to undertaking a credible military guarantee to the new South Arabian State—not indefinitely but just so long as Egyptian troops remain in the Yemen? The first objection that I have heard is that there would be pressure from the Left Wing of the Labour Party. I do not believe this to be the case. In the last few months my hon. Friends have shown themselves to be very tame animals.
There is the economic argument. I have heard this cash accounting case put forward on a number of occasions. Let us consider it. What is the cost of the Aden base? It is not more than £20 million a year. On the Prime Minister's own admission in the House not long ago the revenues that the Treasury receive in respect of oil from the Persian Gulf amount to over £200 million a year. With revenues of that kind the Treasury's total income in the sterling area must be at least £500 million a year. Then there are the sterling balances held by the Arab States, which are well in excess of £500 million. What would be the consequence of their withdrawal for our economy? I am considering this purely on a cash accounting basis. On top of all this there is the Western investment in the Gulf, for which the area's stability is essential, and which is well in excess of £2,000 million. So much for the economic argument. It perishes overnight.
Another argument implicit in my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's speech was contained in his remark that freedom was not guaranteed by foreign troops. I wonder. It is, and history shows that it has been. The background to this thinking is that it will always be successfully resolved by the people in the area—this takes no account of the presence of fifty to sixty thousand foreign troops in the area already—and, somehow, without our being involved. "A far away country of which we know little" is the background of this kind of absolution of political responsibility for this nation. We must never return to that, because this country and this House would then deservedly receive the opprobrium of future generations for gross irresponsibility.
The question is whether the Government are prepared to show the will to contribute substantially, as they can do, to the solution of this crisis by a resolute stand, or whether this Government and this nation have lost their stomach for world affairs. I do not believe that they have, and I do not believe that the Government can possibly turn their backs on this vital responsibility in this vital part of the world.

7.52 p.m.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: I will not follow the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) into his


argument with his hon. Friends about whether or not we should keep forces east of Suez, but would like to return to an earlier remark of his, that unless freedom of navigation is protected "the Jews will have to take action". That echoed what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) about the restraint of the Israelis, by my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton), and others. This is an odd assumption. Why should we think that it is very restrained for someone not to start an aggressive war which may set the whole world alight? This is the consequence of having got this crisis out of perspective and of looking at the Gulf of Aqaba in isolation.
To borrow a phrase of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, we should lift this crisis out of its isolation and treat it as part of the Middle East as a whole. The general history, the orthodoxy, outlined by most speakers seems to assume that history in the Middle East began in 1957 and that because there has been freedom of navigation since then, that should remain the status quo and that, if that status quo is not reverted to, the Zionists have every right to start an aggressive war.
This ignores a large number of facts, for instance, that the general status quo is heavily in Israel's favour. After all, 1 million Arab refugees are outside their country. In a very moving and eloquent speech, I was only sorry that the right hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner) made some extremely ungracious remarks about those refugees. All they want to do is to return to Palestine, which is something for which any Zionist ought to have considerable respect. To suggest that they are pawns and do not want to return to their homes is a travesty of the truth. People who think that should visit some of these camps.
The basic point is that the status quo in the Middle East is in favour of Israel. It has now been altered in one respect against Israel's interests by the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, but why that should automatically produce the assumption that Israel has the right to embroil the whole of the Middle East and, very likely, the whole world, in a war, has not yet been explained.
They have no excuse to start an aggression of that kind. I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor Goldsmid) that the situation is probably expensive for Israel at present, but he would probably agree that in her mobilisation Israel is probably receiving help from the United States in return for not starting a war—

Sir H. d'Avigdor Goldsmid: My hon. Friend said that I would agree with him that Israel is getting help from the United States. I should be delighted to agree if I knew anything about it. I have no evidence that this is happening, but would be grateful to hear it from my hon. Friend.

Mr. Gilmour: I have no evidence, because I have not consulted about the matter, but I think that it is a reasonable assumption.
But why, then, should we concentrate our attention in this crisis on the Gulf of Aqaba? We talk about the rights of maritime Powers, but our efforts throughout our history have been to preserve the rights of maritime Powers at war to take certain steps against the shipping of other countries. This is, therefore, a considerable turnabout for us.
To say that a pledge is a pledge for all time and that what was said in 1957, that we must regard the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway, should always apply, is invalid. But, anyway, the question is: should we do anything about it? In 1917 when this whole matter began, we, basically, gave away someone else's country to a third party. This has had some happy results and many unhappy ones. Equally, it is not within our power or right to give away someone else's waters in 1957 and maintain that because we say so, they are now an international waterway.
I do not know the exact legal case. Egypt may be acting contrary to international law, but I have not heard this argument put very cogently or definitely and I have great doubts about it—

Mr. James Davidson: I do not know how it can possibly be maintained that it is anything but an international waterway, when the entrance is shared by two nations—Saudi


Arabia and Egypt—because their territorial waters overlap, by anyone's calculations, and when the two ports in the Gulf belong to two additional nations. Since four nations share the water, how can it be anything but an international waterway?

Mr. Gilmour: If the hon. Member had been here earlier—

Mr. Davidson: I have been here throughout the debate.

Mr. Gilmour: —he would be aware that that point has already been made.
We all know the geography of the Gulf of Aqaba. It goes through Egyptian territorial waters. Egypt claims that it is at war, and it is generally thought that a country has a right to stop its enemies going through its territorial waters. Whether or not the United Nations can say that a country is no longer at war I do not know, but it is thought that there is something generally belligerent about relations between Egypt and Israel. Otherwise, Israeli ships would be allowed through the Suez Canal without molestation. No one says that it is illegal that they are not allowed through. Therefore, it is far from certain that the international case on the Gulf of Aqaba stands up.
In this crisis, the Government should first of all look back beyond 1957, when they would see the Israeli-Arab problem in a different light. My right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham said that he did not think that this was the basis of the trouble and he added that Arab countries had been forced to support President Nasser in this crisis; but he thereby destroyed his earlier contention. If this was not the basis of Middle Eastern politics, Saudi Arabia, King Hussein, and the Sheikh of Kuwait would not have had to rush to support Egypt, for whom most of the time they have little love.
Thus, the Government should look backwards in time and wider in place if they are to have a useful part to play in this crisis. I hope that their negotiations about the Gulf of Aqaba will succeed, but I am bound to say that I am doubtful about this. I suggest that by far the most useful part this country can play is to go for a general Middle Eastern settlement of a fairly radical kind.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. Colin Jackson: I was in sympathy with many of the comments of the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central (Mr. Ian Gilmour) in his analysis of the Aqaba situation. While I am sure that others will not agree with his view, it will be generally agreed that the tone of his speech set a mood to the debate which has been somewhat lacking. As I have listened to this discussion, I have often been filled with deep unhappiness that we seem to be reflecting in the House so much of the bitterness, disappointment and lack of understanding of the problem and of the place—the problem between Arab and Jew in the Middle East.
It is impossible for any hon. Member to make any remarks that could possibly be considered a reflection on the people who now live in the modern State of Israel. It is equally impossible for us, with our background of hostility towards the sort of things done against the Jews, to say anything which would seem to be critical of the conduct of the Jewish people in Israel. For example, I was glad to discover that no hon. Member was dreaming of criticising the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner), although I was distressed to find that when my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths) attempted to put the point of view of the Arab nations there were turbulent and violent interruptions of an unsympathetic character which added nothing to the debate or to our understanding of the problem. They simply tended to alienate my feelings, feelings which I attempt to apply with logic, reason and understanding. Indeed, I was almost driven away from the cause of Israel by the violent nature of the attacks and comments and the cheap criticisms about the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Exchange.
I will attempt—and I wonder what will happen this time—to express the attitude of the Arab peoples as an element in this crisis. I do so not because we have to agree with it but as a factor in the crisis. After all, unless we understand it, we cannot move towards a solution. At the same time, we must consider the views of the people with whom I have the utmost sympathy, the people of Israel; and if ever there was a democracy


in which people can live together in free understanding, certainly such a democracy exists in the State of Israel today.
I put the Arab point of view based on conversations I have had with vast numbers of Arab people, from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. They say, for example, "We did not persecute the Jews in Europe. We should not be obliged to expiate the sins of the European people. We did not massacre the people in Poland. Why should we, as Arabs, pay the penalty?" Many of the Arabs with whom I have spoken—people of President Nasser's variety, good or bad—have said to me, "Israel is now a place where Western Europeans have come to stay, just as Western Europeans went to Rhodesia and as Frenchmen went to Algeria." They ask, "Why should they?"
Most hon. Members will say that the Jews are entitled to their homeland, but to the Arabs this is happening after a very long time. The Arabs say, "Europe for the Europeans. Britain to the Commonwealth and America to Texas. But this is the Arab Muslim part of the world and we have been put upon by the Balfour Declaration and by agreements subsequent to the Second World War."
In most of the arguments put today hon. Members have tended to ignore this basic dilemma of the feeling of the Arabs. I am extremely gloomy about the future because, having carefully watched the Middle East for the last 10 years, I have found that feelings between young Israelis and young Arabs have been growing wider. The young Arab student is taught to loath and hate the Israeli in a way in which the young Arab was never taught during the time of the mandate of Palestine to hate and loath the Jew. Equally, I was distressed, when giving a lecture there, to hear the comments of young Israelis about the people of Jordan and Lebanon, comments which struck me, almost fantastically, to be a herrenvolk in reverse.
We are, therefore, in this whole discussion, speaking against a background of bitter and almost irreconcilable attitudes. As he hon. Member for Norfolk, Central said about the international waterways question, the House appears to be talking post-1957. From the point of view of the Arab States, we should be

considering two points; first, that Eliat was moved into after the Israel-Egypt armistice and, secondly, that as a result of the Israeli action of 1956, Israel was rewarded with the opening of the Tiran Straits. When looking for a solution to this problem, I say frankly that I do not see the question of free passage through the Straits as being one of very long duration. We therefore need to consider this matter as a point in dispute and I wish to put forward a number of constructive suggestions against tins background of bitterness.
I sometimes feel about hon. Gentlemen opposite that, with honourable exceptions, they are so obsessed with their hatred of Nasser and the sins of 1956 that they cannot give a rational answer to the situation which exists today. If there were no President Nasser in Egypt, the leader, whoever he might be, would be the spokesman for Arab nationalism. He would be anti-Israel and difficult for us to handle. To suggest that one can have a sort of bogeyman and that, by attacking him, one can solve the problem, is being unrealistic.
Has the possibility been considered of solving the problem of the Tiran Straits by having a pattern modelled on the Montreux Convention? Being realistic in politics, we want to find an answer which will both allow President Nasser to retreat without too much loss of face and which will, at the same time, guarantee or ensure the passage of ships through the Tiran Straits. It is interesting to look at the parallel of 1935–36 in regard to the passage of vessels through the Bos-phorus, which allows Turkey to exercise its sovereignty over these waterways and to control military vessels, while other shipping can pass. If we could have some possibility of a blending of these two it might be a way out and a way which would avoid a head-on clash.
Two weeks ago I was in New York talking to Dr. Ralph Bunch. The question of United Nations observers as an element to prevent conflict between the Arab States and Israel came up. At that time I was particularly interested in the situation along the Syrian-Israel frontier because it seemed that that was the most dangerous point.
Bearing in mind that the Soviet Union and the United States must realise that if this problem is not solved we could


drift into World War III, could we not, through the United Nations, take a fresh look at the whole question of observers? The pessimists can easily say that observers can be placed there only with the permission of the parties concerned, and that the difficulty is that the Lake Tiberias area remains a problem, but if we could have some kind of United Nations trip-wire between the two opposing factions that seem, in a strange, macabre fashion, to be like lemmings as they rush to distraction, we might almost save them from themselves. I should have thought that in those circumstances Israel should look again at the possibility of accepting United Nations troops. If her boundaries are to be kept intact, one of the best guarantees would be to have United Nations personnel within the area.
Thinking again in terms of trying to ease the problem, and bearing in mind the basic clash between the two sides, we might look again at the problem of the Palestinian refugees. It is really not enough to say that they are simply there as pawns in a game. I can think of young Arabs, personal acquaintances of mine, just outside Jerusalem in refugee accommodation. They will take a visitor outside and say to him, "Across the valley there is my house where I was born. There is the tree under which I used to sit. There is the window out of which I looked from my family home. Now I have nothing to do but wait and hate." Some of these refugees have been moved to Kuwait, some have jobs in Jericho, and Amman, but the others are literally rotting. An effort could be made within the United Nations structure either to encourage technical training, for example, throughout the Arab world—make a move in that direction—or to ask Israel again whether she is prepared to accept a limited number of the Palestinian refugees.
There is not very much time left. It has already been said that with the expenditure of this war Israel's position is desperately curtailed. The Arab nations are not likely simply to forget the threat of Israel or forget the refugees. I believe that it is up to the British Government, as has been notably mentioned today, to keep the initiative in the United Nations, which will be a continuing initiative. They might, for example, put up as a possi-

bility an agreement on the Montreux Convention model. They might bring up the question of the refugees. In no circumstances, however, should we allow this situation to drift, hoping that it will go away, because unless something drastic is done it will get worse.

8.15 p.m.

Mr. Dennis Walters: I am pleased to note that towards the end of this debate the balance has been rather altered and equalised. In the opening stages, most of the emotion was displayed on the side of Israel, and this, of course, is understandable. We had one or two very moving speeches expressing this feeling. It is understandable because of the appalling barbarities perpetrated against the Jews in Europe in the 1940s. When history is written, this will be one of the most bestial chapters in the present millenium.
However, it does not fundamentally alter the rights and wrongs of the Balfour Declaration, of the Palestine Mandate and of the Labour Government's withdrawal in 1947. It does not alter the perfectly justified sense of deep emotional grievance mentioned by the hon. Member for Brighouse and Spenborough (Mr. Colin Jackson) as being felt by those Arabs who have been thrown out of their homes and cannot return. Therefore, the justification for strong emotional feeling cannot be entirely on one side. The emotional feeling on both sides is understandable, and so is the right to feel strongly.
Having said that, I must add that it is also true that the State of Israel is now a fact, and we cannot countenance its obliteration. That means that we must look at the situation as it exists now and not as it might have existed, or, as some people feel, should have existed. In this context, it is also true that for 10 years the situation between Israel and the Arab States has been smouldering, and that far too little has been done to try to achieve a more permanent settlement.
In a debate on the United Nations, on 12th May last, I said that the United Nations had intervened successfully to end the fighting in Palestine and in Cyprus, but that after that they had done very little; that the disputes that the United Nations had temporarily


smothered still spluttered on beneath the surface. I went on:
The Security Council and the Secretary-General should surely be more energetic than at present in pressing the parties towards negotiation, in appointing mediators, or in suggesting compromises."—[OFFICIAL REPORT; 12th May, 1967; Vol. 746, c. 1903.]
Occasionally, when one makes a comment in one speech that one is prepared to quote, a few weeks later there is an irresistible temptation to do so, and I am afraid that I have fallen for it.
More should have been done in the last year or two as the tension mounted, but almost exactly the opposite has been the case, and then at the first sign of acute crisis, the United Nations faded away and disappeared, almost without a murmur. It would be interesting to know why the Secretary-General of the United Nations did not go to Cairo before accepting the demand to withdraw the United Nations force. It was very right for him to go afterwards and make an attempt of pacification, but why did he not go before accepting to withdraw?
As my noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) has rightly said, the outcome of this crisis will ultimately depend on what happens about the Gulf of Aqaba. As my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, Central (Mr. Ian Gilmour) has said, it may be that the legal case is not absolutely clearly defined and it may also not be a very satisfactory argument that if something is not done Israel will fight a preventive war. But as this is a fact so that if we want to prevent a war it will be necessary to act now, before the crisis develops further. The principal action must come from the United States and it is the United States which must make clear to the Soviet Union that it is prepared to act to keep the straits open because ultimately it is on the two great world Powers, that the decision will rest.

Dr. Hugh Gray: Is the hon. Member saying that the Gulf of Aqaba is not an international waterway and thus contradicting the Conservative Government which made the statement, the Labour Government which supported it, and the Liberal Party, which has supported the two parties? If so, will he give his reasons?

Mr. Walters: I am not saying that. What I said was that there is an argu-

ment—this point was put very effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, Central—that if there is a state of war between Israel and Egypt then it could be legally debatable whether the Egyptians are not entitled to close the gulf. I personally do not accept that argument—

Dr. Gray: Good.

Mr. Walters: I am glad that the hon. Member agrees. I am not particularly delighted by this fact, but I am glad that he sees that what I am saying is that there can be an argument about it.
Ultimately, when the crisis has passed, and, I hope, has been resolved pacifically, we shall, of course, return to the other confrontations in the Middle East between the Arab countries themselves. Again it will be a question of how one deals with President Nasser. About this, while it is undeniable that, in the past, President Nasser has provided the stimulus for some of the changes and some of the advances that have been carried out by other countries in the Middle East, that this has been a positive contribution which I believe history will recognise, it is a positive side of his policy which is not very easy to see at present.
What is more, I believe that economic progress and political evolution in Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have acquired a momentum of their own which will continue and the external policies of President Nasser have become more negative and more obstructive. I am not obsessed by President Nasser, as was suggested by the hon. Member for Brighouse and Spenborough, but I do think that the situation should be looked at objectively; and if it is looked at objectively I suggest that it would be a fair deduction that President Nasser has now set his mind quite firmly against any acceptable compromise with Britain or indeed coexistence with his evolutionary Arab neighbours.
How great a part Communist power politics are playing in this I am not sure. There is very considerable evidence that they are playing an important part. I shall not repeat the figures which have been already quoted. My hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed referred to the number of technicians and military advisers there. I believe that there are between 500 and 800 Russian military


advisers in Egypt at present. There are eight squadrons with about 12 operational planes in each squadron of MiG21s. There is a very considerable fleet concentration. All of this clearly is an immensely relevant factor in the policies pursued by President Nasser.
As I have said, although it is not possible to assess exactly how great the Communist influence is, it is not so difficult to evaluate President Nasser's present policies. I suggest that any such objective evaluation leads to the conclusion that for the present, at least, he is non-negotiable and, therefore, there is no substantial justification for approaches which will be rebuffed. Should his attitude change, and a desire for compromise become apparent, then there is no reason at all—quite the contrary—why Britain should not readily agree to negotiate. We have no imperialist ambitions and any such readiness to negotiate would be shared by other Arab countries. Saudi-Arabia, which I visited recently, would be perfectly willing, I am sure, to reach a compromise with Egypt based on non-interference in the respective spheres of influence of the two countries.
I very much hope that the Government's policy in regard to the South Arabian Federation will now be altered, because it is simply unrealistic to ignore the danger and the pressures that will be put on the Federation should we withdraw without giving a suitable guarantee. Despite the extra financial help which is being given by Britain to the Federal armed forces, there is no chance that those armed forces will be strong enough to deter outside pressure for several years to come.
Domination of Aden by Egypt would unquestionably bring about great pressure on the Gulf and bring it very much more quickly than some people seem to suppose. This will provide a serious, possibly a fatal, setback to the chances of preserving British interests in the area. It is for this reason that the Conservative Party has consistently urged the Government to guarantee the security of the Federation for a period after independence. This would not involve retaining in Aden anything like the present military establishment but a limited British commitment would be necessary even if the

Federal rulers in 1964 had not been assured that independence would be accompanied by a defence agreement.
As it is, this commitment is a matter of good faith as well as a matter for good sense. It could well be a limited commitment. To limit this and, at the same time, to give us a lever with which to encourage the Southern Arabians towards self-reliance, the British guarantee could be terminable after an agreed period at one year's notice by either side, but the main purpose of our commitment would be to hold the ring against outside intervention.
I have drifted away from the main scene of the present tension, because, as was mentioned by many hon. Members, and particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, Central, the question of tension between Israel and the Arab States should be looked upon in the general context of Middle-Eastern policy. It is only by realising that, even if we can overcome the present crisis pacifically—as we all hope is possible, and as I believe can be done, but only if we and the United States are prepared to be strong and determined at the present time—that this will be only another chapter in the history of the Middle East. We must be prepared to influence a gradual and evolutionary process of development in the Arab countries and to resist the pressures and aggressions of the President of the United Arab Republic at this time.

8.29 p.m.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: From the start of this debate, when the Foreign Secretary made his thoughtful review of the events which have led up to the present critical situation, a review which, I think, was generally accepted by the House as being a very constructive contribution with which to open the debate, the tone of all the speeches, with, I am afraid, the notorious exception of that of the hon. Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. Will Griffiths)—the tone of all the subsequent speeches—has shown a deep awareness on the part of every right hon. and hon. Member of the deep gravity of the situation which we face and the responsibility which lies on this House, if it possibly can, to make a constructive contribution to a settlement without war.
Certain facts seem to me to have been clearly established by speaker after speaker. The first is that Egypt's action in expelling the United Nations force from its territory has created a situation which, under Article 39 of the Charter, is one which constitutes a threat to the peace. There can be no doubt about that. I think that there can be little doubt, too—because, with respect, I cannot accept the argument of my hon. Friend that one country has a right to declare itself at war with another and thereafter to use that situation to strangle its neighbour—that there has been a breach of international law by Egypt—a point made by my noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton).
Article 16—I do not rely, with all respect, on the statements of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in this House—of the Geneva conference of 1958 reads as follows:'
There should be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign State.
I think, if I may say, that the Foreign Secretary was right to put this particular action of Egypt in the Straits of Tiran in the wider context of international waterways and the need to keep them free for international shipping.
These facts, clearly, in my view, and, I think, in that of most right hon. and hon. Members, required a United Nations response, and to that I shall come in a moment, but as the debate proceeded I did notice that hon. Members noted with deep concern two further aspects of this matter. The first, that Egypt ejected the peacekeeping force of the United Nations without reference to the Secretary-General, without reference to the Security Council or the Assembly, and that the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself immediately acquiesced in this action without consulting the Council with which he is provided. That, I think the House has generally accepted, was a fateful and perhaps fatal error of judgment-There may yet be many casualties from this affair, but the melancholy fact is that the first casualty has been the United Nations itself, and it will need an immense effort, an almost superhuman effort, to restore the prestige of that organisation.
The House has noted, too, that the Soviet Union, a member of the United Nations, has publicly declared its support for Egypt's policy, which is proclaimed to be the extermination of another member of the United Nations, a member supported by Russia when her candidature came before the United Nations in earlier years. I shall later draw some conclusions from the actions of the Soviet Union, but that way lies international anarchy.
In short, this has been a shocking week for international co-operation, for collective security, and, generally, maintaining peacekeeping machinery.
The House has been almost united in the view that there should be a response from the United Nations, and that, ideally, this should be action authorised by the Security Council to raise the blockade in the Straits of Tiran, because this is the centre of the matter. Further, I think that the House is convinced of the urgency of the matter, particularly after the moving speech of the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Sir B. Janner), who speaks with so much feeling on the subject.
The plain fact of the matter is—the House is clearly seized of this—that Israel simply cannot stay passive while the life is slowly squeezed out of her. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid) very truly drew the attention of the House to the fact that Israel, to preserve her own independence and integrity, has had to call up all her manpower. For how long can she thus continue? Clearly, only for a limited number of weeks, or, at best, months.
Another aspect of the matter which has not escaped attention is that vacillation on the part of the United Nations, or, indeed, the very anxiety of the peace-loving nations to prevent fighting, in some sense plays into the hands of the aggressor: it allows him to complete his game. Indeed, it completes it for him. He pursues and consolidates his position, while the victim is put on its honour not to respond in kind. This is a very onesided business—grossly unfair and very dangerous to the real interests of free nations. Therefore, it places an extra obligation on Britain and other countries who give such advice to Israel to provide an alternative answer to war which is just.
Consequently, I suggest that two issues face us. Immediately, if no action is taken, in the very near future there will be war between Israel and Egypt at least, and this may spread far and wide in Arabia. In the longer-term consideration, if there is no action by the United Nations, that organisation itself in future will be useless in terms of security to any country anywhere, whether it is in Cyprus or anywhere else.
The Foreign Secretary called our attention, and it was timely, to the weaknesses inside the organisation—to the operation of the Russian Communist veto and to the double standards by which so many small countries blindly play the Communist game. In the past, I have sometimes called attention to these dangers. I hope, for this may be a last chance, that the members of the United Nations will take a grip on themselves and recognise that, unless the principles and the rules of the Charter are applied without fear or favour, the United Nations itself will go the way of the League of Nations.
That will be a tragedy for all mankind. The question which they and, in particular, the small nations of Africa and Asia—the newer nations—face, and which we now face, is: if the United Nations is helpless, who is to restrain aggression; or are those guilty of the breaches of international law to be given a free run?
There is only one answer if the Communist countries will not co-operate, and that is that the free nations, the democracies, with the power must take the responsibility. In this particular case, it means, I suggest—I think that again the great majority of right hon. and hon. Members will agree with this—accepting the necessity to keep open the Straits of Tiran. This is a risk, but I believe that we have concluded that it is, on the whole, a lesser risk than an Arab-Israeli war by reason of the fact that Israel is compelled to break out of the ring. The fear, unexpressed, though the Foreign Secretary hinted at it, at the back of everyone's mind is whether, if such action is taken, the war will escalate into a confrontation ending with the United States of America and the Soviet Union finding themselves fighting each other.
No one who has studied the history of the Middle East in recent years will be

surprised that the Foreign Secretary hinted that, behind the immediate moves, attempts are being made, as he put it—I think I do not misquote his words—to change the strategic balance of power in the world. Some months ago, I drew the attention of the House to the Soviet Government's activities in the Middle East over the past few years, which seemed to me to have a design and pattern very dangerous for the peace of that area and, perhaps, of the world.
Clearly, they were using Egypt's ambitions as an instrument to achieve their own political ends. They have helped to finance the Yemen war and the liberation army in South Yemen. They have given substantial quantities of arms to Syria, the traditional focus of political turbulence in the area. They have lately—this may have escaped notice—given large quantities of wheat to Egypt to make Egypt independent of American aid.

Mr. Will Griffiths: Mr. Will Griffiths rose—

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: No I should like to conclude this part of what I have to say, and I am not particularly inclined to give way to the hon. Gentleman, either. He was not here when I made a reference to him a little earlier.
The Soviet Government, as I say, have given consignments of wheat to Egypt to make Egypt independent of the United States. They have given significant supplies of arms to Somalia. There can be no purpose in this other than mischief, either with Kenya or against the day when the Emperor of Ethiopia dies and the Russians anticipate political trouble in that area. On every occasion, they have fanned the emotional hatred of Arab and Muslim for the Jews. These are political acts which I would expect from the Soviet Government. In their consistent search for world revolution, they always go for the soft spot. This has been apparent for some time.
If, through the confusion arising from the Arabs and Jews standing to arms, Egypt could be helped to succeed Britain in Aden and, as a result, the Soviet Union could achieve a political presence in Aden and Somalia, from which it would have the option to turn either to the Persian Gulf or into Africa, it would have achieved a political coup of the first importance in a vital strategic area of the world, and


it would, in the Foreign Secretary's words, change the balance of world power.
The Foreign Secretary cannot say these things. Perhaps I can, and they ought to be said. We must face the realities of this situation.

Mr. Will Griffiths: Mr. Will Griffiths rose—

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: No.
The Soviet Union having taken this political action, does it follow that, if the Straits of Tiran are kept open for international shipping, the Soviet Union would intervene? It is possible, I believe—the Foreign Secretary will know this better than I—that both Egypt and the Soviet Union miscalculated on the speed of the United Nations withdrawal, which no one could have foreseen and that, therefore, the rapidly developing crisis and confrontation between Arab and Jew came faster upon them than they thought it would.
If that is so, there is possibly some hope that the Soviet Union will exercise influence on the side of caution. But, leaving those considerations aside, it is not the Soviet Communist method to go for direct confrontation, least of all with the United States. Their method is to cause the maximum amount of political confusion with the minimum deployment of power. Their actions in Cuba, Berlin and Vietnam confirm that diagnosis. Of course, there is a risk, but so far the moves which the Soviet Union has made politically in the Middle East are strictly according to the Communists' book, which is to attain their political objective and advantage by subversion, stealth and attrition.
Against that background what should be done? The hon. Member for Clapham (Mrs. McKay) made an emotional speech. I could not agree with many of her remedies, but, nevertheless, the first thing which should be done is precisely what the Foreign Secretary is trying to do—to get a negotiated settlement. I do not, in this context, ignore the possibilities that, behind the scenes, the four Powers-France, the United States, Britain and Russia—may be able, or ought to, at any rate, to come to some agreement. The attempt should be made.
The second move should be to try and get the United Nations force restored to the area and possibly on both sides of

the frontier. This is worth considering. But, certainly—because this is the centre of the whole problem—authority should be given by the Security Council for a force to keep the Gulf of Aqaba free of mines and to protect international shipping on its lawul occasions.
I hope that events will not prove that this is only being said for the record, but I am afraid that they may. If the United Nations fails us—and the Foreign Secretary himself was bound to talk in this possible context—then what is to be done? There is, in effect, only one alternative: that the maritime Powers, inevitably led by the United States and Britain, but, I would hope, including Canada, perhaps one of the Scandinavian countries and, for example, the Dutch, would themselves undertake the task.
The Foreign Secretary must be right when he says that this policing of the Gulf of Aqaba and the assurance of free passage for international shipping is at the centre of the matter. Therefore, it is right to make, or seek to get, a positive and firm declaration that the Gulf and the Straits will be kept open. I would stress again and again the absolute importance of the time factor. Unless there is assurance of rapid action following a firm declaration, then Israel must break out of the ring.
It would not be reasonable, and I have no intention of doing so, to press the Prime Minister as to how the Gulf and the Straits should be kept open. It is not a proper time to do that. He is going to see Mr. Johnson and Mr. Pearson and I hope that, as a result of those visits, not only a firm declaration will be made but that there will be a firm declaration that action will be taken. That, I believe, is the only way to save the peace.
Therefore, with all the risks, with a sober and full sense of responsibility, I believe that the majority of hon. Members are clear that this duty at least must be undertaken. Mention has been made of Munich and of Suez. Lessons can be learnt from both these events. I myself have learnt the lesson at least from Munich that, if a dictator gets away with loot, the penalty we pay the second time is double or more.
The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary can, therefore, rely on the full support of this side of the House in the


course which the Foreign Secretary outlined. I believe that this is the right course lest our children pay the price of total war.

8.50 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): The tone in which the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has spoken has been in harmony with the tone adopted right through the debate. The gravity with which the whole House has approached this debate has shown that it was right, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said, for the Government to propose that our prearranged Parliamentary programme should be altered so that the whole House could express its concern about the situation which developed with such dramatic and startling speed during the Recess.
The debate has been inevitably serious and sombre, but it has been more than that: it has been constructive and it has been determined. I do not propose tonight to go over the ground which was so fully covered by my right hon. Friend this afternoon. His analysis and interpretation have been widely recognised by the House as fair and judicious, and there has been a general desire in the speeches which have followed to support him in keeping the international temperature down, so far as that is possible in this situation. So I shall not attempt to go over the same ground, whether the events of the past three or four weeks, or the wider historical setting in which my right hon. Friend placed this present confrontation.
I think that I am summing up the mood of the House today and the vast majority of speeches—although, as the right hon. Gentleman said, there have been two or three on both sides which have taken a line different from this—when I say that there is no attempt to take sides, either in terms of support, or in terms of condemnation. The whole House feels—and in this I take account of the very serious and constructive approach of so many who have spoken—that, as the right hon. Gentleman has just said, Britain has an important rôle to play in securing peace and in securing an honourable negotiated settlement. I think that it has been recognised throughout the debate that that rôle can best be ful-

filled not on the basis of dramatic declarations but on patient diplomacy, seeking to influence others and, as occasion offers, to influence others to take initiatives which in other circumstances we might have felt it right to take ourselves.
For this reason, and again following my right hon. Friend, while there is a great deal which all of us on this Bench would like to say, as the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman very fairly recognised, there are things which are best not said if we want to get the result which we want.
What we have today is not conflict but confrontation, not a breach of the peace but a deep and dangerous threat to peace. This confrontation and the dangers which it presents are on two levels. As so many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have said, including the Leader of the Opposition, there is first confrontation along hundreds of miles of land frontier between Israel and Arab countries. Aircraft and naval units are in a state of instant readiness. Indeed, one of the great dangers last weekend was the fears of one side of a pre-emptive strike by the other.
Nor is it solely Israel and Egypt, or Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. Arab States which have been deeply divided on ideological grounds and grounds of national interest one with another have suddenly made common cause, burying, for the moment at least, their differences in new-found unity directed against their old enemy, Israel. In some respect—and this adds to the dangers—this confrontation has all the dangers and characteristics of a holy war.
It is not only for that reason that this confrontation is so dangerous. In the past, wars have been threatened and wars have been fought between sovereign States who, recognising one another's existence and recognising one and another's right to exist, nevertheless had deep differences of national interest or imagined national interest, claims on territory, or claims of persecution of ethnic minorities, or whatever it might be, and those feelings have led to war. But the characteristic of this situation is the declared aim of one side not to win concessions from the other. Their demand is that Israel should cease to exist—indeed has never existed.
But there is a still deeper danger which every speaker in the debate has recognised. The Leader of the Opposition—I made the same point outside the House—felt that if we are to seek in any sense an historical analogy—there have been references to Munich, Suez and the rest—that analogy is to be found, not in the events of 1956 or anywhere in the history of the Middle East, but in the Cuba confrontation of 1962. I think that both of us are right in feeling that even that analogy is not complete. The Cuban situation was dramatically described at the time, rightly, as an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation of the two super-Powers. with all the dangers that that confrontation presented of a thermo-nuclear holocaust.
As both the opening speakers and most of those who have followed have made clear today, the statements, commitments and postures of powerful outside countries with a vital interest in the Middle East suggest that a local conflict, disastrous and brutal though that would be, might quickly escalate into a still more tragic war whose consequences could engulf the whole world. But there are, as I think we all recognise, important differences from the Cuba situation—differences on the favourable side. There is, I think, the clear desire and determination on all sides to urge restraint and to prevent the first fatal step from being taken by either side.
No one will doubt the sincerity with which the United States, we ourselves and France have urged the maximum restraint during this past week, whatever provocation might have been thought to exist. Equally, I fully accept—indeed my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was given evidence of this on his visit to Moscow last week—the sincerity of the Soviet Union in desiring and urging restraint at this critical time. Here at least we have common ground which, despite all disappointments—disappointments about the fate of the French President's proposal for four-Power talks—could provide a basis for co-operation and consultation between the four great Powers to help all concerned to work their way towards a negotiated and honourable settlement. We have urged—and I was glad that the Leader of the Opposition supported this today—that the United Nations presents, or might present, the right forum for quadripartite

co-operation of this kind to begin. I am less sure that the right hon. Gentleman was right in suggesting that such co-operation might be more productive or perhaps easier to get off the ground if the aim of the four-Power talks at the United Nations were to be an attack on wider world problems, including, as I suspect he had in mind, dangers in the Far East as well as the Middle East. I should like to feel that this was so and was right.
We for our part have proved that we are as anxious to secure an end to the fighting in Vietnam and to get the parties there to the conference table as we are to prevent fighting in the Middle East and get the parties there to the conference table. We shall continue to pursue peace in Vietnam with all the energy and imagination of which we are capable. Nothing that has happened in the Middle East in the last two or three weeks has made that less urgent. But to widen the area of peace-keeping, as I thought the right hon. Gentleman was perhaps suggesting, might lead to delay in dealing with the desperately critical and urgent situation in the Middle East. Indeed, it might even provide opportunities for delay for those who might welcome them.
While we must hope and feel that we now have a short breathing space—that view has been expressed on both sides today—and while every minute of that short breathing space must be used to work for peace—while that must be our hope—time is certainly not on the side of peace.
That brings us to the other difference from the Cuba situation. Cuba, dangerous though it was—the right hon. Gentleman made the same point this afternoon—was a situation uniquely within the control of the two nuclear protagonists. Either of them had it in its power to call a halt to the actions on the high seas which were bringing war nearer. One could have called the ships back and the other could have dropped the proposals for the quarantine. In the end, it was the supreme statesmanship of both sides, the give and take, which meant that action was taken on both sides and that the danger was averted.
In the Middle East crisis, however, the great Powers which are concerned, and, indeed, who are committed by their statements, are not in complete control


of the situation because the action of countries on the spot, those to whom commitments have been made—on the Arab side, not necessarily one country—or a dangerous border incident coming from either side—either of these things could trigger off conflagration and involve the great Powers.
I want now to turn to what has been the central theme of the debate, as it is the central theme of the danger which we face, and that is the central theme of the search for peace. This is the threat to the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. I say "the threat to the right of innocent passage" because up to this moment the Straits remain open. Hon. Members who have talked of reopening the Straits rather than keeping them open, which, I think, is the right phrase, could perhaps tend to overstate the present position and thereby possibly make a solution just that bit more difficult.
Hon. Member after hon. Member from my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary onwards has stressed that the ten years since the time when Mr. Hammarskjoeld negotiated the settlement that led to the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Sharm el Sheikh area and the debate which followed in the General Assembly in March, 1957, have been years of free movement through the Straits.
Again, and I know that the right hon. Gentleman will not object to my making the point, while that was, as he suggested, partly due to the stationing of the U.N.E.F. force in Sharm el Sheikh, that was not the only reason for continued freedom of passage because, quite apart from what happened to the battery there, as recent events have made plain, shipping could have been interfered with in other ways whoever held the battery, but it was not interfered with.
The position of Her Majesty's Government about the freedom of passage I made clear about a week ago in a speech in the country, and this was repeated by my right hon. Friend this afternoon. It repeated the statement that was made on behalf of Britain in the General Assembly debate ten years ago. It remains our position, and the Government today have been encouraged by the very wide sup-

port given to it by right hon. and hon. Members in all parts of the House.
It is through the United Nations that, in the first instance, we shall seek to secure acceptance of the principle that was laid down. It is through the United Nations that, in the first instance, we shall seek to get effective agreement on the part of all concerned to see that that principle continues to hold good and that the right of the international waterway is maintained.
Here again, I very much agreed with the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire when he expressed agreement with my right hon. Friend that this problem is best looked at, not as a special localised problem, but as part of a much wider internationally-agreed conception of the freedom of passage through international waterways.
Doubts have been thrown this evening on the question of whether there is a legal right of free passage. Those who have the duty of advising Her Majesty's Government in this matter are in no doubt whatever that this is an international waterway, and that the right of free passage for innocent vessels through that waterway does not derive in any sense from the agreement registered by Mr. Hammarskjoeld in 1957, or from anything that was said at the General Assembly in that year, that this right is a right inherent in the situation of the Straits as part of a much wider international agreement. My right hon. Friend made clear that, with the present deep division within the Security Council, there can be no guarantee that a satisfactory arrangement will be concluded and made effective.
Perhaps here I should reply to the point with which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asked me to deal. He took up the words of my right hon. Friend today about what our attitude would be in the event of a failure to secure an equitable settlement. The words which my right hon. Friend used were these:
We could not be satisfied with a situation in which a numerical majority are satisfied with an inequitable settlement which will merely ensure that an Arab-Israel war is inevitable sooner or later".
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether, given such a situation, that implied an intention to use the veto or, if not, what other action might be appropriate.
This is not the right moment at which to anticipate what will happen, and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be unwise and perhaps unhelpful if I were now to try and forecast either the situation which might arise or what the appropriate action might be in any particular circumstances. We might be faced at the Security Council, for example, with a situation where the hopes of an equitable settlement were frustrated by a veto used against such a settlement. We might face a situation where there was a majority in favour but not an adequate majority in terms of the requirements of Security Council procedures. We might face a situation where there was no majority at all. Again, we might face a situation where there was general agreement on a resolution, but on a resolution which did not go far enough to secure the right objective, in which case we should have to try again. That is what my right hon. Friend had in mind.
At this stage, it is impossible also to forecast, whatever present disappointments there have been about the fate of the proposals of the President of France for four-Power talks, what prospects there might be of discussion between the four great Powers in this context, which has been proposed, which so far has fallen on stony ground, but which will be pressed with the very warmest support from Her Majesty's Government.
What my right hon. Friend was urging, with very strong support from all parts of the House, was that, as I have said, time not being on the side of peace, it is our duty to extend our diplomatic activity beyond what we are now trying to do in the Security Council; for example, as he said, by our contacts with other maritime countries which share with us a vital interest in the freedom of the seas.
While, so far as the Security Council is concerned, our position has been made clear in New York and while we shall continue to press it there, above all, I feel that our decision was right to consult with other like-minded nations—and here I am thinking of the maritime nations—about the issuing of a clear declaration by the international maritime community that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and that the Straits of Tiran do provide an inter-

national waterway into which and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. For the same reason as my right hon. Friend said, if our other diplomatic efforts did not produce the desired results and such a declaration of itself failed to secure the right of innocent passage to which we and other maritime nations attach such importance, we should be failing in our duty if we were not now consulting with those concerned about the situation which would then arise and what action would then be appropriate to ensure that the objective which we have in mind is fulfilled.
As to the attitude of the international maritime community to the problem of maintaining freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, we are, of course, in consultation with them. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned a number of those whom he and we might feel would be particularly concerned, but I would like to remind the House, as my right hon. Friend did this afternoon, of the very clear declarations made by practically the whole international maritime community when the matter was debated in the General Assembly on 1st March, 1957.
The statement of the representative of Her Majesty's then Government has been repeated a number of times today, and I shall not weary the House with it again. There was the statement of the United States Government, and indeed the public declaration of the then President of the United States, which was quoted in the General Assembly. There was the statement of the French Government, which I think puts this so clearly that it would be right to remind the House that it said:
The French Government considers that the Gulf of Aqaba, by reason partly of its breadth and partly of the fact that its shores belong to four different States, constitutes international waters. Consequently it believes that, in conformity with international law, freedom of navigation should be ensured in the Gulf through the Straits which give access to it. In these circumstances no nation has the right to prevent the free and innocent passage of ships, whatever their nationality or type.
The representative of Italy said:
As far, in particular, as free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran are concerned, I do not need to restate here that we consider that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and that no nation has a right to prevent free and innocent


passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits giving access thereto.
The Netherlands Government said that they were
in full agreement with the statements made by Israel, the United States, France and a number of other countries to the effect that passage through the Straits of Tiran should be free, open and unhindered for the ships of all nations.
The Australian representative said:
Let me now turn to the issue of the Gulf of Aqaba. In this case, we have a gulf of importance to the commerce and shipping of at least two States—Israel and Jordan—and bounded by the territories of four States, Israel Jordan, South Arabia and Egypt. I think no one could fairly deny that the Gulf of Aqaba is part of the seas where the principle of the freedom of maritime communication applies—a principle"—
the Australian delegate went on to say
which the International Court of Justice, in its judgment of 9 April, 1949 on the Corfu Channel case characterised as one of 'certain general and well-recognised principles'.
I think that that is what the right hon. Gentleman had in mind a few moments ago.
The New Zealand Government, Norway, Denmark—I could go on, but I do not intend to weary the House because the whole world maritime community was saying these very things in 1957. I think it is therefore right, and it seems to enjoy the support of the House as a whole, that we should be working with the rest of the world maritime community to secure a declaration of the kind to which my right hon. Friend referred this afternoon.
The House will not expect me to say more about what we will do, or what we feel it will be right to do, if, first, action through the Security Council proves ineffective, or the mere issuing of a declaration fails to maintain the freedom of passage through these Straits. All of us here recognise that time is not on our side, and I think it is recognised that one of the significant facts which has so far prevented action of a kind which could have escalated in a way which we all know it could, indeed one of the significant facts which I believe last weekend prevented such action being taken, with all the dread consequences which would have followed, has been the assertion of the obvious concern of ourselves and other maritime nations about the continued right of free passage

through this as through other international waterways, and I think it right to say to the House that if this concern had not been expressed as strongly as it has been, it is very doubtful whether there would have been sufficient confidence last weekend to have averted what might have become a general conflagration.
Because of that, and because of the concern which has been expressed so clearly, time is not on our side in working out the necessary arrangements. We may have a few weeks, as the right hon. Gentleman said, or even a month or two. None of us can be certain about that. Therefore, I believe that we have a very strong sense of urgency, and I believe that the House appreciates that sense of urgency.
As my right hon. Friend made clear and as has been said by hon. Members on both sides of the House, we shall do everything in our power to secure the effective presence of an appropriate United Nations agency or agencies to help maintain the peace in the area. As we all recognise and have said, they did so successfully in the past. It would be wrong at this stage to speculate about the precise duties which will be assigned to such a United Nations presence, but certainly, as has again been said by hon. Members on both sides, we are right to press that Israel as well as the Arab countries must accept a United Nations presence on their soil.
When the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition made his comments on the precipitate decision to withdraw United Nations peacekeeping force and, indeed, when the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire said what he did in pretty strong terms about the precipitate withdrawal and the acceptance, without consultation, of that demand, I believe that what they said was absolutely right, and we fully support their account and their criticism of this decision.
The Leader of the Opposition asked what possible consequences or implications this might have for Cyprus. I will come to that in detail in a moment. I certainly agree with the implication contained in a number of speeches, including that of the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, that this


decision could have very far-reaching consequences for the United Nations as a whole, in a wider sphere, if we are not able in a very short time to repair the damage that has been done—and damage has been done, and it was done very much against the very strong pressure and insistence of the British delegation there, which wanted to have full consultation in the way the right hon. Gentleman suggested.
This situation has no bearing on the circumstances in which the Cyprus peace-keeping operation was set up. That was set up not by the General Assembly but, as the right hon. Gentleman remembers very well, by a Security Council resolution which requires a confirming resolution every six months. We are the major contributors to that force, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, and even if no more were done on such an occasion than was done in the case of the Sinai force we should have the right of consultation there, because there were some informal consultations with the countries who had troops in Sinai.
But this is not the point here, because if the Government of Cyprus requested that the forces be withdrawn Britain could and should demand that the question be debated by the Security Council, because the Security Council set it up and also because such a withdrawal of that force would be rightly regarded—indeed, this has been underlined by the events of the last two or three weeks—as a major threat to peace. We could therefore ourselves request, and would request, a meeting of the Security Council. Therefore, in terms of a parallel between the two cases, the unfortunate and regrettable decision in the case of Sinai has no governing influence on what would happen in the case of Cyprus.
The right hon. Gentleman criticised this withdrawal, but it was not only Britain; other countries were with us in pressing that there should be full consultation and a full generalised discussion by those whose authority it was and under whose authority the original force had been sent out. Here I think particularly of Canada, whose forces have co-operated in maintaining this lonely vigil for these many years.
To sum up, I feel that this debate has been undeniably useful, not only in stat-

ing the views of the great majority of hon. Members—and I believe that they are the views of the great majority of hon. Members—but also in helping to emphasise, from a vastly confused and tortured situation, those issues to which Her Majesty's Government and all others who are concerned in the search for peace should now give priority.
I emphasise again that we are not concerned in this debate or in the actions which follow—and I think the House is not concerned—with taking sides or apportioning blame. However visionary this may seem in such a dangerous situation, what we must seek to do is not only to avoid the dangers of a tragic war, which would be tragic enough in all conscience even if confined to those who now only glower at one another across Middle Eastern frontiers. Many of us here who have visited one or another of many Middle Eastern countries in recent years can imagine the tragedy of the destruction that would follow, not only in loss of life but of treasured possessions and buildings and historic treasures of the countries in question.
Even if so limited, it would be tragic enough, but, as we have all emphasised, it is the danger of a war more horrible because of the dangers of escalation. Visionary as I have called it and visionary though it may seem, what we must seek to do in this situation is not merely to avoid war but to create the conditions of peace. A number of hon. Members have made their contribution to what we call conditions for a lasting peace rather than concentrating on things which must be done urgently to stop war breaking out.
One condition of a lasting peace must be the recognition that Israel has the right to live. As my hon. Friend reminded us, it has been for nearly twenty years a member country of the United Nations, entitled to the respect and protection of the United Nations. Whatever the bitterness that rules today, there are wise men in Israel and there are wise men in Arab countries, however difficult it may be for them to become articulate, who recognise not only the need for coexistence but also the immense opportunities for peaceful co-operation which exist once man-made barriers, based on primeval hostility, can be broken down.
There are some, we know, in Arab countries who argue that with all the


poverty and hunger in the Middle East, poverty which there is still, despite the new but inequitably shared riches which oil has brought, and which is still the lot of the great majority of people in the Middle East, the cutting off of an initially fertile area and its designation as a home for large numbers of refugees from vast areas of the world is a provocative act and one which inevitably condemns the rest of the area to continued poverty.
But this is entirely to misconceive the problem of poverty in the Middle East. Wise men, Arabs and Jews alike, conscious of what has been achieved in this small country, which is one of the classic prototypes of successful economic development, conscious of what has been done particularly in irrigation and the transformation of desert into fertile areas, these men know how much could be achieved in a total Middle Eastern war on poverty and hunger if political differences could be set aside.
Commonwealth and other countries in Africa and Asia have good reason to know what Israeli technical assistance means, based as it is not on the expertise of an established advanced industrial country, with all the irrelevances which are sometimes provided in the form of technical assistance from advanced countries, but on their own recent experience in developing a primitive and under-developed area. They have come through this way, and they have made mistakes. They know

what mistakes to avoid. But they have also had tremendous successes.
The tragedy for the Middle East is not that the Israelis are occupying a small part of the vast cultivable area; it is that political hostilities on both sides and, above all, perhaps the wasteful deployment on both sides on arms and military expenditure of a prodigious amount—a scale that cannot be afforded—of resources which should be devoted to economic developments, it is these things, the continuing bitter hostility and this wasteful use of resources on arms one against another which has stood in the way of the economic and social development of millions upon millions of people.
In putting on record my feeling about the constructive way in which the whole House has approached this debate, I feel that it is right to interpret this debate as a mandate to Her Majesty's Government by every means in our power to continue with all who are working with us in the search for peace, as we are working with them, but in a wider sense, to use this opportunity today, if opportunity be given, having peered into the abyss as we have, to turn the threat of military war into the reality of total war in the Middle East against man's most ancient enemies of poverty, hunger and disease.

Mr. Harry Gourlay (Lord Commissioner of the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Orders of the Day — FINANCE (No.2) BILL

Committee deferred till Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — PROCEDURE

Mr. Derek Page discharged from the Select Committee on Procedure; Mr. David Marquand added.—[Mr. Gourlay.]

Orders of the Day — OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAMME

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Gourlay.]

9.28 p.m.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: I rise to call attention to the need for a national programme of marine science and technology. For a maritime country without raw materials to have one ex-Minister and one Minister—I do not know where he is at the moment; I am sure that he will arrive immediately-discussing this matter for half an hour scarcely describes the level of urgency which faces us in these matters. During the next 50 years these matters will have to be faced, with the world's population trebling, for we are in danger, to use the words of Aneurin Bevan, of watching ourselves starve to death through our television sets.
With the extraction and extinction of more and more land-based materials, we are faced with a problem to which there is as yet no satisfactory answer. In debating the exploitation of the oceans, I trust that this is a subject which one day will merit a full debate of the House rather than a short exchange at the end of a long and interesting day's work. I warn the Government that this is my first shot in this matter; that I will return and that I will go on pressing until we have a national programme which is worthy of our needs.
The contentions I put forward are simple. They are, first, that there is no evident Ministerial direction of our oceanic, scientific and technological programme. In the United States one knows precisely who to address politically. It would be Vice-President Humphries, and with him on his council would be five senior Cabinet Ministers directly respon-

sible for the United States' exploitation of the sea.
With great respect to the hon. Gentleman the Minister of State, Department of Education and Science, for whom I have a great personal regard, I do not believe that anyone in the country knows that he is responsible for these matters.
Secondly, although in our oceanographical research—

It being half-past Nine o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Goronwy Roberts.]

Mr. Fraser: Secondly, although in our oceanographical research individual British scientists and establishments are pre-eminent, and world pre-eminent, there is simply not enough money to meet requirements. Thirdly, lacking these resources, whatever their individual excellence our maritime scientific programmes lack coherent pattern. Fourthly, even if priorities and resources were to be available, the machine and system of committees set up by this and previous Governments would be inadequate to the modern task.
Fifthly, the present set up is neither powerful enough to resist depredations on the world's ecology which, alas, are too often swiftly accepted by national and international bodies nor widely enough based to initiate major acts of international association in the marine sciences. Sixthly, the present bias of our research is too scientific and academic and not sufficiently technologically orientated.
Seventhly, there are no guide lines, and there cannot be, without a national programme which industry can understand and along which it can make its own potential involvement in research and activity. Eighthly—and I apologise to the Minister for this long list—it is only in a publicised national programme that our people can feel involved and associated in a vital and exciting exploitation of national resources, and be made eager to contribute by hand, by brain and by personal investment.
Considering the immediate and main potential of the sea for protein production


—the whole range of amino-acids; considering its possibilities as an area of mineral extraction, whether by mechanical or chemical means; considering its obvious use for fresh water manufacture through desalination processes; and considering the new era in weather prediction made possible by the measurement of the ocean currents, our present set-up and the funds available are simply inadequate—and grossly so.
Already, we are seeing the first fruits of the new technologies: oil from four continental shelves, gas from our own North Sea, gravel from our own eastern sea shelf, sulphur off the American coasts, the possibilities of tin off the coast of Cornwall, the exploitation of diamonds off South-West Africa, Japan's hundredfold increase in mollusc production. These are but the beginnings of the application of this new scientific research and these new technologies. Yet, as a nation, we are singularly little involved, and this is what should worry the House and the country tonight.
It is disconcerting to find that in spite of our own Middle East and Far Eastern oil experience, the pipe lines, rigs and lines, inspections in the North Sea are largely in the hands of North American operating companies. It is even more disturbing to find that some of the inventions of our own excellent Institute of Oceanography are not marketed in this country, but are manufactured and sold in the United States of America. Who is to blame? Is it the timid industrialist? It is sad that Royal Dutch Shell should have concentrated its submarine division work in Italy. Or is it that the Government are unwilling to finance research technology and education and to spearhead what is amounting to, or could amount to, a new industrial revolution?
It is proper to make some comparisons between what the United States Government and our Government are doing in marine science and technology. At the most, including £5 million on work for the Admiralty, we are spending £10 million a year. The United States Government, in 1968, will be spending the best part of £200 million. That is including their civil and military development. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) will know, civil work and work for

the Admiralty are difficult to separate. Many advantages in the marine warfare field have their application in civil engineering.
In the United Kingdom, at the most we have 40 industrial firms involved to some extent in the exploitation of the oceans and so far as I know not one has received any major grant from the Ministry of Technology. In the United States at present at least 2,000 firms are active, many of them with their own research programmes. In this country, apart from one submersible being built for the British company, Underwater Marine Group, no publicised British marine vehicle is available either for Government or industry.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Does the amount mentioned by my hon. Friend include money spent by the 40 industrial firms to which he referred?

Mr. Fraser: No this is Government expenditure through various Departments. In France, Japan, and, above all, in the United States of America, a large range of scientific and industrial underwate craft are built or being built. Although there has been a welcome increase in the number of small British oceanograph-ical surface vessels, we have no capacity to compete with the United States or the U.S.S.R. in sub-polar projects. Academically, although there has been some progress in recruitment—a scholarship here and there—clearly our cadres of marine scientists and technologists are inadequate.
In 1966, special American legislation was passed to double the contribution of America's academic institutions to the science of the seas. It is not the fault of our institutions, or our marine laboratories, or of their academic standards—these are among the highest in the world—but it is a question of money, priority and direction.
My first proposal is an extremely simple one. If the Government are unable to find funds to make this critical and crucial investment, I believe that with the development of the North Sea, from which the Government will derive royalties, I am informed, of at least between £100 million and £150 million a year, at least 10 per cent. of those royalties should be put into scientific and technological marine research. This is the


absolutely minimum type of investment which the Government should make. I suggest that that should be a minimum.
Next, I come to the question of the Government machine. Frankly ever since the present Government abandoned the concept of a Ministry of Land and Natural Resources there has been confusion in the setting out of a national programme. It may be that the oceanographic policy of the United States is too high-powered; it may be that it is not a good thing to have too many vice-presidents of one's country or too many Cabinet Ministers around. That may well be. It may be that the French system is over-centralised, as is the German system.
This may well be true, but here we have a situation which is palpably absurd—a Ministry and a Minister weighed down by the daily considerations of administering a vast educational system, permanently short of money, and yet having put upon them this responsibility for our national protection and for the development of these national resources. I really think—I am sure that the hon. Gentleman must agree—that this is the wrong place for this responsibility to be.
Let us just look at the system which he has now. He is advised on these matters by a central scientific committee; and there are scores of other problems right across the field. Of course, he has devolved many of these powers and some of the scarce money which is available to him to two sub-committees of the National Environmental Research Council, that is to say, the sub-committees dealing with oceanography and geology. Very good work is done by both those committees. Excellent men sit upon them. but if we compare this sort of organisation with the sort of organisation for these projects in the United States and the Soviet Union, or even in France, then it is a pitiable piece of organisation.
At the head of these institutions are men like Professor Lighthill and Dr. Deacon, of the International Institute of Oceanography. They are men of the very highest calibre, but it is impossible for these people without the finance and the necessary bridging operations, involving so many other Ministries and so many other departments, to have the necessary weight of authority.
I really believe, therefore, that the Government having had a look at it themselves, and having, after two and a half years, found only this type of system which today is totally inadequate, should now allow someone else to have a look. I would suggest—it is my second suggestion—as a matter of urgent and vital importance, that the Prime Minister should set up a joint Government and industrial committee to report back to him and to this House the outlines and parameters of a national programme for the exploitation of the seas, with suitable authorities, agencies, and finance for its implementation.
I would suggest further that this task should be undertaken by someone outside the present Government, with all the burdens of their individual jobs. I myself believe that it should be undertaken by someone who has had a major connection with the naval forces of this country. I can think of many names. I can think of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten. I can think of other names, too. I can think of other names, like Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, both a brilliant sailor, and now Bursar of University College. I can think of Admiral Sir Edmund Irving, ex-Hydrographer to the Navy, and of Earl Jellicoe, men of great intellectual capacity.
I believe that men of this type, aided by the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government himself, backed by the C.B.I., and by the resources of men like Professor Lighthill and Dr. Deacon, should be entrusted with this work of adjudging the problems, and the necessary responses, which the Government should then undertake and push through. These men could attempt such an action. I believe that they should be asked to do so.
Time is pressing. The world is moving industrially at a fantastic pace. This country has the men of skill. We have the resources, because, after all, this is not like a space programme costing £2,000 million a year. This is a programme which could be limited to scores, rather than thousands, of millions of pounds. Above all, this is an exciting and an essential area of national activity.
It is even more than this. Such a programme would not only be in our best maritime tradition. With the skills here available, we have the possibility of


making further contributions to the well-being of all mankind; for, looking ahead, it is only through man's mastery of his environment that mankind will continue, if a little precariously, to inherit the earth.

9.46 p.m.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: With no prepared speech, I should like in about two minutes to support what my right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) has said in raising this vitally important subject. There are two distinct aspects of it. There is the defence aspect. There is also the aspect of peaceful purposes, for which further research in oceanography is most desperately needed.
We must always remember a basic fact about these islands. In peacetime we import about 2½ million tons every week of the year. Therefore, from the defence point of view the greatest possible danger to our existence in war lies in the possibility of U-boat attack on our trade.
It is not generally known that the word "Asdic", which means a great deal to anybody who has been connected with the Royal Navy, comes from "Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee". It dates from 1923, since when it has been a top priority project, in so far as money was available, for the Royal Navy.
Again, anybody who has been concerned with the problem of detecting submarines knows what an intensely frustrating job it is and how little we know about sea conditions, which vary with temperature, with weather, with the time of the year, and even with the time of day. Extraordinarily little is known about these conditions. However much we spend upon immensely sophisticated equipment to seek out and be ready to destroy U-boats which are such a threat to us, we are constantly defeated by our lack of knowledge of what actually goes on beneath the surface of the sea.
Another point on the defence side is that even the British Admiralty charts, which have been famous through the centuries, are inadequate for the high-performance nuclear submarines with which the navies of the world are arming themselves today.
As regards the peacetime application of this knowledge, my right hon. Friend has mentioned fish farming, food and minerals, and the extent to which these can solve the problems of the world.
I would end by urging, on much the same lines as my right hon. Friend did, that this country should take a conscious decision not to enter into the first league with a space programme, because many of us doubt how far we can get in the way of an outer space programme with our existing resources, but that we should, instead, go along with a programme for which our history so well fits us—a programme of oceanographic investigation, in which we could, and should, lead the world.

9.48 p.m

The Minister of State, Department of Education and Science (Mr. Goronwy Roberts): May I first apologise to the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser). As he saw, I mistimed the precise point at which the House would propose the Adjournment, and the right hon. Gentleman has had, I am very glad to say, a few extra minutes in which to deploy his argument. He has made his points in the very responsible and substantial manner that I, and I am sure the whole House, expect of him. He has asked a number of very important questions about a scientific field which is of growing importance. If I have insufficient time to address myself to every point which the right hon. Gentleman raised, he may rest assured that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I will most carefully examine what he said when his speech is reported in HANSARD tomorrow.
The right hon. Gentleman wishes to see established what can only be an entirely new body responsible for the co-ordination of effort in marine science, and this view was echoed by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles). It is not necessary for me to remind the right hon. Gentleman that the Natural Environment Research Council already has a very strong Committee, the Oceanography and Fisheries Committee, under the chairmanship of Professor Lighthill, a distinguished scientist in this field and the type of independent chairman which the right hon. Gentleman and I would


wish to see presiding over this important Committee.
The Committee comprises a wide range of scientists of the highest repute, together with representatives of such activities as the fishing industry, the oil industry and the British Ship Research Association. It includes in its membership the research directors of the marine laboratories of both fisheries Departments and the Council. It includes, also, the Hydrographer of the Navy, a member of the office of the Chief Scientist (Navy Department) and the former chief geologist of British Petroleum.
In this way, there is full consultation and increasing co-ordination of effort in this most important field. Moreover, through being in the N.E.R.C., the Committee maintains the closest links with its sister Committee on Geology and Geophysics, such links being essential if the proper development of the resources of the sea floor and sea bed is to be achieved.
So far, the Oceanography and Fisheries Committee has been particularly involved in assessing the economic potential of the marine environment and its resources. It endeavours to co-ordinate research and to select growing points in relation to the possible economic benefits which could accrue.
I cannot deal with matters of defence, as, no doubt, the right hon. Gentleman will understand. That aspect of the matter ought to be dealt with separately by the Minister directly concerned. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman, nevertheless, that on the Oceanography and Fisheries Committee the Defence point of view and the effort which that Department contributes are made known, as appropriate, and there are exchanges and comparisons of the various Departmental and other efforts, so that the Committee does co-ordinate civil and, to some extent, defence research in this field.
The Committee has decided that the question of winning sand and gravel from the sea is a matter worthy of more consideration, and it has, therefore, recommended that surveying for new marine resources of sand and gravel should be undertaken and further knowledge gained of the effects on the marine environment of extracting these materials.
It has also assessed the possible benefit that research on currents and waves might have in improving ship design and ship routing and has seen to it that such basic work as is essential to our understanding of waves and currents is in no way hampered through having insufficient resources for its successful prosecution. I shall return to that matter in a moment, as the right hon. Gentleman made a point of what he deemed to be inadequacy of financial resources.
The Council has already commissioned one new research ship, the "John Murray", primarily for the use of university scientists studying the sea floor, and it has plans for further research ships well advanced. It is fair to say—and I emphasise this—that so far, no major project which the Oceanography and Fisheries Committee has recommended to the Natural Environment Research Council as worthy of support on the grounds of scientific opportunity and economic benefit has been hampered through lack of funds. In fact, the body set up to oversee oceanographic research, the N.E.R.C, has given priority to oceanography over many of its other interests.
I hope that what I have said so far has indicated that the machinery is as wide and as comprehensive as possible. If any hon. Member has suggestions to make as to how we might strengthen it, possibly by increased representation from industry, although industrial representation is already very strong, he is most welcome to do so and we will give such suggestions the closest attention. I must repeat, however, that the present system has only been in being for some two years. So far it has worked very well, coordination is increasing and it would be ill-advised to effect any radical change at the present time.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: How often does it meet?

Mr. Roberts: I cannot say without notice but it has continuously met over the last two years.
If there is any truth in the suggestion that we have not been pursuing the development of oceanographic research as fast as we might, it can only be justified on the basis that we have not made the fullest use of our resources of manpower


—that is, skilled technicians and highly-trained physical scientists. But the programme being pursued is resulting in the recruitment of this kind of research worker as fast as is possible.
There has lately been considerable and increasing general interest in the exploitation of the sea and the sea bed, although it has not so far proved easy to identify specific projects which appear to be technologically possible and economically encouraging. Accordingly, in 1966, the Ministry of Technology asked the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority at Harwell, as its agent, to begin a review of current activities in this field and possible new initiatives. As part of this review, Harwell suggested holding a conference as a convenient way of providing a forum at which representatives of industry, the universities, Government bodies and other organisations could discuss their ideas.
This conference, which took place early in April, has proved valuable in this respect and is to be regarded as one of the steps in the review of this subject and future possibilities which the Ministry of Technology has in hand. The part to be played ultimately by Harwell—and I know that the right hon. Gentleman is interested in this point—as agents of the Ministry of Technology in continuing economic and technical assessments as a preliminary to the establishment of a national technological programme is under continuous consideration.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the American system, suggesting that it

has produced perhaps a more coherent national programme than exists here. I ask him to examine carefully the procedures that exist in the United States, where a much greater number of private, federal and state organisations conduct programmes of research into various aspects of oceanography. There is no one organisation that has as much effective responsibility over the whole field of oceanography as has our own N.E.R.C. The Inter-agency Committee on Oceanography in the United States has no budget of its own for support of oceanography. Funds are disposed of by the various agencies, whose control of programmes remains with them and who can accept or reject the programmes approved by the Inter-agency Committee.
The right hon. Gentleman suggested that we might create a new oceanographic organisation. This would, of course, involve dismantling the existing one. It would break up N.E.R.C. and lose all the benefits gained from having oceanography as an integral part of the environmental sciences. I also suggest to him that it would confuse and complicate Departmental responsibilities, including, possibly, defence. Should we not rather build upon the structure already existing in N.E.R.C, encourage it to expand—

The Question having been proposed at half-past Nine o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at Ten o'clock.